

POLICY PAPER

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The policy paper is prepared by the Centre for Global Studies "Strategy XXI" in the framework of the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea region through Greater Involvement of Non-Governmental Players" with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States¹.



Policy paper

Trends of the security situation in the Black Sea region

(by July 2020)

Since 2014, when Russia occupied and illegally annexed Crimea, and invaded and occupied eastern Ukraine, the Black Sea region has become less stable. The current formats of regional cooperation and international law do not guarantee security anymore. The situation is becoming increasingly unpredictable. In addition to the constant militarization of Crimea, the Azov and Black Sea regions, the Russian Federation is producing new threats, both military and non-military (economic, energy, transport, infrastructure, etc.) ones. A vivid example was the Kerch Bridge, which was built under the slogan of meeting needs of the population in occupied Crimea, but it became an instrument of taking the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov under illegal Russian control that led to increased Russian dominance in the Azov-Black Sea area.

There are also other security challenges in the Black Sea region, such as the TurkStream project, increased Russian subversive information and cultural activities in Bulgaria, propaganda, interference in the internal affairs of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, "unplanned" Russian military exercises, and the closure of naval areas, etc. All these issues justify the constant monitoring of the situation in the region with the involvement of both governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations. For the last year, the expert group, including representatives of all Black Sea countries, has carried out such monitoring. Based on it, the Center for Global Studies "Strategy XXI" has summarized the main trends and informed key

stakeholders about new challenges, threats and signs of deterioration of the security situation in the Black Sea region, that was carried out within the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea region through Greater Engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations", supported by the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation. Summarized conclusions and recommendations are set out in this policy paper.

1. General assessment of the security situation in the Black Sea region

The Russian Federation is implementing its strategy of dominance in the Azov - Black Sea region. Taking advantage of the inactivity of the West in the period after the aggression against Georgia in 2008 till 2014, Russia achieved full control over the eastern sector of the Black Sea, and, after the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, it has expanded its zone of *de facto* dominance to the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Strait and the central and northwestern sectors of the Black Sea.

The occupation of Crimea was strategically important for Russia: the Russian troops on the Peninsula were doubled, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet received 20 new combat ships (including three frigates, six submarines, and missile boats). At the end of 2019, the total volley of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with missile weapons amounted to more than 80 tons, including 40 tons at the distance of 1,400 km and more. Experts talk that Russia is ousting "rivals" from the Black Sea and gaining dominance there. At the same time, the

¹ The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Black Sea Trust or its partners.

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Black Sea countries, which are NATO members, focus their main security efforts on defending their territories.

At the seventh year of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, part of Luhansk and Donetsk regions (7% of the territory of Ukraine) remain occupied. Although Putin's Novorossiia project has failed, the Kremlin has not given up on its aggressive plans to annex Ukraine, and it is trying to disguise them under the protection of its compatriots in a situation of a "civil war" in Ukraine. However, such actions by Russia are becoming increasingly counterproductive, as the international community is increasingly recognizing the guilt of Russia for this conflict and destabilization of the Black Sea region.

NATO, which is the only organization capable to resist Russia's hybrid aggression, is constantly targeted by the Kremlin. However, Europe's slipping into war can only be stopped by collective actions to force the aggressor to peace. By this time, this is possible with non-military means. However, this will not always be possible. Reconciliation or capitulation can only lead to the increased appetite of the Putin regime and its further aggression. False assessments that Russia was not able to withstand two wars at once - against Ukraine and in Syria, have led to the fact of the growing Russian military presence in Libya, Venezuela and Central Africa.

Tensions continue to rise in the Black Sea region. Concern is caused by the strategic exercise Caucasus 2020, scheduled for September, which may precede the next stage of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine. Continuous exercises of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Black Sea at the tactical level indicate its preparation for the blockade of the Ukrainian coast by striking at Ukrainian strategic objects, and sea and air landings on the Ukrainian coast. One of the Kremlin's goals is Dnipro water from the North Crimean Canal for Crimea, degraded under Russian occupation.

After the so-called "constitutional referendum" on the "re-loading" of power in Russia, the internal situation is increasingly destabilized. Falling of Russians' incomes, unpopular pension reform, ineffective government actions to combat the coronavirus pandemic, restrictions of the rights of federal subjects, protesting reaction in the regions of Russia, the burden of participation in the Kremlin's military adventures abroad undermine sharply the regime and personally Putin. One of the means of salvation for the Kremlin is the rise of foreign policy tensions through possible expansion of armed aggression against Ukraine, annexation of Belarus, final de-Europeanization and dependence of Moldova, separation of northern regions of Kazakhstan, and invasion of the Baltics. This is despite the fact that Putin's Russia is now a boiling cauldron of growing internal tensions, where the North Caucasus, the Far East, the Urals and Siberia have different worldviews from Moscow ones.

The "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Restraint", signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 2, 2020, neglect the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and demonstrate the Kremlin's readiness to escalate international tensions and create an additional intimidation effect for European countries. In fact, Russia sends them a message that they are the primary targets for the Russian "preventive" nuclear attacks. The Kremlin expects that, in the case of a nuclear strike on a non-NATO country, the United States will restrictedly react with political and diplomatic measures and possible sanctions but will not use the nuclear weapons in response.

At the same time, Moscow is constantly appealing to the West to lift sanctions, referring to the coronavirus pandemic. However, the real reason is Russia's entry into a severe economic crisis due to a sharp fall of oil prices, the collapse of the Russian ruble and the COVID-19 pandemic, the real state of which is carefully concealed. Russia's external aggression, especially in the Black Sea region, may be aimed at diverting attention from domestic problems and putting pressure on Western countries to lift sanctions.

2. Challenges, threats, and signs of deteriorating of the security situation in the region

Military-political domain

By occupying Crimea and its infrastructure, and building new infrastructure (including the Kerch Bridge, the TurkStream, etc.), Russia is expanding its controlled space with an ultimate goal of turning the Black Sea into a region of Russian influence. According to the Kremlin, this should create a basis for further advance of Russia to the West as far as it has necessary forces and resources, and as far as it is allowed.

The purpose of the Russian Fleet's actions in the Black Sea is to form a "habitual" perception that the entire Black Sea is Russia's area of influence. In addition to the deliberate destabilization of the situation in eastern Ukraine, a deep concern is caused by Russia's *de facto* blockade of the Sea of Azov and the northern part of the Black Sea, the creation of A2/AD (Anti Access / Area Denial) areas, and security challenges to communication lines that traditionally cross the region and are important for trade, economic development and co-operation. The tactics of establishing A2/AD areas through navigation restrictions have been widely used. The latest example is the "war of exercises" in the north-western sector of the Black Sea where Russia closed sea zones for firing (Russia has used to close sea zones, which were partly closed by Ukraine before for international exercises). In such a way Russia tries to prevent / hinder international exercises by blocking some areas of the sea like it was during the multilateral exercises Sea Breeze in 2019 and 2020. In 2019, Russia almost completely blocked the eastern part of the Black Sea from Sochi to Turkey to obstruct the Georgian-American exercise Agile Spirit-2019. Such actions have become a new form of demonstration of Russia's dominance in the region.

At the same time, the dominance in the Black Sea region is not a final goal for Russia. The region is only a springboard for the exit to the Mediterranean region and strengthening of Russia's presence there. But Russia cannot advance into the Mediterranean without a firm foothold in the Black Sea. Therefore, the Russian Maritime Doctrine states: "In the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, the basis of

the national maritime policy is the accelerated restoration and comprehensive strengthening of the strategic positions of the Russian Federation." Development of NATO's infrastructure is described as the key challenge for Russia in this document. The posed by the Kremlin threat - NATO's advance to the East, to Russia's borders, is far-fetched, because Russia has long bordered the Alliance - Norway, the Baltic States, and Poland. The Allies' naval forces have long been in the Black Sea - Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, but no threats to the Russian national security have been noticed.

Numerous unresolved conflicts in the Black Sea region are a way for the Kremlin to put pressure on independent countries. At the same time, they are increasingly becoming a challenge for Russia itself, as the occupied by Russia regions need additional resources from the Russian budget and have become a source of crime, which penetrates into Russian territory.


Military dimension

The period from late summer to early autumn 2020 is marked in the Russian military calendar by unprecedented large-scale exercises Caucasus 2020, maneuvers of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the occupation forces in Crimea. But even earlier, on July 19, 2020, the troops of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces, located in the Russian territory close to the Black Sea coast and on the occupied by Russia Crimean Peninsula, were put on alert, went to their destination areas and held exercises. At the same time, additional Russian air defense forces were deployed along Ukraine's southeastern borders. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine called those military actions of the Russian Federation a "threat of force."

On July 20, Vladimir Putin illegally visited occupied Crimea, where he took part in the ceremony of the start of building of two new landing ships (in violation of international law) at the captured Kerch shipyard *Zatoka* that confirmed Russia's goals to militarize the Black Sea region. In addition, in 2020, it is planned to form 20 crews to new ships, which are to be constructed. By the end of the year, 16 warships and support vessels are expected to arrive to the Fleet. The fleet aviation continues to practically familiarize helicopters like Ka-27M, Ka-27TB and Ka-31R.



Russian formations along the Ukraine's borders



Source: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/3055672-1100-rosijskih-tankiv-i-330-bojovih-litakiv-uzdovz-kordonu-z-ukrainou.html>


In occupied Crimea, Russia has created a self-sufficient military formation, numbering more than 32.5 thousand soldiers, equipped the fleet with new combat ships and submarines with cruise missiles *Caliber*. Now the Black Sea Fleet is able to fully control most of the Black Sea, redeploy quickly its forward units of marines and special forces to the South Caucasus or Ukraine. At the same time, Russia increases its sonar reconnaissance facilities by placing them on the infrastructure of the Blue Stream and TurkStream gas pipelines. Russia also tests its military underwater robotic systems that will practically lead to full control of underwater space in the Black Sea. In such a way, the Russian Federation creates secretly a new underwater threat, prepares the underwater bridgehead as an element of total control over the Black Sea for future confrontation under water.

It is obvious that bringing of Russian troops into combat readiness was one of the ways of the Rus-

sian Federation's reaction to the annual international exercises Sea Breeze 2020, which were held from July 20 to July 26, 2020. More than 2,000 people, 20 ships, aircraft and helicopters from 9 countries - Ukraine, the USA, Bulgaria, Georgia, Norway, France, Romania, Spain and Turkey, took part in them. These exercises are deterrent to Russia's expansion, and therefore they are under Russia's attention. For example, this year, during the Sea Breeze 2020 exercises, the Russian Federation announced closed several sea areas that overlapped with the exercises' areas. In addition to traditional surveillance, Russian warships committed several provocations against Bulgarian and Spanish ships.

In order to deter Russian aggression, on May 29, 2020, two US *B-1B Lancer* aircraft flew from Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota (USA) to Europe via Poland, Ukraine, the Black Sea and Turkey, demonstrating that the Baltic - Black Sea

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Source: <https://www.blackseanews.net/read/166172>

(Areas marked green - closed by Romania, pink - by Turkey, with yellow lines – by Ukraine, green lines - by Bulgaria, red lines - by Russia).

countries are in the sphere of strategic interests of the United States. In addition, on June 12, 2020, on the Day of Russia, NATO recognized Ukraine as an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. Ukraine also expects the arrival of American *Mark VI* patrol boats and a new batch of *Javelin* anti-tank missiles.

Economic sphere

Russia's *de facto* blockade of the Sea of Azov is accompanied by constant stops of Ukrainian and foreign ships going to Ukrainian Azov ports. This causes damage to Ukrainian ports (primarily the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk). For example, the port of Mariupol in 2019 was forced to move to a four-day working week, and its losses were calculated from 15 to 50 thousand dollars per day. At the same time, the Kerch Bridge, built by Russia in violation of international law (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982), hinders Ukraine's economic development by limiting the size of ships that may enter Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. The consequences of such actions are losses of Ukrainian and foreign shipowners, deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the Ukrainian Azov region that negatively affects the internal situation there.

Security of navigation

Obstruction by the Russian Federation of freedom of navigation in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov remains a serious problem. The threat of imposing an "Azov package of international sanctions" on Russia in response to Russian attacks against Ukrainian ships in November 2018 reduced the duration of ship delays, which was recorded in January-July 2019, but in the second half of 2019, because of the absence of sanctions, Russia resumed blocking passages through the Kerch Strait. In the first half of 2020, the average duration of artificial delays decreased due to the coronavirus pandemic and Russia's desire to lift Western sanctions.

On July 1, 2020, rail cargo traffic on the Kerch Bridge began, and the Russian side applied the practice of temporarily blocking the movement of ships through the Kerch Strait. For example, on July 2, the traffic through the Strait was blocked for five hours, due to the transfer of dangerous military cargo on the Kerch Bridge to occupied Crimea.

After occupation and annexation of Crimea by Russia, the Crimean ports were included into international sanctions lists, and merchant vessels were banned from entering them. Territorial waters of Ukraine (12-mile zone), adjacent to the Crimean Peninsula, have received the status of occupied waters. Shipowners began to refuse sea flights to Crimea, and flag registration countries started depriving such vessels of their registration. However, some shipowners began switching off the International Automatic Identification System (AIS) on ships going to Crimea and falsifying information on ports of destination, indicating Russian ports instead of Crimean ones to prevent violations of sanctions. In turn, the Crimean ports stopped publishing reports on ships. That created a "gray zone" in the Black Sea with a bunch of violations of the maritime law: entering prohibited ports, disabling AIS, falsifying information about ports of destination, navigation with a wrong flag.

Russia has organized the predatory use of natural resources in the occupied 12-mile zone of the Black Sea and the sea shelf around Crimea, where it illegally extracts natural gas, sea sand and catches fish. There are installed maritime surveillance systems and armed Russian marines on the seized marine gas platforms. The areas around them are guarded by Russian Black Sea Fleet and FSB Coast Guard ships, which pose additional military threats to the safety of navigation.

Energy sphere

The Black Sea region is mainly energy dependent. In 2018, the dependence of most countries in the region on gas imports was over 80%, except for Ukraine and Romania, where the dependence did not exceed 50%. The majority of countries in the region are heavily dependent on oil imports. Ukraine and Turkey also import coal.

Although Ukraine stopped purchasing Russian natural gas in 2015, it continues to depend on Russian supplies of oil products, liquefied natural gas and coal. In 2015–2019, the share of oil products imports from Russia ranged from 17% to 41.3%. The total share of oil products supplies from Russia and Belarus, which receives Russian oil on preferential conditions, reaches 75%. Moldova's gas supply also fully (100%) depends on Russia.

The activities of Gazprom and other Russian energy companies in the region could be a threat. In particular, Gazprom hinders competition in the gas supply market in Bulgaria, which was confirmed by the European Commission in 2015, and it implements a general strategy of abuse in the energy markets, induces territorial restrictions and pursues unfair prices policies. In Ukraine, the behavior of the Russian monopolist has long been similar: blackmail by termination of gas supplies; imposing high prices with the following political requirements to reduce them; sabotage of the decision of the Stockholm Arbitration; requirements to Naftogaz to pay for gas supplied by Russia to the Ukrainian occupied territories.

Russia's energy projects are another source of security challenges. Russia is trying to tie consumers of its energy resources to its imposed supply routes. Launched in January 2020, the TurkStream gas pipeline (the first branch) ties consumers in Southeast Europe, primarily Bulgaria and Serbia, to energy supplies from Russia, increasing Russian influence over them.

Information sphere and cyber threats

Russian activity in cyberspace is a serious challenge for the security of the Black Sea countries. Russia uses cyberspace for intelligence activities, as well as for secret access to cybersecurity networks of state bodies and establishment of remote control over critical infrastructure objects. Some of the identified Russian cyber groups are: "Cyber-Bercut" (Sofacy / Fancy Bear / APT28) - attacks on sites of state bodies and public organizations; "SPRUT" ("System of counteraction to Ukrainian terrorism"), Snake, Uroboros - attacks on official sites of ministries, media, financial institutions, special services and armed forces; Black Energy - attacks on power systems.

In March 2019, during the presidential election campaign in Ukraine, a high-quality targeted phishing attack was recorded, and it was covered under the Center for Social and Marketing Studies (SOCIS). In July, the APT StrongPity group was suspected in a campaign to distribute versions of WinRAR, Winbox and Internet Download Manager, which contained the Trojan code.

Very dangerous activities are spoofing attacks on navigation systems, in particular - GPS navigation, in the Black Sea region. Distortion of the signal may cause the system to mismatch the location of an object, and a ship or an aircraft cannot correctly determine its own location or lose access to the positioning system. The report by the American organization C4ADS proves that Russia is using technologies that disorientate the GPS satellite navigation system, in particular in occupied Crimea, which poses a significant threat to civilian GPS systems. There were 9 883 cases of Russian interference with GNSS in 10 locations, which affected the operation of navigation systems of 1 311 civilian vessels.

Russian information offensive against the Black Sea region continued with a rather high intensity. Among the most significant information campaigns of Russia, one can mention the following: the preparation by Russian TV channel RT and pro-Russian Ukrainian TV channel NEWSONE of teleconference in violation of Ukrainian legislation; the transfer of accusation for protest provocations in Georgia to the western countries; the information companies against conducting international exercises Sea Breeze in 2019 and 2020.

International lawfare

The main factors of destabilization in the international jurisdiction are Russia's abuse of international maritime law to consolidate its dominance in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Russia manipulatively interprets and applies the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Montreux Convention, the Black Sea Memorandum on PSC, and other acts. Abuse of regulations of international organizations to include collaborators from Crimea into Russian delegations and hold fake conferences and presentations on the "Russian Crimea" became typical.

In the international jurisdiction, the Russian Federation pays considerable attention to cases initiated by Ukraine and Ukrainian residents against the Russian Federation in the UN International Court, the ICC and the ECtHR, UN committees, arbitrations on maritime law and investment protection. This relatively legal activity of Russia is accom-

panied by mass fabrication of statements against Ukraine through sham "human rights structures". Russia has introduced self-restrictions on participation in the mechanisms of international law: the withdrawal of Russia's signature from the Rome Statute; termination of Russia's recognition of the powers of the International Humanitarian Commission to establish the facts under the Geneva Conventions; the supremacy of national legislation over international law. The purpose of such actions of the Russian Federation is to make impossible for Russian officials to be responsible for committed by them international crimes.

The special juridical means used by the Russian Federation include the formation of an illegal regulatory system in occupied Crimea and Sevastopol. It is necessary to note the gradual destruction of all Ukrainian organizational and administrative acts as grounds for protection of human rights (on citizenship, residence in Crimea, land and other real estate, etc.), followed by violation of such rights, as well as mass involvement of Ukrainian citizens, despite their own desire, to positions in the occupation authorities in violation of the regime of the occupied territory ("election commissions", "recruiting commissions", "juries"). A separate dimension has become the preparation of Russia's "legal" basis for declaring the maximum size of sea space around Crimea allegedly belonging to Russia: the establishment by Russia of "nature sanctuaries" at sea and "the boundaries of the marine search and rescue area"; documentary reflection of the actions of the Russian forces at the facilities of "Chornomornaftogaz"; "procedural" consolidation in the occupation jurisdiction of measures against Ukrainian fishermen in the sea waters.

Important measures of the Russian Federation in its own jurisdiction are: initiation of cases against Ukrainian servicemen for alleged commission of "international crimes" on the territory of Ukraine; approval within the Russian legal system of acts aimed at "legalizing" the existence of occupying authorities in eastern Ukraine as "state bodies" (recognition of "passports", "diplomas", etc.); approval of regulations of the Russian Federation granting the right on Russian citizenship to a considerable part of inhabitants of eastern and southern of Ukraine.



Source: <http://voicecrimea.com.ua/main/mainnews/in-yalta-occupants-need-demolish-temple-ptsu.html?fbclid=IwAR2oXh5LHgCcd8St9OhQ-FggNw1KOMF9kyVFdd7eHLdoYuLvXVpBY8-QknQ>

Human rights, national minorities and migration

Since the annexation of Crimea, and especially since 2016, the Russian Federation has pursued a purposeful long-term policy of repression, intimidation of the local population, and imprisonment of residents of the occupied territories as part of politically motivated or religious prosecution. As of July 2020, according to the Commissioner for Human Rights in Ukraine L. Denisova, the list of citizens of Ukraine, who are political prisoners of the Kremlin in the occupied territories of Crimea and Sevastopol and in Russia, counts 132 people. A year ago, this list counted 115 people. The occupation authorities use a particularly discriminatory approach to the indigenous Crimean Tatar people, who profess Islam. Most of the repressed people are Crimean Tatar activists. Human rights activists also inform about violation of the rights of Crimean residents through regular conscriptions for military service in the Russian Armed Forces, as well as physical and psychological coercion to participate in the so-called "Constitutional Referendum" from June 25 to July 1, 2020.

Violating the rights of believers, through the court under its control, the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea approved an illegal decision obliging the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to demolish a church in Yevpatoria. It is a manifestation of Russia's discriminatory attitude to Crimean residents.

The strategic level threat is the practice of replacing the population in Crimea by Russia in order to legalize the occupation of the Peninsula and change the ethnic composition of the population there in Moscow's favor. The current Russian power is actively encouraging Russians to move to Crimea. First of all, this concerns military retirees, for whom Russia has the program of resettlement to the southern regions. Moscow also tries to stimulate the resettlement of Russians with the help of mortgage lending. In different regions of Russia, it is actively offering mortgages on Crimean new buildings. Crimean statistics show that, excluding the military and security forces and other officials seconded to Crimea, 252.5 thousand people have moved to the Peninsula for the years of occupation, "replacing" at least 180 thousand people who have left Crimea since 2014.

3. Proposals for enhancing security and regional security cooperation

Russia has become a source of hybrid threats to the Black Sea region and to the whole European security that requires continued monitoring of Russia's actions to identify signs of new acts of hybrid warfare and to plan countermeasures. At this stage, the recommendations are the following:

1. It is necessary to withdraw the policy of pacification of the Russian Federation, which only leads to stirring up appetites of the Kremlin and its further aggression. International organizations should clearly indicate the responsibility of Russia for violating international law and use all possible mechanisms for its return to the legal framework, establish a system of international monitoring of the situation in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, and apply international sanctions for violation of the rules of international navigation.
2. NATO should continue to strengthen its naval presence in the Black Sea region to counter Russian military aggression and ensure the necessary balance of forces there (including through the formation of a permanent naval group, the deployment of air and missile defense systems, as well as exercises to create its own regional A2 / AD area in the Black Sea). More attention should be paid to the development of the navies of the Black Sea partner countries - Georgia and Ukraine.
3. Ukraine, the U.S., the EU and other international players need to establish a clear system of monitoring compliance with their sanctions against Russia and punishing their perpetrators.
4. The Black Sea countries should refrain from implementing joint Russian infrastructure projects that Moscow uses to expand its expansion.
5. In order to consolidate international pressure on the leadership of the Russian Federation, international organizations, especially PACE and OSCE, should impose punishment against Russia, including updating of the Magnitsky Act and imposing of new sanctions on Russia, because of the brutal violation of human rights, repressions and falsification of criminal cases.
6. The international law should contain a direct ban on ships without a flag state registration. In addition, all ports administrations in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, the Navies and the Coast Guards in the region should receive up-to-date information on ships, which are deprived of flag state registration.
7. To prevent the easing of existing sanctions, imposed by Ukraine and civilized countries of the world to deter the aggressor, and expand sanctions lists in the areas of influence on the powerful economic structures of the Russian Federation in the fuel and energy sector, maritime, air and railway transport, communications, and financial sectors, in particular²:
 - To impose international sectoral sanctions on Russia's shipbuilding industry for the collaboration on the construction of military equipment at seized Ukrainian plants in occupied Crimea;
 - To impose international sanctions against those Russian shipowners, insurers and classification societies that were involved in activities of seagoing vessels visiting the sea-ports of the Crimean Peninsula in violation of the sanctions;
 - To impose Ukrainian and international sanctions on Russian ports in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, namely Port Kavkaz, Rostov-on-Don, Temryuk, Azov and Novorossiysk;
 - To publicly warn about the imposition of Ukrainian and international sanctions against Russian and foreign/international tour operators, travel agencies, online travel resources, advertising, exhibition, and other companies providing services in/for the tourism industry in occupied Crimea;
 - To strengthen Ukrainian and international sanctions against Russia for its continued refusal to release Ukrainian citizens illegally imprisoned in Crimea and deported to Russia, as well as for continuing the policy of repression and new arrests of civil society activists on the Peninsula.

² Full text of proposals on sanctions is here - <https://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/164630?fbclid=IwAR2txLPux8K5qrKyvwmOtRUqexps8ieEkmBjRcILZTTC70ec3oeX3wbRJCQ>

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8. To initiate establishment by Ukraine of a maritime border with Russia in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Strait and the delimitation of maritime areas with Russia on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
9. To prohibit the navigation and stay of all vessels/ships in the 12-mile zone of the territorial sea around the Crimean Peninsula, since Ukraine, as a coastal state, is unable to fulfil its obligations under the key international documents in the field of maritime security, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS) and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974 (SOLAS), within the occupied waters.
10. Ukraine should address NATO and the USA with a proposal to introduce naval and air patrols on the main routes of merchant ships in the Black Sea to ensure freedom of navigation, and to continue the practice of control flights of US surveillance unmanned aircraft systems RQ-4B Global Hawk over the Black Sea.
11. It is necessary to initiate appropriate decisions of international organizations (IMO, ICAO, FAO, World Telecommunication Union, Council of Europe, and the EU), courts and arbitration tribunals on Russia's violations of freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and further monitoring of the situation.
12. The international community should keep its attention on Russian military actions in occupied Crimea, the North Caucasus and the Black Sea area to prevent possible Russian military operations against Ukraine from the Sea of Azov, and on the territory of Odessa, Mykolaiv and Kherson regions.

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