

SYNERGING



ENERGIES

BLACK SEA SECURITY

ANALYTICAL JOURNAL №2 (38) 2020



FOCUS ON:

COUNTERING
RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA
THEATER OF OPERATIONS

NEW VIEWS
ON OLD PROBLEMS

AS OF JULY 2020, ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN UKRAINE L. DENISOVA, THE LIST OF CITIZENS OF UKRAINE, WHO ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS OF THE KREMLIN IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL AND IN RUSSIA, COUNTS 132 PEOPLE (115 PEOPLE ONE YEAR AGO). THIS LIST INCLUDED THREE OUR COLLEAGUES:

Oleksii Bessarabov, journalist, deputy editor-in-chief of the Black Sea Security Journal in the NOMOS Centre (Sevastopol), political prisoner of the Kremlin sentenced to 14 years of the strict regime colony for “saboteurs case.”



April 2011: “Today, Russia does not apply military and political pressure to Ukraine, preferring to seize its strategic assets and economic absorption ... Such a course of events does not exclude the likelihood of a situation escalating into a conflict, including using force.”

“The Black Sea Region: An Explosive Mix with Multiple Detonators,” Digest of the Razumkov Center “Crimea, Ukraine in Black Sea Security Coordinates”

Dmytro Shtybylykov, Head of International Programs of the NOMOS Centre, member of the editorial board of the Black Sea Security Journal, political prisoner of the Kremlin sentenced to 5 years of the strict regime colony for the “saboteurs case.” Does time in the Penal Colony-6, Omsk, (Russia).

October 2012:

“...what war is preparing for and with whom Russia is going to fight?

...in terms of military and economic performance, Russia is now unable to wage a war with either NATO, China or Japan. The obvious conclusion is that the armed forces of the Russian Federation today are able to fully handle combat missions in the post-Soviet territory.”

“Military Threats of Russia or with whom Russia is going to fight,” the Black Sea Security Journal No 4 (26).



Volodymyr Dudka – retired, former commander of the Simferopol ship of the Naval Forces of Ukraine, sentenced to 14 years of the strict regime colony for the “saboteurs case.”



Volodymyr Dudka was not engaged in the publishing of the Black Sea Security Journal, he was just a friend of Oleksii and Dmytro since their service in the Ukrainian Navy. This proved to be enough to become the third participant to the fraudulent “saboteurs case” and to receive a harsh sentence.

Bessarabov, Shtybylykov and Dudka are included to the lists of Ukrainian human rights organizations, as well as the Freedom House (USA), Memorial (Russia) and the resolutions of the European Parliament as political prisoners.

Last year, Haryy Kemian, US Chargé d’Affaires in the OSCE stated: “The United States remains concerned about the unfair imprisonment of a growing number of Crimeans and other Ukrainians. On April 4, the so-called Sevastopol City Court sentenced two members of the Sevastopol-based think tank Volodymyr Dudka and Oleksii Bessarabov to 14 years in prison on suspicion of “subversive activity.”

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Members of the editorial board Oleksii Bessarabov
and Dmytro Shtybylykov are political prisoners
of the Kremlin. Since 2016 they have been kept
in prison by the FSB on the fabricated charges.

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CONTENTS

Foreword	2
Focus on: Countering Russia's Aggression THE MARITIME EXPERT PLATFORM ASSOCIATION: FOR URGENT ACTIONS TO DE-OCCUPY CRIMEA AND COUNTER THE OCCUPATION OF THE SEA OF AZOV AND THE BLACK SEA	6
Focus on: Enemy at the Black Sea Theater of Operations <i>Yurii Bakai, Anatolii Burgomistrenko, Sergii Gaiduk</i> UNDERWATER SPACE OF THE UKRAINIAN SEA: CHALLENGES AND THREATS	14
Focus on: Enemy at the Black Sea Theater of Operations <i>Sergii Mukhrynskyi</i> THE BLACK SEA FLEET OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: THE SOVIET FLEET BEHIND THE PAINTED FACADE	26
Focus on: Ukrainian Navy <i>Ihor Kabanenko, Andrii Ryzhenko</i> THE NAVAL FORCES OF UKRAINE: TIME TO ACT	34
Focus on: Regional Problems <i>Nika Chitadze</i> ROLE OF THE BLACK SEA AND BALTIC REGIONS IN THE WORLD POLITICS	40
Focus on: New Views on Old Problems <i>Andrii Ryzhenko, Bohdan Ustymenko</i> THE MONTREUX CONVENTION: GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS OF APPLICATION. THE NEW VIEW OF AN OLD PROBLEM	52
Focus on: Russia from inside <i>Yurii Fedorov</i> RUSSIA: CRISIS SCENARIOS	57
Focus on: Countering Russia's Aggression <i>Oleksandr Sukhodolia</i> SANCTIONS: IMPACTS ON THE RUSSIAN ENERGY SECTOR	65
Focus on: Crimean dossier <i>Borys Babin</i> LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF UKRAINE AND OCCUPATION OF CRIMEA	74
Focus on: Moldova <i>Oksana Ishchuk, Igor Stukalenko</i> MOLDOVA'S 'ENERGY SPLIT': TO EU OR EAEU?	81
Focus on: International maritime organizations <i>Bohdan Ustymenko</i> REGULATORY IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATIONS ON UKRAINE'S PROVISION OF NAVIGATION AND HYDROGRAPHIC AIDS FOR MARITIME TRAFFIC	89

FOREWORD

The Kremlin's New Course: To Test Europe with Bayonets!

This issue of the journal is the 10th since its publication was renewed in the summer of 2017 and the 38th since the Nomos Centre had been founded in Sevastopol in 2005. Over three-and-a-half years, two of the members of the Editorial Board, Oleksiy Bessarabov and Dmytro Shtyblykov are kept in the Russian prison on falsified by the Federal Security Service "saboteurs' case." But we continue publishing journal and studying Black Sea security agenda. In addition, at the joint initiative of the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies, the Black Sea News Agency and a number of experts on the Black Sea issues, Centre for Global Studies Strategy XXI became the founder of the Marine Expert Platform – an informal site for small brainstormings on regional issues. The first document adopted by the Platform – “The Urgent Actions on Crimea’s De-Occupation and Resistance to the Occupation of the Azov and Black Seas.”

In general, this issue of the magazine is devoted to mainly maritime and naval affairs. Military and political tension in the Azov, Black and Mediterranean Seas not only continues but grows. The tension generator is Russia, which openly demonstrates its military dominance in the Azov and Black Sea basin and entered into a new confrontation with Turkey. To the Syrian military attacks of the parties, the Libyan ones have been added.

The crushing defeats that Turkish troops inflicted on the Russian expeditionary unit of the Armed Forces, which is being disguised as the Wagner's private military company in Syria and Libya, using modern technology for combat operations with the use of drones, cause additional aggression of the Putin regime. The Kremlin has finally formed an irrepressible desire to limit the use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the power and advantages of Russia against the backdrop of economic failure, public discontent and political turbulence within the Federation. The pompous militaristic show-parade on June 24 once again demonstrated the Kremlin's unquenchable thirst for war.

Signed by the Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 2, 2020, the Fundamentals of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence State Policy, which effectively levels the threshold for the use of nuclear weap-

ons, is a manifestation of the Kremlin's readiness to an escalation of international tension to force Europe to abandon the American nuclear shield and create an additional deterrent effect for countries that seek NATO's membership or a security umbrella from the United States – such as Ukraine and Georgia.

In the past Russia also pointed out to the Europeans that deployment of American missile defense system automatically makes it the targets for Russian nuclear weapons. Now we are almost talking about the fact that deployment of "general-purpose groups with the means of nuclear delivery at contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies territories and adjacent offshore," almost gives carte Blanche for Kremlin's **pre-emptive use of tactical** nuclear weapons to prevent the emergence of a **strategic** threat at Russia's borders. For example, with the presence on the airfields of the Baltic States of rotating aircraft of Western NATO members that perform air patrols in the South-Eastern sector of the Baltic region, Russia will clearly consider a threat of nuclear weapons' use. Russian propaganda media, even before the adoption of Putin's "Fundamentals..." distributed the estimates of pro-Kremlin experts under the headlines "NATO aircraft in Estonia can carry nuclear bombs." The basic argument of such publications is that there is only a hundred and fifty kilometers, 10-15-minutes flight in subsonic mode from the border of Estonia to Saint Petersburg. Therefore, they say, it is possible to resort to preventive measures to beforehand reduce risks and prevent them from escalating into the danger of a strike on Russia, whether with nuclear or high-precision weapons with conventional equipment.

The situation is similar in the Black Sea region. Upgraded, located in the depths of Romania (Deveselu base), the American Aegis Ashore site of the AMDS is viewed by Moscow as a redesigned strike complex for Tomahawk land attack missiles used for striking Russia. A year ago, through the Russian media, the Kremlin warned the Romanians: "the deployment of a modernized facility in Deveselu turns this region of the country into a possible object of the first nuclear strike..." Allegedly, the distance from Deveselu to the main naval base of the Russian Federation at the Black Sea, in Sevastopol is less than 800 km and therefore it will act proactively. And now, when Bucharest, after

FOREWORD

such messages, has directly pointed to Russia as a threat to Romania's national security, Moscow will already "legally" identify Deveselu and the country's key military infrastructure facilities as targets for a pre-emptive nuclear strike of limited power.

Thus, Putin's new "Fundamentals ..." practically legalize the Kremlin's aggressive intentions, traditionally disguised by the needs of defense against the background of a propaganda thesis about the approach of NATO's infrastructure to Russia's borders and the growth of its aggressiveness. In fact, the Russian Federation sends a message to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, primarily the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Ukraine, that **they are real** targets for Russian nuclear weapons.

Certainly, it is all blamed on the United States, which destroyed – according to the Kremlin's logic – the entire global system of IRNFT and START, developed and made operational the latest B61-12 nuclear bomb. This air bomb has been chosen by Russian military experts as an excuse for Moscow to counter the "aggressive intentions of the United States." According to Russian estimates, the B61-12 increases the threat of nuclear war. "A more precise bomb with a lower (and also regulated in a fairly wide range) power reduces the nuclear threshold – it is suitable for use against a wider set of targets; politicians and the military can more easily decide to use it (including first), without fear of mass, indiscriminate death of civilians (collateral damage) resulting of the explosion and subsequent radioactive fallout," these are the Russian estimates of B61-12.

The Kremlin's is being self-confident relying on a limited, **non-strategic** response from the US if Russia uses a low-power tactical nuclear warhead against a country that is not a member of NATO. This, according to Russian strategists, will not cause fatal reactions for Russia from the United States and NATO. They, according to the Kremlin, will be limited to powerful information, diplomatic and political reactions, perhaps some additional non-fatal sanctions that will be imposed by the West, but no more. If Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons against a NATO member country, the US response will be within the range of a retaliatory

strike with a power comparable to the warhead used. Moreover, the US passed into service missiles with W76-2 low-yield power nuclear warheads. In February this year, training was conducted in the state of Nebraska, which simulated the crisis caused by a Russian limited nuclear strike on a target in Europe and the limited American response. In other words, a massive nuclear strike on the territory of the Russian Federation and a global Armageddon are not envisaged by Russia.

Based on these considerations, behind the Kremlin walls, they believe a low-power nuclear strike somewhere on the route of Turkish troop's movement in the Libyan Desert will not lead to a nuclear strike by the United States against Russia. Therefore, under certain circumstances and on a certain occasion, they can try, and this will practically demonstrate the Russian Federation's determination to use nuclear weapons in other cases as well. However, back in 2018, the then US Secretary of Defense James Mathis quite clearly expressed an assessment of such approaches: "Do not believe that there is such a thing as non-strategic nuclear weapons. Any nuclear weapon used at any time changes the rules of a strategic game." It seems that the Kremlin has forgotten this. However, despite the rattling of nuclear weapons, Russia's main focus, in our view, is subversive activities against the West from within. The events in the United States with the light in the pogroms of various left-wing organizations of the pro-Russian direction are the proof of this.

Foreign policy, as we know, is a continuation of domestic policy. The situation in Russia is undergoing powerful dynamic changes towards internal destabilization. The fall in income of Russians, unpopular pension reform, inefficiency of the government's actions to overcome the coronavirus pandemic, incomprehensible for most constitutional changes, restrictions on the rights of Federal subjects, the rise of the Russian language and simultaneous discrimination of the national minorities' and indigenous peoples' languages, and the burden of Russia's participation in the Kremlin's military adventures abroad – all this sharply reduces the rating of the kleptocratic regime and personally V. Putin. In particular, in the circumstances of the oil and gas prices collapse. In such cases, in

FOREWORD

the Russian tradition, the panacea for the regime is an external enemy; and several of such is even better. The United States, NATO, Poland, the Baltic States, Georgia, Ukraine, and even Belarus are all "enemies". Therefore, according to the Kremlin's logic, all that is needed is to create a casus belli.

The geopolitical basis has already been created. Vladimir Putin's nostalgia in the June propaganda film about "gifted Russian lands" as a motive for continuation of the presidency is a confirmation of Russia's intentions of geopolitical revanchism, initiated by him on April 25, 2005 in a message to the Federal Assembly, where he called the collapse of the USSR "the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century." "When creating the Soviet Union, the right to exit was prescribed, and since the procedure itself was not prescribed, the question arises: if a particular republic had become a part of the Soviet Union, had received a huge amount of Russian lands in its luggage - traditional, historical, Russian territories, and then the republic had decided to leave the Union...in this case it ought to have gone out with what it had entered and should not have brought gifts from the Russian people," - it's easy to guess the case of Ukraine behind these words.

In the past, Putin has repeatedly made informational attacks on "gifts to Ukraine" - "Khrushchev gifted Crimea," "Lenin gifted Donbas." At the same time, for some reason, the Kremlin Fuhrer forgets about the Soviet "gifts for Russia" at the expense of Ukraine: Kuban, Taganrog, Boguchar, Ostrogozke, Starodub, and so on. It is obvious that Putin's Russia is not only going to deviate from the

path of war, but on the contrary - seeks it and prepares to expand armed aggression against Ukraine, as well as to annex Belarus, restore final de-Europeanization and vassality of Moldova, separate northern Kazakhstan and invade the Baltics. The century-old idea of the Soviet Russia to "feel Europe with bayonets" is back on the Kremlin's agenda, especially given that the United States plunged in internal chaos.

The year 2020 is marked in the military agenda of the Russian Federation by unprecedented large-scale exercises "Caucasus 2020", maneuvers of the Black Sea Fleet and groups of occupying forces in Crimea. The latter conduct training of the tactical level almost continuously. Elements of the blockade of the Ukrainian coast with strikes and air landings are being worked out. Large-scale provocations are being prepared to create a casus belli, which should justify the use of force. And the Dni-pro water from the North Crimean Canal for the Kremlin's degrading Russian occupation is seen as an important goal in rescuing the Putin regime through a new injection of cheers and patriotism.

The United States through the unprecedented flight of two B-1B Lancers on May 29, 2020 from Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota to Europe via Poland, Ukraine, the Black Sea and Turkey, demonstrated that the Baltic-Black Sea countries are in the US strategic zone and Russia this time will not succeed with its plans.

However, granting Ukraine the status of NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner on June 12, 2020, on Russia Day, is an additional warning to the Krem-



FOREWORD

lin, as well as American Mark VI patrol boats and a new batch of Javelin anti-tank missile, which are already heading to Ukraine.

And even the traditional advocate of the Putin regime in Europe, Germany, against the background of the "Khangoshvili case" declares the possibility of tightening sanctions against Russia. In the United States, congressmen point out that Russia may be recognized as a sponsor of terrorism. For us in Ukraine, this has long been an obvious thing. It is good that the West in the seventh year of Russian aggression against Ukraine and four years after the Kremlin's interference in the US elections not only felt but also understood that Russia is a state that secretly funds various radical extremist and terrorist organizations, using them to conduct subversive activities against Ukraine, the EU and the United States, acting from within with the arsenal of crypto-war, ranging from propaganda and falsification of history to terror.

In this issue of our journal, you will find many interesting pieces published for the first time - what are the enemy forces at sea, what underwater threats await Ukraine and NATO in the Black Sea, what should be the Ukrainian Navy, a revolutionary view on the Montreux Convention, scenarios waiting for Russia through the eyes of a Russian expert, a look at the Baltic and Black Sea regions of the South Caucasus and their role in world politics. Energy, sanctions against Russia are also in the spotlight of this issue. Also, for the first time we prepared a special e-annex to journal named "In the spotlight." Dr. Benjamin L. Schmitt from the U.S., who served as European

Energy Security Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, in the special annex to this issue, introduces an American vision for the Russian gas megaproject in the research "Putin's Pipeline and Transatlantic security."

All this, of course, will be interesting and will provoke discussions. Well, we will be happy to provide journal columns for your opinions and assessments.

P.S. While this issue was being prepared for publication, the Kremlin implemented the planned constitutional changes in Russia, which enshrined almost lifelong power of Putin. There should be no illusions about "zeroing" of Putin Forever. The regime is preparing the country and society for a war, the goal of which is not only to "gather lands" but also to defeat NATO by using subversive methods against the Alliance from within its member states. It is significant that the movement of Russophiles has intensified in Bulgaria, as they considered the establishment of the NATO Naval Coordination Center in Varna as a blow to Bulgaria's national security. As well as the planned rearmament of the Bulgarian Air Force with American F-16s, which are able to carry nuclear weapons, makes Bulgaria, accordingly, a target for Russian missiles.

We are attentively monitoring transformations of Putin's aggressive autocracy and its growing activity in the Black Sea and Mediterranean areas.

Mykhaylo Gonchar, Editor-in-Chief

PROPOSALS

THE MARITIME EXPERT PLATFORM ASSOCIATION FOR URGENT ACTIONS TO DE-OCCUPY CRIMEA AND COUNTER THE OCCUPATION OF THE SEA OF AZOV AND THE BLACK SEA¹

THE RED LINES – WHAT AND HOW SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT BE DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE STATED ISSUES

It is unacceptable to continue to use a departmental and non-systemic approach to the de-occupation of Crimea and to countering the creeping annexation of Ukraine's sovereign waters in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea.

These issues are complex in themselves and accordingly require targeted and coordinated actions of state bodies of the security and defense sector and all relevant departments of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

For joint planning and coordination of these actions, it is necessary to immediately formally determine the **Unified National Centre for the Coordination of Strategic Actions (not operational or tactical, but strategic!) on the De-Occupation of Ukrainian Territories.**

Further attempts to act using the assets, forms, and methods of one or two ministries having different decision-making centers and areas of responsibility, not coordinating their actions with other bodies, and ignoring the professional expert community will only exacerbate contradictions and problems.

It is unacceptable to continue to act without a clearly defined strategic goal and without taking

¹ The Maritime Expert Platform was established with the participation of experts of the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea Region through Greater Engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations" with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Black Sea Trust or its partners.

appropriate state actions on the probable military-civilian scenarios of the enemy.

The strategic goal should be the return of all the occupied territories by taking complex civilian-military, asymmetric, and flexible actions. That is, actions to de-occupy Crimea and Donbas should be carried out according to an integrated plan.

The tasks of the comprehensive state actions on Crimea should be:

(1) strengthening the national and regional **proactive response to Russia's ongoing occupation of the Crimean peninsula, in particular to new negative facts, trends, and processes** that have emerged on the territory of Crimea during the occupation and tend to intensify. The purpose of these measures on the part of Kyiv should be to gradually force the aggressor to refrain from such actions;

(2) the prevention of Russia's de facto occupation and annexation of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea – **countering the geographical and actual/sectoral expansion of the zone of effective control of Russia in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea**, which is taking place with the use of military, political, legal, and geostrategic capabilities created by the Russian Federation in Crimea, temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and on its own territory;

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

(3) **the military-political prevention of possible military operations of the Russian Federation from occupied Crimea** in the direction of Nova Kakhovka, the Kherson region, by land, sea, and air against the land territory of Ukraine on the coast of the Sea of Azov, the Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions, including islands, peninsulas, and the Danube Delta, the seizure of the North Crimean Canal.

It is unacceptable to continue to act on an ad hoc basis and in response, i.e. tactically and not strategically.

Ad hoc response means fighting a losing battle. Historical experience shows that in order to defeat a stronger enemy, it is necessary to act strategically, ahead of events, and preventively, without being afraid of flexibility and manoeuvre for achieving strategic goals.

The current package of preventive measures on the part of Ukraine should include:

1) The Updated Crimean Sanctions Package.

2) The Policy of Non-Recognition of the Annexation of the Crimean peninsula – the rules that develop and specify the UNGA Resolution of 27 March 2014² calling for non-recognition of Russia's attempts to illegally alter the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and for refraining from any actions, inaction, or steps that might be interpreted as recognizing such an altered status.

3) The Package of Actions to Deter the Russian Aggression in the Black Sea – preventive measures in the military-diplomatic field.

1) THE UPDATED CRIMEAN SANCTIONS PACKAGE

Sanctions have proved to be an effective tool for deterring the aggressor. Therefore, Ukraine's sanc-

tions policy should adhere to the principles of *preventing the easing of existing sanctions*, such as *reducing the sanctions lists*, *relaxing the control over the actual state of sanctions imposed by Ukraine and civilized countries*; and *the imposition of new sanctions*.

The evidence of the intensification of negative trends and processes in Crimea in the military, humanitarian, environmental spheres and of the harm and risks from these processes to Ukraine and at the regional and global levels should form the basis for preventing the easing of sanctions and for the imposition of new ones.

The expansion of and updates to sanctions lists should take place in the areas of influence on the powerful economic structures of the Russian Federation in the fuel and energy sector, maritime, pipeline, and railway transport, communications, and financial sectors.

Under any circumstances, it is **necessary to synchronize the sanctions** of Ukraine, the EU, Great Britain, and the United States against legal entities in relation to Crimea.

- **To impose international sectoral sanctions on Russia's shipbuilding industry for the collaboration on the construction of military equipment at seized Ukrainian plants in occupied Crimea.**
- **To impose international sanctions against those Russian ship-owners, insurers, and classification societies that were involved in activities of seagoing vessels visiting the seaports of the Crimean peninsula in violation of the sanctions.**
- **To impose Ukrainian and international sanctions on Russian ports in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, namely Port Kavkaz, Rostov-on-Don, Temryuk, Azov, and Novorossiysk.**

Sanctions are proposed to be imposed for regular maritime transportation from these ports to the occupied Crimean peninsula.

² Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014 – 68/262. Territorial integrity of Ukraine, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION



These sanctions may include:

- 1) the prohibition of providing any services for merchant ships departing from the above-mentioned ports in the ports of Ukraine, the EU, the USA, the Commonwealth of Nations, and other countries (except for emergencies and catastrophes);
 - 2) the prohibition of organizing voyages to these ports from the ports of Ukraine, the EU, the USA, the Commonwealth of Nations, and other countries;
 - 3) the prohibition of shipping sea cargoes that have been transshipped or are planned to be transshipped at the Port Kavkaz roadstead to/from the ports of Ukraine, the EU, the USA, the Commonwealth of Nations, and other countries.
- **To publicly warn about the imposition of Ukrainian and international sanctions against Russian and foreign/international tour operators, travel agencies, online travel resources, advertising, exhibition, and other companies and organizations**

providing services in/for the tourism industry in occupied Crimea, including Russian sea liners making calls at the ports or sea area of the peninsula and companies and organizations producing and distributing related information and advertising materials.

- **To synchronize and coordinate sanctions lists of Ukraine, the EU countries, the USA, the Commonwealth of Nations related to legal entities of the RF operating on the occupied Crimean peninsula.**
- **To strengthen Ukrainian and international sanctions against Russia for its continued refusal to release Ukrainian citizens illegally imprisoned in Crimea and deported to Russia, as well as for continuing the policy of repression and new arrests of civil society activists on the peninsula.**

What not to do in the area of sanctions policy:

- **to not reduce sanctions lists, remove persons from them, or tolerate the failure to impose sanctions on them in Ukraine and**

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

abroad, to not agree with or tolerate such actions of partners;

- ▶ **to not tolerate calls for easing the sanctions policy** in Ukraine or abroad from any sources and for any reason;
- ▶ **to not ignore the negative factors, trends, or processes** in Crimea, in the area of the Sea of Azov, and the Black Sea.

2) THE POLICY OF NON-RECOGNITION OF THE ATTEMPT TO ANNEX THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA (The Universalization, Systematizing, Proactivity of the Non-Recognition Policy)

Non-recognition of the attempt to annex the Crimean peninsula is an obligation rather than a right.

This obligation is based not only on the "Crimean" UN Resolutions (and numerous other documents of the EU, NATO, and individual countries) but also on the fundamental international custom.

The non-recognition is the obligation of the subjects of international law, which arises from the international custom expressed by the ancient Roman maxim *ex injuria jus non oritur* – a right does not arise from wrongdoing.

At the level of conventions, the obligation of non-recognition is a logical extension of the principle of non-use of force and threat of force, enshrined in the UN Charter and interpreted in the Declaration on Principles of International Law of 1970, on the Definition of Aggression of 1974, and others.



Non-recognition is universal and covers all areas of interaction of third countries with the Russian Federation and Ukraine – from the control of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to children's sports completions.

This obligation is minimal and constant – that is, it cannot cease on its own and is a form of response, less than which even a politically friendly to the RF state cannot afford.

The policy of non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea should be implemented, among other things, **through the adoption of decisions by international organizations and individual states that supported the UN General Assembly Resolution, which contain the following provisions:**

- **the prohibition of publication or any kind of presentation of geographical maps**, including nautical charts, showing the Crimean peninsula as "part" of the Russian Federation;
- **prohibiting the travel businesses**, including those providing online booking, logistical, or insurance services, from cooperating with Crimea-based tourist facilities (such as hotels, museums) or travel agencies, directly or through partners, including listing such facilities/routes on their online platforms;
- **prohibiting organizers of international scientific, educational, tourist, sports, cultural, or business events; exhibitions, festivals, advertising campaigns, or other events** from granting permission to place, present, or publish information that would point to the Crimean peninsula's "belonging" to the Russian Federation; prohibiting them from involving people who reside in occupied Crimea as participants in such events on behalf of Russia or as part of Russian delegations;
- **prohibiting politicians, civil servants, and other public figures from entering the Crimean peninsula from the territory of Russia;**

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

- **strong recommendations for citizens of the respective states not to enter the Crimean peninsula from the territory of Russia**, with a warning about responsibility for such actions according to the Ukrainian legislation;
- **the prohibition of the issuance of any entry visas to:**
 - 1) holders of any passport documents issued in Crimea by the Russian occupation authorities or under their control;
 - 2) citizens of the RF who have their place of residence registration in Crimea;
- **the prohibition of/sanctions for the use of foreign brands** on the territory of the Crimean peninsula by Russian companies (such as brands of manufacturing companies, retailers, providers of services). Franchise agreements signed by companies from the countries that supported the above-mentioned UN Resolution with any Russian business entity should include a standard clause on the prohibition of operations in Crimea and heavy fines in case of a violation of this condition;
- **the prohibition of the sale (resale) to the territory of the Crimean peninsula of any goods or services supplied under contracts to the territory of the Russian Federation.** Such contracts with any Russian business entity should include a standard clause prohibiting the movement or resale of goods or services to Crimea and heavy fines in case of violations;
- **the prohibition of providing port services for direct voyages between the ports of the respective countries and the ports of the Crimean peninsula.** The authenticity of a ship's documents about the port of arrival/ departure must be verified.

In turn, Ukraine and its civil society must state **that a third country's disrespect for the territorial integrity of our country removes the obligation of Ukraine to take a range of measures to protect the integrity of the respective state.**

What not to do in the area of the non-recognition policy:

- ▶ to not tolerate uncoordinated with Ukraine activities of international organizations or consular work of third countries, attempts by the Russian Federation to involve "Crimean" representatives in its own diplomatic and consular relations and cooperation with international organizations;
- ▶ to not tolerate any uncoordinated visits of any public persons of third countries to Crimea or any their anti-Ukrainian statements on Crimea;
- ▶ to not tolerate the passport and visa policy of third countries leading to the de facto recognition of the attempted annexation;
- ▶ to not tolerate the activities of any transnational corporations, financial-industrial groups, and powerful media holdings whose actions lead to the de facto recognition of the annexation of Crimea.

3) THE PACKAGE OF ACTIONS TO DETER THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN THE BLACK SEA

- ▶ **Ukraine has all the political and legal grounds to initiate the establishment of a maritime border with Russia in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Strait and the delimitation of maritime areas with Russia on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.**
- ▶ **We consider it necessary to prohibit the navigation and stay of all vessels/ships in the 12-mile zone of the territorial sea around the Crimean peninsula**, since Ukraine, as a coastal state, is unable to fulfil its obligations under the key international documents in the field of maritime security, UNCLOS and SOLAS, within the occupied waters.



The possibility for a coastal state to suspend the navigation/stay of vessels is expressly permitted by UNCLOS.


In addition, the inadequate level of coordination of more than ten bodies and institutions involved in ensuring maritime/river security cannot be ignored. This is absolutely unacceptable during the Russian aggression.

- In order to solve the problem of coordinating maritime security, it is proposed to create a center under the National Security and Defense Council or the Cabinet of Ministers for the coordination of activities performed by civil, law enforcement, and military bodies and institutions that deal with maritime/river security.
- Ukraine should address NATO and the USA with a proposal to jointly create an A2/AD (anti-access and area denial)

area in the area between Deveselu military base, Romania, and Odesa naval base, Ukraine, so that it protects the sea and air space in the area of the Black Sea coast of Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania and guarantees the security of the only route for commercial shipping to the Black Sea ports of Ukraine that is not controlled by Russia.

- Ukraine should address NATO and the USA with a proposal to introduce naval and air patrols on the main route of merchant ships in the Black Sea from the Bosphorus in the general direction of Odesa, including the Black Sea area from the Dnieper-Bug estuary (Ochakiv) to the Danube Delta (Vilkovo) and the area of gas and gas condensate fields seized by Russia in Ukraine's EEZ in 2014; for this purpose, it is necessary to further increase the number of NATO member states' Navy ships on duty in the Black Sea.

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION



- ▶ Ukraine should **initiate the establishment of a joint naval format in the Black Sea "NATO, including its Black Sea member states and partner countries (Ukraine and Georgia)"** for regular patrols in the Black Sea to ensure freedom of navigation.
- ▶ In cooperation with NATO and the United States, agree to **continue the practice of control flights of US surveillance unmanned aircraft systems RQ-4B Global Hawk over the Black Sea**, including in its north-western sector.
- ▶ To **initiate an international investigation into GPS spoofing in the Black Sea area by the Russian side with appropriate sanctions.**
- ▶ To **initiate appropriate decisions on and the monitoring of Russia's violations of**

freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov by international organizations (IMO, ICAO, FAO, International Telecommunication Union, Council of Europe, the EU), courts (ITLOS, ECHR), and arbitration tribunals. In particular, this may apply to the **restriction of shipping**, fishing, mass abuses of sea areas closures under the **pretext of military exercises** using the international system of maritime navigation warnings about the dangers NAVTEX, and so on.

What not to do in the area of deterring the Russian aggression at sea:

- ▶ **to not continue the policy of "internal waters" on the Sea of Azov**, the 2003 Treaty, and the 1993 Agreement on the regime of this sea and the Kerch Strait;

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

- ▶ to not tolerate capture and abduction of Ukrainian fishermen by Russians, the delays of merchant ships by Russians, the **stay of Russian Coast Guard and warships in the waters near mainland Ukraine**, the militarisation of platforms and structures seized on the Ukrainian shelf;
- ▶ to not tolerate **the use of Crimea as a military and naval base for the Russian aggression in Syria, Libya, and so on** or building up Russia's military and naval forces in the region.

Signed by the members of the Maritime Expert Platform association:

Borys Babin	Professor, Doctor of Law, former Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
Mykhailo Gonchar	President of the Centre for Global Studies Strategy XXI, Editor-in-Chief of the Black Sea Security journal
Tetyana Guchakova	Chairman of the Board of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, Editor of www.blackseanews.net
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Andrii Klymenko	Head of the Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies on sanctions and freedom of navigation, Editor-in-Chief of the www.blackseanews.net online publication, Economist Emeritus of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
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Underwater Space of the Ukrainian Sea: Challenges and Threats³

The issue of Russia's creation of a system of full control over both civil and military navigation within the Black and Azov Seas, and the dual use of marine infrastructure facilities for intelligence activities of the Russian Federation, has already been discussed on the pages of the Black Sea Security [1].

³The publication was prepared in the framework of the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea Region through Greater Engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations" with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Black Sea Trust Fund or its partners..

We will try to investigate the concept of "militarization and occupation of the Black Sea underwater space". What is the purpose of the Russian Federation deploying underwater forces and assets, which are a segment of the strike and reconnaissance circuit in the Black Sea and in the entire south-west direction? What does not lie on the surface is always interesting.

Assessing today's threats from the sea and understanding the essence of modern hybrid warfare at sea, it is possible to state that the Russian Black Sea strategy combines the following goals:



FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

- gaining of undisputed dominance in the Azov-Black Sea region with the restriction of NATO's presence in the Black Sea and the unrestricted use of the Black Sea straits;
- blocking Ukraine from the sea, control over shipping to the Black Sea and Danube ports of Ukraine as part of the strategy to restore control over Ukraine.

After the occupation of Crimea and Sevastopol, the Russian Federation is taking measures to build up the interspecies grouping of troops/forces. According to the naval grouping of the Black Sea Navy, this is an increase in combat potential by Navy replenishing with modern warships and submarines, which are carriers of long-range missile weapons: on surface targets – up to 500 km, on land – up to 1,500 km. This, of course, makes it possible for the Russian Federation not only to occupy the waters of the Black and Azov seas, but also to control a significant part of Europe and the Middle East, with the possibility of launching missile strikes if necessary.

Is this Russia's narcissism based on the "law of the power" or a challenge to NATO and its concept of "Enhanced Forward Presence" in the Black Sea? (*"Enhanced Forward Presence of NATO on the South-Eastern flank provides for strengthening the military capabilities of regional NATO member-countries (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) and increasing training and coordination activities. At the same time, a significant obstacle to the development of NATO's capabilities in the region was the position of Bulgaria, which does not see a threat from Russia and refused to form a joint NATO naval forces (Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria) in the Black Sea – ed.*)

The presence of NATO ships in the Black Sea is increasing due to their participation in joint military manoeuvres in the framework of Operation Atlantic Resolve, which was launched under the auspices of NATO in 2014 after the occupation of Crimea and the start of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine – 80 days in 2017 and 120 days in 2018.

Since 2014, it is obvious that the Russian Federation continues occupation not only of the surface

and air space through formation of a restriction zone and prohibition of access and manoeuvre (A2/AD), but also underwater space:

- deployment of the surface and air lighting system and radio monitoring system, including its advanced components, on the captured platforms of the subsidiary of Naf-togaz of Ukraine NJSC, Chornomornaftogaz (*it was reorganized by the occupier into the Chernomorneftegaz State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea – ed.*);
- closure of the areas, under the guise of combat training of the Russian Black Sea Navy, to hinder international navigation. Simultaneous closure of the Black Sea regions tends to increase: if in 2017 it was 1/10 of the Black Sea, in 2018 it was 1/6, and in 2019 it was 1/3;
- improvement of the monitoring and control system for underwater area of the Black Sea. A special feature is the use of interdepartmental forces and means of the Black Sea Navy, the FSS of the Russian Federation, Gazprom and Chernomorneftegaz State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea in a single contour.

"Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030," approved by Presidential Decree No. 327 dated 20.07.2017, the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the Federal Target Programme "World Ocean" clearly outlined the position of the Russian Federation at sea:

- The Russian Federation considers the emergence of direct military threats to its national security – the deployment (build-up) of strategic non-nuclear systems of high-precision sea-based weapons, and sea-based missile defense systems by foreign states in the seas and oceans adjacent to the Russian Federation;
- The Navy creates and maintains the conditions necessary to ensure the safety of maritime activities of the Russian Federation, protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the underwater environment,

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

including underwater and diversionary defense in the interests of the Russian Federation security;

- increase of the operational and combat capabilities of the Black Sea Navy by developing joint-force groups (troops) *on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula (providing this groups with the necessary intelligence information and issuing guidelines for combat use – ed.)*;
- ensuring the permanent naval presence of the Russian Federation in the Mediterranean Sea and other strategically important areas of the World Ocean, including in areas where the main sea navigation passes;
- creation and maintenance of a Unified State Surveillance System for Surface and Underwater Environment (*stationary, positional and manoeuvrable component of the Azov-Black Sea segment of the unified state system – ed.*);
- destruction of the military and economic potential of the enemy by destroying its vital objects from the sea.

What threats does the underwater space pose?


A) Mine threats. It requires the control of coastal waters, maritime communications and the protection of seaports.

The number of mine weapons' carriers of the Russian Federation includes up to 32 surface ships, up to 20 aircrafts, and over 50 vessels. In addition, up to 7 submarines, ultra-small submarines and submarine saboteurs on carriers can be additionally involved in hidden mining.

Mining sites can be recommended for routes, anchorage and cargo transshipment areas, approach channels and narrows, port water areas, marine infrastructure facilities, etc.


Neutralizing this threat requires constant monitoring of the mining situation and ensuring safety of navigation in the event of the mine weapons use by the enemy. It cannot be excluded that hidden mining can be used by the Russian Federation to stop international shipping under the legend of "mine threat areas of the World War I and II."

It is noteworthy that on June 14-21, 2019, in the Eastern part of the Black Sea, testing of a sea Shelf mine and new sea trawls – the BAT-U (*IIIAT-Y - in Russian*) wide bandwidth acoustic trawl and the deep-water GKT-3M sweep were conducted. Era Military Innovative Technopolis and Concern Sea Underwater Weapon Gidropribor were involved in testing.



FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Mine setting was carried out from the torpedo tube of the Kasimov small anti-submarine ship (corvette ASW) and combat swimmers of the 136th Separate Special Detachment of the Submarine



Anti-diversionary Service (SSD SADS). The following has been tested:

- *detection and targeting of the mines at sea targets of various tonnages;*
- *the stability of the mine during non-contact trawling;*
- *testing of the "friend-or-foe" recognition system.*

B) Submarine Diversionary Forces and Special Operation Forces of the Russian Federation.

These forces are reduced to detachments of combat swimmers in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk to 500 combat swimmers each. According to prelimi-


nary calculations, 45 marine diversionary and reconnaissance groups may be involved in the acts of sabotage.

Means of delivery: warships and submarines, civil vessels, low-speed vessels, planes and helicopters, ultra-small submarines. The objects of mining can be warships, control points, communication points and systems for the surface situation lighting, the water areas of naval bases and seaports, and marine infrastructure facilities.

Taking this into account, state regulation concerning equipping seaports and other important objects of marine infrastructure with underwater diversionary forces and means' detection devices is necessary.

Example: in mid-May 2018, tests of the Klavesin unmanned underwater vehicle (UAV) were conducted in the Black Sea at a range near occupied Feodosia with the support of the Viktor Cherenkov research vessel of the Black Sea Navy. Klavesin 2R-PM UAV is designed to solve deep-water military tasks.

The main tasks that can be solved are protection of objects, search operations, research of the seabed at a depth of up to 6,000 m, detection and neutralization of minefields, bottom mapping and soil sounding.




FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS



C) Submarines

The submarine forces of the Black Sea Navy of the Russian Federation are organizationally consolidated into the 4th Separate Underwater Brigade, which consists of 7 diesel-electric submarines. The formation of the brigade was carried out dur-

ing 2014-2016, when the Black Sea Navy annually received two submarines built in the framework Varshavyanka 636.3 project. Thus, at the end of 2016, the creation of the submarine group for the Black Sea Navy of the Russian Federation was completed (*Table 1*).



Klavesin UAV's specifications:
Length – 6,500 mm;
Diameter – about 1,000 mm;
Weight – 3,700 kg
Operational Range – up to 50 km;
Maximum travel range – up to 300 km;
Rate of sailing – up to 1.5 m/sec;
Autonomy – up to 120 hours;
Maximum submersion depth – up to 6,000 m.

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Table 1

Grouping of submarines of the Russian Black Sea Navy.

Designation	Name	Shipyard	Keel laying date	Date of launch	Put into operation	Condition
Project 877 <i>Paltus</i> (NATO reporting name <i>Kilo</i>)	Alrosa	JSC Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard	17.05.1988	10.09.1989	01.12.1990	Upgrade
Project 636.3 <i>Varshavyanka</i> (NATO reporting name <i>Improved Kilo</i>)	Novorossiysk	JSC Admiralty Shipyards	20.08.2010	28.11.2013	22.08.2014	In action
	Rostov-on-Don	JSC Admiralty Shipyards	21.11.2011	26.06.2014	30.12.2014	In action
	Stary Oskol	JSC Admiralty Shipyards	17.08.2012	28.08.2014	03.07.2015	In action
	Krasnodar	JSC Admiralty Shipyards	20.02.2014	25.04.2015	05.11.2015	In action
	Veliky Novgorod	JSC Admiralty Shipyards	30.10.2014	18.03.2016	26.10.2016	In action
	Kolpino	JSC Admiralty Shipyards	30.10.2014	31.05.2016	24.11.2016	In action

The underwater space of the Black Sea allows the use of Black Sea submarines without restrictions, with the exception of the shallow north-western part of the Sea, where the depth is less than 60 meters. This factor creates certain navigational obstacles for the submarine use.

Analyzing the diagram (Fig. 1), we can conclude that as of the end of 2019:

the ratio of surface/underwater Kalibr cruise missiles carriers of the Russian Black Sea Navy is 50/50%;

the total missile salvo of the Kalibr cruise missiles is 72 units (*potential by 2024 is 152*).

A special feature is that the Black Sea submarines have experience in the combat use of cruise missiles during a special operation in Syria. In addition, there were missile launches from the SSK *Varshavyanka* pr. 636.3 with a 91R1 missile from the Kalibr-PL complex at the combat training range in the Anapa/Eastern part of the Black Sea area on 17.02.2017 and in the area of Cape Chauda on 11.10.2017.


It is significant that according to the press service of the Black Sea Navy of the Russian Federation dated April 16, 2020, *Kolpino Diesel-electric submarine armed with Kalibr cruise missiles and Su-24M Fencer bombers (Fig. 2) demonstrated a joint missile and bomb attack on a group of ships of a simulated enemy in the Black Sea while escorting the US Navy destroyer USS Porter DDG-78 by the BSN ships.*

D) Interagency Integrated Underwater Surveillance System

The Russian Federation is taking active measures to develop a Unified State Surveillance System for Surface and Underwater Environment, which will include three circuits – marine, space and surface. The ongoing development of a layered surveillance system for surface and underwater environment, with the development and deployment of the latest sonar systems with three detection boundaries, includes:

- the planned deployment of sonar systems in strategically important areas of the World Ocean at the first boundary (ocean operating zone). Information on the situation will

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS



be transmitted via the Liana multifunctional satellite system to the processing and analysis point. At the moment, this long-range sonar system is under development;

- the planned use of the Harmony underwater robotic system at the second boundary (the far sea operating zone). This system includes a deployed complex of sonar stations at the seabed with a possible 300-km situation coverage radius. Sonar stations of the Harmony system can transmit information both directly through fibre-optic communication channels and satellite communication channels of the Liana system. The military leadership of the Russian Federation is considering the possibility, after system is passed to service, of setting up sonar stations in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, primarily in its Eastern part;
- starting from 2016, measures to install and commission the MGK-608 stationary passive sonar complex, which tasks include surveillance of environment near the territorial waters of the Russian Federation are being performed at the third boundary (near sea operating zone). In the north-western part of the Black Sea, starting in 2019, the deployment of a MGK-608 stationary passive sonar complex has begun. The peculiarity of this complex is that the removal of sonar buoys (antennas) is carried out at a distance of up to 200 km from the coastline and the detection radius is about 100-150 miles. Data transmission will be carried out through fibre-optic communication channels to the data processing and analysis point. After the deployment of the sonar field from Cape Tarkhankut, probably to the area east of Zmiyiny Island, the Russian Federation will be able to fully



Fig. 2. Su-24M Fencer bomber and Kolpino submarine, Russian BSF.

control the surface and underwater situation in the north-western and western waters of the Black Sea.

Reference. Specifications of MGK-608 stationary passive sonar complex:

- *number of sonar antennas in the system – up to 60;*
- *deployment depth – up to 1,000 m;*
- *underwater object identification capability – 0.8-0.9;*
- *object positioning inaccuracy – 1-2 km;*
- *maintenance crew – 2 persons.*

Also, to monitor the surface and underwater environment, both in the near-sea operational zone and in the coastal zone of the Black Sea, a number of sonar systems have been deployed and continue to be deployed. They are also likely to be integrated into a Unified State Surveillance System for Surface and Underwater Environment. We are talking about the Rationality VG-5 stationary sonar complex, designed for sonar reconnaissance and classification of underwater and surface targets (in the modes of sonar and listening), and providing sound and acoustic telegraphic communication with submarines and other objects in the open sea.

It is known that construction of the infrastructure of the control centre of this complex is finished at the moment. Organizationally, it will be a part of the 14th surveillance area of the Novorossiysk Navy Base. In the future, the Russian Federation plans to deploy another complex of the kind on Cape Sarych (temporarily occupied territory of Crimea).

Additionally, to monitor the surface and underwater environment, the underwater classification system is used as part of Amga-M autonomous sonar stations (ASS), which are designed to search, detect, classify and track submarines, determine the travel direction and transmit information about them to onshore or ship control points. For the first time similar system for classification of submarines, including 20 specified stations was deployed in early 2014 in the water area of Sochi to ensure the security of the Olympic games. These measures allowed creating an anti-ship border up to 100 km long and up to 6 km wide.

The stations can be controlled from a surface ship or a coastal control point using sonar communication, and the transmission of submarine classification data from ASS is performed by the means of radio communication with up to 60 km range. Amga-M ASS provides a 360-degree visual field and can be anchored in the areas with 300-1,500

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

meters depths. This ensures that the station and the entire underwater detection system are hidden at their position.

Anaconda-SP Stationary Electromagnetic Station (SEMS) is designed to detect and classify underwater diversionary forces and means (combat swimmers, unmanned vessels, etc.) at a range of up to 30 km. The Russian Federation plans to commission two such stations located on the TOT of Crimea: one in the Cape Tarkhankut area and the second on Chersoneses Cape. The deployment of these stations will strengthen the near defense zone of the Black Sea Navy bases, and critical civil infrastructure, primarily against possible actions of underwater diversionary forces and means.

The Russian Federation plans to use the active MG-818 Diabaz magnetic acoustic station (detection, classification of underwater diversionary forces and means) to detect diversionary forces and means in the near defense zone of bases and other objects of marine infrastructure. To date, the combat capabilities of this station are being assessed and the location of its further deployment is being determined.

Amga-M ASS, Anaconda-SP SEMS and Diabaz MAS are autonomous stations, which allow quick deployment in the Azov-Black Sea region (Fig. 3). It is not excluded that they will be used to protect Russian-captured facilities at the Chornomornafogaz gas fields in the exclusive maritime economic zone of Ukraine and the Kerch Strait bridge.

In the period of 2018-2019, the new Delta-MGA system was tested and commissioned. It is actively used in the interests of JSC Gazprom (according to statements, in the interests of the offshore gas pipelines' security). These sonar stations are installed on the route of the TurkStream pipeline (Fig. 4).

The Russian Federation does not give up the prospect of increasing the means of sonar reconnaissance by deployment such means on the infrastructure facilities of the Blue Stream and the TurkStream, which will practically lead to full control of the underwater space of the Black Sea.

Thus, the Russian Federation is secretly forming a new "from under the water" threat, preparing




Fig. 3. Sonar systems in the Black Sea.

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


Fig. 4. The System «Delta-MGA».

an underwater bridgehead as an element of total control over the Black Sea and transferring the upcoming confrontation not only to space, but also under the water. Will Moscow stop there? Apparently not!

Aware of the military-political and military-strategic changes taking place at the end of 2019, Putin set a task to develop a new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation and a 2035 Weapons Development Programme. We should expect the development of a new Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, followed by the new marine challenges and threats.

As the Russian Federation occupies the Black and Azov Seas, other powerful players do not trail far behind in the underwater space. An example is the April publication a report titled “Emerging

technologies and the future of US-Japan defense collaboration” by the US Atlantic Council. The research reviews the technological trends in the focus of the world's leading states. One of the main trends is unmanned underwater vehicles. China's success is indicative. Unmanned systems are used by them not only for data collection and reconnaissance, but also to indicate a permanent presence and support their claims in the South China Sea. The Chinese Navy spends a lot of time and effort to develop and deploy new unmanned platforms for underwater space.

What shall be done? The implementation of the following measures is critical:

1. The creation of a Unified State Surveillance System for Surface and Underwater Environment based on objects and zone reconnaissance principles with the option of the

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS



Chinese new unmanned submarine HSU-001.

data exchange on the situation by the state users – the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, Coast Guard State Border Service of the MIA of Ukraine, the Ministry of Infrastructure, as well as with partner countries.

For example, the Romanian Integrated System for Observation, Surveillance and Control of the Traffic at the Black Sea S.C.O.M.A.R – was created within five years. The system consists of two subsystems – the Border police subsystem and the Marine forces' subsystem. It has surveillance components (air, land, and marine), a command and a response component. A special feature of S.C.O.M.A.R. system is that along with radar and optic-electronic equipment, both manoeuvrable and stationary sonar reconnaissance means are used. Interesting is the experience of combining S.C.O.M.A.R. and SCOD (System for Control and Observation of the traffic on Danube) systems.

2. Organization of anti-submarine and diversionary defense of critical marine infrastructure (ports, hydraulic structures, naval bases, etc.).
3. Development of heterogeneous components of the Navy and Maritime Security of the SBS (ships, boats, naval aviation, special forces, ultra-small submarines) for the tasks of anti-underwater, mine and anti-underwater and diversionary defense.
4. Working out the issues of eliminating the threats in the underwater space within the framework of the international NATO's Atlantic Resolve Operation involving the forces and means of both NATO and partner countries.

An example of the compatibility of forces and means of NATO member countries and Ukraine as a partner country is the participation of the Hetman Sahaydachny frigate in the international Sea Shield manoeuvres (Romania) in 2015 and 2016 together with the Alliance ships. One of the manoeuvres episodes was the search for a possible enemy submarine, the role of which was performed by a Turkish Atılay-class submarine. Our frigate provided sonar control of the underwater environment in 2015 for 2 hours

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

and 28 minutes, and in 2016 – for almost 1 hour. And this is with analogue sonar, which has been on board since the ship was built in 1992.

Finally, it is worth remembering that on November 12, 2019, under the leadership of the Commander Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army V. Gerasimov, a meeting attended by the commanders of Russian military districts located in the European part of Russia, commanders of the Armed Forces, the chiefs of staff and operational departments of

the respective army groups, was held. Report of V. Gerasimov was devoted to the analysis of threats in three directions: Northern, Southern and Western and Ukraine separately. In the Southern direction, the main identified tasks were countering the increase of NATO's presence in the region, protection and security of the offshore energy facilities and navigation in the Black Sea, and countering the US Missile Defense System in the region. Thus, Russia is preparing for a not-defensive war at sea. It purposefully creates advantages for itself on the Black Sea theatre of operations in advance.

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The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation: The Soviet Fleet behind the Painted Facade⁴

The Black Sea Fleet (BSF) of the RF, in comparison with the strategic Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet, has always played a secondary role in the Soviet-Russian history. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a significant part of its ships was

dominance in the region, and the grouping of forces in Crimea also became a symbol of a striking fist against NATO.

After the occupation of Crimea, the military and



"cut to pieces" due to the inability to maintain such a number of outdated combat units. However, in 2014, after the Russian occupation of Crimea, the BSF gained military, strategic and geopolitical importance. Russia's naval formation in the Black Sea became a demonstration of Russia's claims to

political leadership of Russia managed to strengthen not only the military group on the annexed Peninsula, but also the Black Sea Fleet. The process of qualitative and quantitative strengthening of the BSF, pulling it up to the quantitative and qualitative indicators of the USSR times, began. Since the occupation of Crimea, the Fleet received over 20 new combat units. These include three Krivak IV class frigates, six Improved Kilo-class submarines, Buyan-M class missile boats and Project 22160 patrol ships. All combat units are equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles. Today, the Black Sea

⁴ The publication was prepared in the framework of the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea Region through Greater Engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations" with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Black Sea Trust Fund or its partners.

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Fleet consists of 74 warships and boats, including 7 diesel submarines. Construction of new ships and boats for the Black Sea Fleet, according to Russian officials, continues. Some experts talk about Russia's ousting of rivals from the Black Sea, its conquest of sea dominance, and its creation of a Mare Nostrum in the region. Thus, the situation in the Russian Black Sea Navy requires careful analysis and appropriate assessment.

Quantitative and qualitative indicators of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation

As of the end of 2019, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation consisted of 227 waterborn platforms, including 74 warships and boats (32.6% of the total number of ships), and 153 support vessels (67.4 %) (see *Table 1*). The average age of waterborn platforms is 30.4 years. The average age of combat vessels is 20.2. The ratio of combat units (ships and boats) and auxiliary watercrafts is 2.07 auxiliary watercrafts for one combat unit, which is conditioned by both the unbalanced structure of the Fleet and its low technical condition, which, in turn, requires continuous support of warships at sea.

Table 1

Age structure of watercraft of the Russian Black Sea Fleet

All ships, 227			Including combat ships and boats, 74	
Age of watercraft (years)	Number	%	Number	%
1 - 10	72	31,7	35	47,2
11 - 15	4	1,76	3	4,05
16 - 20	3	1,32	2	2,7
21 - 25	1	0,44	0	0
26 - 30	12	5,29	4	5,4
31 - 35	33	14,53	18	24,3
36 - 40	22	9,7	5	6,75
41 - 45	20	8,81	2	2,7
46 - 50	21	9,25	2	2,7
51 - 55	17	7,49	3	4,05
56 - 60	6	2,64	-	-
61 - 65	10	4,41	-	-
66 - 70	4	1,76	-	-
71 - 75	1	0,44	-	-
76 - 80	1	0,44	-	-

An important combat characteristic of the Fleet's capability is data concerning the total weight of fire by missiles, artillery, torpedo weapons and air defense, mine setting capacity and Fleet's amphib-

ious operations. The total salvo of the Black Sea Fleet is 329.34 tonnes. Its structure by fire type and battle range is as follows (see *Table 2*).

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Table 2

The structure of a volley of the Russian Black Sea Fleet

Total volley by missiles – 72,9 t, including at a distance:						
Distance (km)	20	90	150	250	700	1400
Weight (t)	6,27	1,96	5,96	10,8	8,0	40
Total volley by artillery 169,4 t, including at a distance:						
Distance (km)	5	10	15	20		
Weight (t)	15,389	110,75	1152	42,087		
Total volley by air defense means 19,9 t, including at a distance:						
Distance (km)	2,5	3,5	6	15	24	50
Weight (t)	0,02106	1,51936	2,608	1,44	0,96	4,464
Total volley by torpedo weapons - 67 t at the distance 15 km						

In 2019, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation actively practiced setting mines in areas of submarine threat and possible mine blockade of ports, straits, and shallow sea areas. Fleet's

ships can simultaneously set **443 sea mines** and, observing the minimum interval, create a 53-km mine line.

Table 3

Possibilities of mine installation

Type and project of a ship	Name of a ship	Number	Number of mines at a ship	Total number of mines
Grisha-class corvettes	Alexandrovet Suzdalets Muromets Povorino Yeisk Kasimov	6	18	108
Natya-class minesweepers	Ivan Golubets Carpet Turbinit Valentin Pikul Vice-Admiral Zakhariev	5	7	35
Gorya-class minesweeper	Zheleznyakov	1	16	16
Alexandrit-class minesweepers	Ivan Antonov Vladimir Emelyanov	2	7	14
Improved Kilo-class submarines	Krasnodar Rostov-on-Don Sary Oskol Novorossiysk Velikiy Novgorod Kolpino	6	24	144
Kilo-class submarine	Alrosa	1	24	24

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Type and project of a ship	Name of a ship	Number	Number of mines at a ship	Total number of mines
Alligator-class landing ships	Orsk Saratov Nikolay Filchenkov	3	30?	90?
Project 02510 landing boats		3	4	12
The number of mines number of one-time installation				443

Offensive capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation are determined not only by the power of the fire salvo, but also by the possibility of assets landing on the territory of a potential enemy (*see Table 4*).

Table 4

Landing capabilities of the Russian Black Sea Fleet

Type and project of a ship	Number	Seats for a landing unit at a ship		Seats for a landing unit. total		Draft, m
		Personnel	Technics	Personnel	Technics	
Alligator-class landing ships	3	300-400	20 tanks or 45 BTR or 50 vehicles	900-1200	60 tanks or 135BTR or 150 vehicles	4,5
Ropucha-class landing ships	4	340	10 middle tanks	1360	40 middle tanks	3,7
		340	12 armored vehicles	1360	48 armored vehicles	
		313	3 middle tanks 3 self-propelled artillery systems 2S9 «Nona-S» MTLB 4 cargo vehicles	1252	12 middle tanks 12 self-propelled artillery systems 2S9 «Nona-S» 4 MTLB 12 cargo vehicles	
Serna-class landing crafts	2	92 or	or 1 basic tank or 2 IFV or 45 t of cargo	184 or	or 2 basic tanks or 4 IFV or 90 t of cargo	1,52
Ondatra-class landing crafts	2	20 or	1 basic tank or 2 GAZ-66 or 5 t of cargo	40 or	2 basic tanks or 4 GAZ-66 or 10 t of cargo	1,5
Project 02510 landing boats	3	19	-	57	-	0,9
Raptor-class patrol boats	7	20	-	140	-	0,9
Flamingo-class patrol boats	2	27	-	54	-	1,24

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Type and project of a ship	Number	Seats for a landing unit at a ship		Seats for a landing unit. total		Draft, m
		Personnel	Technics	Personnel	Technics	
Anti-diversion boat of the type 1S16MII	2	8	-	16	-	?
Total	25			5363-5663	ACV – 315 Vehicles – 166 Cargo – 100 t	

Analysis of combat training and activities of the Black Sea Fleet

After the occupation of Crimea and Russia's intervention in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, the Black Sea Fleet became one of the priority tools for ensuring the military and political course of the Russian Federation in the Black and Mediterranean Sea. The Black Sea Fleet is responsible for the smooth functioning of the maritime logistics chain, the so-called Syrian Express, between Novorossiysk, occupied Sevastopol and the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia. The Black Sea Fleet warships protect the captured by the "green" men marine infrastructure facilities of the Ukrainian PJSC Chornomornaftogaz, located within the exclusive (marine) economic zone in the offshore fields of the Black and Azov Seas, primarily gas production platforms where Russian marines and technical reconnaissance facilities are located.

During 2019, the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation performed the combat tasks in various sea zones.

In the far sea zone – the Mediterranean Sea and other areas of the World Ocean – over 30 ships, submarines and support vessels performed the tasks set. The total travel time of the marine forces for this period was almost 4,500 sea days, with the travel equal to over 237,000 nautical miles in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 50 port calls were made to the ports of Algeria, Greece, Cyprus, Djibouti, Turkey, Oman, Yemen, Pakistan, and Egypt.

In the North-Western part of the Black Sea, protection and monitoring of gas and condensate fields and production platforms captured from Ukraine during the 2014 occupation of Crimea in the exclusive maritime economic zone of Ukraine,

was performed ensuring the readiness to block Ukrainian ports, monitor the movement of NATO ships and international manoeuvres in this zone. These tasks were carried out mainly by the Crimean naval base vessels (the 41st Brigade of Missile Boats, the 68th Brigade of Harbor Defense Ships, and the 519th Division of Reconnaissance Ships).

In the area of the Kerch Strait and the Caucasus coast, the Black Sea Fleet participated in ensuring the protection of the Kerch bridge with the help of Novorossiysk naval base, supporting the actions of the FSS and the Russian Guard Troops' border service ships in blocking of the Kerch Strait, monitoring the activities of the Georgian and Turkish Navies in the Eastern and Southern sectors of the Black Sea, as well as the security of the Blue Stream gas pipeline in this area and ensuring the security of state calls in the area of the Southern Federal District.

The Command of the Russian Navy in 2019, the military authorities, forces and the troops of BSF demonstrated the ability to perform the command-designed tasks. The readiness of the units, formations and detachments of the fleet were repeatedly checked during the command and staff training and manoeuvres in March-July, as well as in August in a bilateral command and staff exercises with the troops and forces under the leadership of the Commander of the Southern Military District. During the year, the Black Sea Fleet conducted 165 various drills, including over 500 battle exercises; 35 single and joint rocket firings, were performed. Compared to 2018, the number of missile firings doubled. The total operating time of anti-submarine ships with submarines also increased by 3.5 times, and that between the submarines doubled.

At the end of 2019, 43 ships and vessels were repaired at the 13th Shipyard of the Black Sea Fleet,

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

both schedules and extraordinary repairs were performed, in particular, the Moskva guided missile cruiser, Alrosa attack submarine (SSK), Saratov large landing ship (LLS), LLS Yamal, FG Ladny, Bora hoverborne guided missile corvette, Ivan Khurs SIGINT ship, and OS-138 special vessel. Unscheduled repairs of various degrees of complexity of ships and vessels that were on combat service in the far sea zone were also carried out by floating workshops in the 720th logistics point in Tartus (Syria). In particular, SSK Krasnodar, SSK Stary Oskol, OMS Kovrovets, FFG Pytlivyy, FFG Admiral Makarov, Ivan Bubnov tanker, MB304 ocean tugboat, Dvinitza-50 cargo ship, GS Donuzlav, and Suvorovets anti-diversion boat, were repaired.

In the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, the flight training plan is fulfilled by 115%. This includes a total flight plan of 104%, a flight plan for Su-30 Flanker-F multi-role fighters – 100%, a flight plan for Ka-27 Helix helicopters – 134%, and Mi-8 Hip – 145%. 457 helicopter landings were made on surface ships (106% planned, 75% over the number of 2018). It should be noted that against the background of the Sea Breeze 2019 exercise, the Black Sea Fleet's aviation practiced new tactical techniques, including Filter and Wall for overriding the enemy missile strikes. The air transportation plan was fulfilled by 236%. The plan on fleet's combat training and counteraction to NATO forces in the Black Sea was completed by 189%.

For 2020, in addition to the participation of the Black Sea Fleet in operational, tactical and strategic exercises in the Black Sea (including Kavkaz-2020 strategic command and staff exercise in September 2020), 40 combat services of the Black Sea Fleet ships in the far sea zone and 35 calls to foreign ports are planned. In 2020, it is planned to form 20 crews to complete the ships and vessels under construction, and during the year, 16 warships and auxiliary support vessels are expected to pass to service. The fleet aviation will continue practical development of helicopters, including the Ka-27 Helix, and Ka-31 Helix-B.

At analysis of the capability of the Russian BSF to perform the tasks set, not only firing naval capacities but also its special potential below shall be considered:

- SIGINT Centre (Sevastopol) with a separate UAV squadron;
- The 475th Separate SIGINT Centre (Vidradne, Sevastopol), is armed with 3 SIGINT complexes Murmansk-BN, Infauna, Krasukha-4, eight complexes Leer-3, two jamming stations R-330ZH Zhitel and R-934 BMW;
- The 102nd Special Purpose Unit of the Anti-submarine and Diversionary Assets (Sevastopol, the staff number is 60 people, equipped with coastal self-propelled bombing systems DP-62 Damba, eight anti-diversionary boats, a complex of remote underwater reconnaissance and surveillance Obzor);
- The 136th Special Purpose Detachment with underwater anti-diversionary service (Novorossiysk, 60 people, equipped with a remote underwater reconnaissance and surveillance complex Obzor, anti-diversionary boats);
- The 388th Marine Reconnaissance Point (Sevastopol, includes 4 companies – two special purpose, one underwater mining, and one communications, platoons of technical and material support);
- 127th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (Sevastopol) of three-battalion composition:
 - reconnaissance battalion (two special purpose companies and a reconnaissance and landing company);
 - SIGINT battalion (electronic intelligence company, electronic warfare company, communications platoon, support platoon);
 - management battalion (UAV company, material support company, technical support company, and commandant's company);
 - psychological operations' squad;
 - engineering platoon;
 - radiochemical reconnaissance group.

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

And this is only part of the special capacities of the Black Sea Fleet.

Weaknesses of the Russians: What shall we consider?

While realistically assessing the threat posed by Russia and its fleet in the Black Sea, we should not exaggerate the available capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet. The vast majority of the ship's personnel of the Black Sea Fleet remain morally and physically obsolete. In addition, it is becoming more difficult for Russian industry to build new ships in the sea and ocean zone due to the economic crisis, the sanctions and the technological deficiency of the Russian military and industrial complex. The command of the Russian Navy recognizes that the problems of the technical condition of the Black Sea Fleet are caused by the following factors:

- age characteristics of ships and vessels;
- the presence of ships and vessels built at foreign shipyards in the Black Sea Fleet, which causes issues with spare parts and high-quality repairs. There are 38 such vessels in the Fleet;
- the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation, which results in the supply of even new ships with mechanisms and engines that are not designed, which leads to non-compliance with the technical parameters of ships with the designed specifications and frequent failures;
- intensive combat training, which usually significantly increases the training of crews and leadership, but at the same time leads to fast wear and tear of equipment and weapons.

In the Black Sea Fleet aviation, the low technical serviceability of the Be-12 Mail amphibious units and the Su-24M Fencer aircraft is associated with their physical ageing. In particular, Be-12 has been in operation for over 50 years, despite the fact that an equivalent replacement is not yet expected.

The problems of the Navy lie both in the plane of the technical condition of ships and vessels, and in the plane of personnel and organization. Personnel problems are characterized, first of all, by an insufficient general level of staffing of Fleet's units by contractors and by enlisted personnel in particular. This is due to the fact that Russia narrowed

the package of social guarantees for this category of military personnel. Also, at the meetings of the Fleet's Military Council, it was noted that the Navy has a chronic shortage of qualified navigators and experts in electrical and mechanical engineering. In the Black Sea Fleet aviation, according to estimates of the Fleet staff, there is a low level of training of both flight and technical personnel, understaffing of aircraft crews.



As for the replenishment of the Black Sea Fleet with new ships, the announced replenishment of the far sea zone will not happen in the coming years – the construction of Krivak IV class frigates Admiral Butakov, Admiral Istomin and Admiral Kornilov at the Kaliningrad Yantar Shipyard was frozen due to the lack of power plants for them, which is related to sanctions (refusal to supply gas turbine engines and gearboxes), and finally reoriented for export to India. The Black Sea Navy will not receive any new submarines in the foreseeable future. The main replenishment will consist of ships of the near sea zone, which the Russian industry can produce irrespective of the sanctions. However, the introduction of international sanctions to the "wrung out" by Russia Crimean shipyards (Zaliv Kerch Shipyard and Feodosia More SY) can significantly slow down this process.

It can be stated that the Black Sea Fleet now has enough forces and resources to horrify at the sea Ukraine and Georgia – the Black Sea countries that are not members of NATO. In 2017, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Gerasimov, noted that Russia created a "self-sufficient military formation" - in the occupied Crimea, over 32.5 thousand military personnel are stationed, and the Fleet was replenished with new warships and submarines equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles. Due to the new missile systems and aircraft deployed in the occupied Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet now fully controls the

FOCUS ON: ENEMY AT THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

majority of the Black Sea area. The Black Sea Fleet has enough funds to quickly transfer the advanced detachments of marine and special forces stationed in the occupied Crimea and Krasnodar territory of the Russian Federation to the South Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. This way, Russia tries on the role of the key military player in the region. How important was the occupation of Crimea and its transformation into an "onshore aircraft carrier" is evidenced by the course of the RF armed intervention in Syria and Libya. Moscow could only afford it because it had previously captured the Crimean Peninsula.

However, not everything is so good in the Fleet, as its full-time propagandists try to demonstrate.

Even the new frigates and submarines have very limited capabilities and do not pose a real threat to NATO ships in the Black Sea-Mediterranean space, and their number in the total ship composition is insufficient for large-scale combat operations at sea. The use of ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet to support the actions of the Syrian group of the Russian Army requires maximum Fleet effort and the old equipment needs continuous repairs. For a full-scale amphibious operation in the Black Sea or the Balkans, the Russians shall withdraw their troops from the territory of Syria, as the involvement of a few large amphibious ships in regular military transportations in the Syrian direction excludes the possibility of performing any other tasks.

Ihor KABANENKO,
Admiral of Reserve,

Andrii RYZHENKO,
Captain,
Ukraine

The Naval Forces of Ukraine: Time to Act⁵

It is known that during the Russian occupation of Crimea, most of the Ukrainian Navy's warships were captured by the Russians and remained in Crimea. The Command of the Ukrainian Navy, deployed in the spring of 2014 in Odesa, started urgent mobilization of everything that could physically stay afloat, including the installation of machine-gun weapons on auxiliary Navy vessels. Now it looks more like a step of desperation than preparation for a real counteraction at sea as it happened without a clear strategic vision and did not lead to an increase in the Navy's combat capabilities. In this context, it should be recalled that at that time, without any resistance, Ukrainian gas production and drilling platforms located on the continental shelf of our state were seized and later turned into military outposts of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation near the Black Sea coast of our state. Later, Moscow will build the Kerch Bridge and gain dominance in the Sea of Azov.

Naval experts with real experience of sea duty are well aware that populist statements or situational solutions at sea cannot solve the problems of Ukraine. The only possible restriction to any aggressor at sea is having power trumps in hand and an appropriate strategy. Unfortunately, only in 2016, with the change of the Navy leadership, an awareness of the need to develop the advanced strategy for Navy development, based on expert assessment of the real situation and the forecast of its development, came. Due to the efforts of the professional naval community, in 2017-2018 such

a strategy was developed and published under the title "Strategy of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the period till 2035" (hereinafter the Strategy).

The process of this strategic document preparation did not occur behind the scenes and behind the closed doors. Specialists of the Naval Forces, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine participated in the development of its provisions, using the experience of Ukrainian experts and colleagues from NATO and the EU, and the results of an active Internet discussion. The result is a logical, balanced and professional document that is written in a language understandable to politicians, the military and the ordinary citizens. The approved Strategy was presented by the Commander of the Ukrainian Naval Forces at the International Maritime Security Conference held on November 28, 2018 in Kyiv.

According to the Strategy, the main tasks of the Navy are defined: first is the protection of Ukraine from aggression at sea and from the sea direction; second is the protection of national economic interests of Ukraine at sea (including freedom of navigation and protection of maritime activities); third is participation in international maritime security operations.

Priorities for increasing Ukraine's naval capabilities by 2025 are as follows:

- purchase of anti-ship missiles and suitable platforms for naval surface forces (the so-called "mosquito" fleet);
- creation of the surface and underwater surveying system through the purchase of mobile radars, sonar stations, unmanned

⁵ The publication was prepared in the framework of the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea Region through Greater Engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations" with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Black Sea Trust Fund or its partners.

FOCUS ON: UKRAINIAN NAVY



Photo 1. International conference on the Maritime security.

Source: https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2017/11/28/u-kyevi-vidbulasya-mizhnarodna-konferencziya-z-morskoi-bezpeki/?fbclid=IwAR0BmPNXJMgmj8moDy7QnkPcBP6ZscLy9_cvy2YLqfRMt0wkrGB3VSuYM4M

aircraft, reconnaissance tools and integration of these tools and other Ministries and departments into a single system;

- development of marine special operations forces;
- development of the Ukrainian Navy base infrastructure.

Achieving the necessary combat potential of the fleet to perform these tasks was planned in several stages with priority formation of those capabilities that are required to respond to the most dangerous threats and, of course, taking into account the budget that the state can allocate to support the national Navy. According to calculations, the state can allocate up to 200 million US Dollars a year for the development of surface forces of the Ukrainian Navy in the near future. This is a significant amount, massively over what was allocated for this purpose earlier. However, it is not enough to create a group of frigates/corvettes, submarines and boats. It should be added that the

cost of the ship itself on average is only 30% of the cost of its maintenance during the entire life cycle. It is also necessary to take the costs of the naval base infrastructure and repair, fuel, crew training and quartering, etc. into account.

Given the threats to Ukraine's national security from the sea, it is obvious that the main focus of the Ukrainian Navy should be on the area of the Black Sea from Odesa to Sevastopol (approximately 150 miles long), and Mariupol/Berdyansk – approaches to the Kerch Strait (100 miles) on the Sea of Azov. Such geographical parameters simply give Ukraine the opportunity to concentrate naval weapons on small platforms – multi-purpose boats of the "mosquito" fleet. At the same time, not all combat boats are classified as "mosquitoes" – this must be clearly understood, as mosquito platforms allow acting asymmetrically as compared to traditional fleet forces (frigate, corvette), suddenly striking deadly blows (attacking) and breaking away from the pursuit. Low visibility, high speed, manoeuvrability of

FOCUS ON: UKRAINIAN NAVY

modern mosquito boats, the ability to mass efforts from different directions, and at the same time, the low efficiency of using anti-ship missile weapons (cruise missiles) and torpedoes of the enemy on them are solid properties and advantages in the modern war and the tools of power deterrence on a closed sea scene of operations. In real weather conditions of the Black and Azov Seas, such boats can be used almost all year round. The first experience of patrol actions of Island-type boats (35 meters long, 150 tons displacement), obtained under the US material and technical assistance programme, shows that such dimensions allow confidently performing the tasks in the Black Sea basin.

One of the key advantages of "mosquitoes" over the corvette-frigate fleet is the cost. Delivery of a set of naval weapons to the area of operations for a modern combat boat costs 15-20 times less than for a corvette or frigate. Those who, contrary to professional logic and experience, dream of a traditional fleet as a symmetrical way to restrict the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, do not consider the resources needed for this, and the absolute advantage of the Russian Black Sea Fleet over the Ukrainian Navy in the main types of naval weapons. We must honestly and professionally admit: even in the long term in the Black Sea region, Ukraine should not expect to achieve a symmetrical balance with the Russian Federation in naval forces and means. We should look for asymmetric techniques and ways to respond to danger, i.e. to form a "mosquito" fleet. Within the framework of the above budget resource, Ukraine has the opportunity to purchase over the next 4 years up to 30-35 modern combat boats for the Ukrainian Navy.

It is important to note that the purchase of larger ships for the needs of the Ukrainian Navy is determined by the further stages of the Strategy. The principle is that these ships will perform tasks in other operational zones, in the so-called "blue waters", i.e. outside the territorial waters of Ukraine, for example, during joint naval operations with NATO or the EU. At the same time, they will cost much over "mosquito" boats. On the other hand, in modern conditions, when the coastal waters of Ukraine are filled with threats and Ukraine is losing in symmetry, such ships are perfect targets for

the enemy's frigate-corvette groupings, equipped with anti-ship missile weapons of various types with the appropriate range. However, their detection and tracking is quite possible from the moment of leaving the base.

In this context, it is worth drawing attention to the attempts to revive the plans for the construction of national project 58250 corvettes with a displacement of over 2,500 tonnes. The project of this ship is difficult for implementation; Ukraine has no conditions for its construction, human, technological, organizational, structural, financial or banking; there are no closed cycles of marine nomenclature weapons' manufacturing, and so on. Even if we assume that there is a rhythmic budget financing, 100% fulfilment of counterparties, which is over 150 enterprises in Ukraine and abroad, obligations within the established deadlines, the completion of the lead ship will require at least 5-7 years. At the same time, this corvette will have an operating weight not exceeding the weight of a rocket boat (at a much higher cost).

The above is supported by a reasonable conclusion of the Strategy specifying that in the medium term "mosquito" fleet is the best option for asymmetric against enemy surface forces of the Ukrainian Navy, and at the same time, threatening the enemy in case of naval aggression against Ukraine.

The integrity, consistency and professional balance of the Strategy contributes to the actualization and targeting of partner programmes for restoration of the national Naval Forces. The transfer of two Island-type patrol boats from the United States to Ukraine in 2019 and the completion of plans to deliver three more such boats in 2021 actually started the era of creating the "mosquito" fleet of the Ukrainian Navy. The Ukrainian media already has the news about the delivery of the latest American "mosquitoes" – multi-purpose Mark VI boats equipped with the most modern naval weapons. We are receiving proposals from the partners from various NATO countries, including on localizing the production of certain platforms in Ukraine – we should welcome this approach as the most efficient way to restore the national shipbuilding cluster in the interests of the state defense at sea.

FOCUS ON: UKRAINIAN NAVY

There is another aspect to draw attention to. History teaches that time is of the essence in the times of crisis. In the early period of World War II, Winston Churchill was well aware that the cutting of British naval communications by Kriegsmarine submarines meant a defeat in the war. Only fast and manoeuvrable destroyers with a displacement of 600-1000 tonnes, fact, "mosquitoes" in today's understanding, could organize reliable protection of Transatlantic convoys. Their sizes just fit into subclasses from large boats to small corvettes. Heavy cruisers – the pride of the British Admiralty – for various reasons were unsuitable for these tasks. Experts estimated the need of at least 50 destroyers. It would take years to build so many ships in national shipyards. Due to the lack of time, Churchill rejected this offer and turned to the Americans for help. Quite quickly, an intergovernmental agreement was concluded and the UK received the expected destroyers. Of course, there were people criticizing Churchill for this deal, speaking of the inefficiency of outdated American destroyers at sea. But the moment of truth came when these destroyers played one of

the decisive roles in the difficult Battle of the Atlantic, in which Great Britain won.

In Ukraine, the situation is similar now. A state understanding that in the conditions of the active threats to Ukraine's national security from sea, the highest priority of the rapid purchase of modern high-tech combat boats (attack, patrol and amphibious) over the economic dividends of domestic shipbuilders, should be acquired. Given the real threats at sea, the Navy does not have time to wait for the national shipbuilding industry to get back on its feet and be able to create what is already effective on the Western market of naval weapons. Purchase of real combat capabilities and quality, and not paper ships' projects and plans for later, should be a priority. This is critical and requires awareness by the political and military leadership of Ukraine. Without a professional understanding of this, a naval fist that can asymmetrically and simultaneously effectively counter the aggressor will not be created, and state resources will have a serious risk of being blurred and levelled.



Photo 2: Island-type patrol boat on tests on the Black Sea.

Source: <https://vpressa.com.ua/news/ukraine/vms-ukrainy-vyprobuvaly-peredani-ssha-patrulni-katery-island>

FOCUS ON: UKRAINIAN NAVY



Photo 3: Multipurpose boat Mark VI (USA).

Source: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/ukraine-might-get-patrol-boats-united-states-162990>

Staged and resource-based development of capabilities should balance the revival of the Naval Forces; ensure their combat coordination to act mobile, asymmetric and fast, primarily on the most vulnerable places of the enemy. Priority for development and resources' provision should be given to the "mosquito" surface forces.

The Marine Corps should return to their typical tasks: amphibious (marine amphibious, counter-amphibious) operations, protection of marine (river) infrastructure, and inspection operations. Marine units should receive high-speed boats, amphibious transporters, missile systems and maritime situation monitoring systems to protect the coast and marine and river infrastructure facilities. It requires the development of base infrastructure at the Black and Azov Seas, the structuring of education and combat training of marines.

Naval aviation should continue performance of its tasks of anti-underwater warfare, conducting reconnaissance, monitoring the situation, supporting marine landing, search and rescue operations and special actions at sea and on rivers. Critical task of naval aviation should include the target

indication in the interests of the fleet's strike forces. Acceptance of the newest maritime patrol aircraft, transport and combat helicopters and multipurpose UAVs into the Navy seems promising. It is important to continue the cooperation of the Navy with the Air Forces and military aircraft of the Land Forces, which should be involved in marine and amphibious operations.

We must work out coordinated actions on the preparation and conduct of special actions at sea and on rivers with Special Operations Forces. In this aspect, the Navy should support its colleagues with speedboats, firepower, and maritime monitoring system.

The implementation of the above views will gradually increase the capacities from the minimum to necessary competitive to deterrence and protection against the aggressive actions of the enemy.

In addition to increasing combat capabilities, the development of the Ukrainian Navy's management system should be completed by 2023. It is important to create a representative office (com-

FOCUS ON: UKRAINIAN NAVY

mand) for Naval Forces in the city of Kyiv, i.e. at the strategic level. Its functions should be the development of the National Navy, namely, the formation of strategies and concepts, the purchase of naval weapons, and interaction with the authorities and foreign partners on naval issues. According to the experience of the Western countries, the availability of naval experts (the specified representation or command) in the capital, close to the legislative and executive power bodies, improves the responsiveness to challenges and threats from the sea. This also contributes to better planning and implementation of shipbuilding programmes (procurement of weapons and equipment of the marine nomenclature), which require significant time and resources, continuous contact with other Ministries and departments of Ukraine, domestic and foreign industry.

In all of the above, the human factor will become critical. Focusing on the most advanced naval combat platforms, such as Mark VI combat boats, the latest intellectual weapons, various sensors, high-tech digital and other equipment, requires motivated, educated and well-trained personnel. This requires systematic work of the state political and military leadership, aimed at forming a motivation and incentives system that will attract the best representatives of our nation to serve in the updated and combat-ready Ukrainian Navy.

In General, long-term political and military reluctance regarding the priorities of Ukrainian Navy building should be ended by adequate decisions based on professional arguments, logic and common sense. This should be followed by purposeful and efficient actions – there is no time left for anything else. It is time to act...

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

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Role of the Black Sea and Baltic Regions in the World Politics⁶

In the research paper, the geopolitical situation in the Baltic and Black Sea Regions, geopolitical importance of both regions, those threats and challenges, which both regions are faced and which are interrelated with the increasing the military presence from the Western and Russian sides, organization of the military exercises, new strategy of NATO and USA especially in the Wide Black Sea Area are analyzed. At the second part of the research includes the perspectives of cooperation between two regions, particularly, taking into account the importance of the increasing the defense expenditures of the NATO Allies from Baltic and Black Sea Regions, sharing an experience of the Baltic countries related to the development of democratic institutions, good governance, defense and security issues, main priorities of the promotion the cooperation among the civil societies, scientific circles, NGO-s of the two regions with the main purpose to introduce the Baltic-Black Sea Regional Cooperation Center. This organization should study relations between two regions, publish books and articles, work out concrete recommendations to the governmental agencies and other decision-making bodies in both regions related to the promotion of the cooperation between them in the fields of trade, energy, democracy, defense and security etc.

Introduction

During the last decade the direction of the inter-regional cooperation has been significantly transformed. Political map of Europe has been changed, and new states have strengthened their independence on the post-soviet space. At the same time,

the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe – former representatives of the communist block - have been finally integrated to the international democratic community as a result of their democratic and socio-economic development. Under the modern conditions of globalization and regionalization, there is a great necessity to develop cooperation among these regions, which, taking into consideration the concrete geopolitical, economic, and security environment, have common interests and priorities. In this regard, the Baltic and Black Sea regions represent one of the clear examples of the existence the common interests of the two regions. It is necessary to point out the establishment of good relations among the governments of some countries from the Black Sea region (BSR), on the one side, and Baltic states (BS), on the other side, a clear example of which is an active support by the Baltic states of the integration of Georgia and Ukraine to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, the Three Seas Initiative, interest of the Baltic countries toward the energy projects in Black Sea/Caspian region, adoption of the EU Eastern Partnership, where countries from post-soviet space of the Black Sea region are included etc. Meanwhile, it is necessary to point out the common problems for the countries of the Black Sea and Baltic regions and some negative factors on the way of cooperation between countries from Black Sea and Baltic regions.

Some of the factors are: Russian military intervention to Georgia in August of 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and attacks to the cyberspaces of Estonia (NATO and EU member state) in 2007 and Georgia (NATO partner country) in August 2008 during the Georgia-Russia war; military concentration of NATO countries, on the one side, and Russia, on the other side, in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Thus, it can be considered that both regions represent the frontline between NATO and Russia, furthermore, the problems of oil and gas import –

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FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

energy dependence mostly on one main source in most of the states of Black Sea and Baltic states, and correspondent energy crises in Europe after the energy conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 years, as well as intension of the Kremlin to implement various energy projects - construction of oil and gas pipelines bypassing the territories of Black Sea and Baltic countries (“Blue stream 2”, “North Stream 2”). In the countries of the Black Sea and Caspian regions, there are conflicts, which are mostly inspired by external forces in different forms (problems of separatism in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine). Some anti-western and anti-democratic forces are also activated in Estonia and Latvia, and they have appeared, for example, after moving of the monument of the Soviet soldier from the center of Tallinn in 2007.

In a long-term perspective, the security of all states of the Black Sea and Baltic regions is an object of military and non-military risks, and due to the variety of those threats, they are very often unpredictable. Among the risks we can call ethnical and religious confrontation, terrorism, WMD distribution, and state-sponsored terrorism by the initiative of some states in the world, existence of terrorist forces in the Middle East and North Caucasus that can threaten the EU and NATO member states in the Baltic and Black Sea regions (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey) and NATO’s partner states with Euro-Atlantic orientation (first of all Ukraine and Georgia).

All above-mentioned factors clearly show that states and societies in both regions have many common problems, solution of which is impossible without joint efforts by governments and civil societies in all countries of both regions. The changed security environment, which was established after the Georgia-Russia war and the start of the Ukraine-Russia war, clearly showed the necessity of amendments to various documents related to national security – national security concepts, threats assessment documents, strategic defense reviews, military doctrines of the countries from the both regions. At the same time, in spite of the existence of common interests, the reality is that the cooperation is not developed in many spheres. For example:

- Despite the adoption of the EU Eastern Partnership initiative for the EU partner countries from BSR (together with Belarus), there are some fields related to defense and security, economy, which have not been transferred into active phase of cooperation.
- Despite the fact, that some energy projects are considered, according to which it will be possible to export energy resources from the Caspian region via BSR to the Baltic region, the Baltic States and some BSR states are still mostly dependent on one main source of the energy supply. Furthermore, there is no prognosis, when the energy projects, which will provide energy security to the Black Sea and Baltic regions, will start. Some of these projects are not included into the agenda at this stage. The examples are the “White stream” gas pipeline and Odesa-Brody oil pipeline.
- Despite the initiative, declared by Presidents of the Black Sea and Baltic countries in 2006-2007, on foundation of a democratic community with participation of countries from both regions, this initiative has not been transferred into real cooperation.
- There is a lack of cooperation among the different regional organizations (BSEC, GUAM, and Nordic Initiative) in both regions.
- Today, all countries of both regions do not work out common approaches and preventive mechanisms to counter possible external aggression.
- There is a legal basis for investments of the companies of the Baltic region to different sectors of economy in the Black Sea region, but, on the contrary, there is a lack of investments from the companies from BSR to the Baltic States. These factors cause the lack of the existence of joint enterprises.
- There is a lack of trade relations between the countries from both regions, which, together with other factors, are interrelated with high barriers for different goods produced in BSR countries for the EU market.

FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

- In many cases, the appropriate governmental agencies in BSR states and non-governmental actors do not take into consideration the experience of the Baltic States in the field of democratization, European and Euro-Atlantic integration etc.

All above mentioned problems, together with other factors, are interrelated with the following aspects:

- There is a lack of the joint programs, which can be implemented by initiatives of the civil society circles in both, Black Sea and Baltic countries. This factor is mostly connected with the issue, that there are almost no donor organizations, which fund joint projects with participation of NGO-s or educational institutions from several countries of the Black Sea and Baltic regions. The Eastern Partnership initiative of Black Sea Trust Fund and East-East Program of the Open Society Institute, NATO program “Security through Science” are the exception from this rule.
- There is a lack of joint programs that creates problems of organizing different inter-regional initiatives – implementation of joint research projects on security, economic, political, cultural and other issues, organization of seminars, conferences, round-tables, and publishing appropriate literature etc.
- There is a lack of information in the societies of the countries of both regions about political, security, socio-economic and other important processes, which are going on in the Baltic region, particularly among the scientific circles, representatives of the governmental agencies, students, NGO-s, representatives of the different regions etc. The same problem on BSR exists among civil society representatives in the Baltic region.

Geopolitical situation in Baltic Region after gaining the independence

During the discussion on geopolitical situation in the Baltic region and determination of the foreign policy and national security priorities of the Baltic

countries, it should be pointed out the main principles of foreign policy strategy of three Baltic States, in particular:

Membership in the European Union and NATO will remain the cornerstone of Lithuania's, Latvia's and Estonia's foreign policy strategies;

Frictions in the Atlantic alliance, as well as political fragmentation in Europe, will continue to pose a threat to the Baltic States, because these countries depend on their international alliances for their security;

While NATO membership is an important factor deterring a formal invasion, the Baltic countries will remain under threat from other forms of aggression, including cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns.

2018 was a symbolic year for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, because it marks the centenary of their independence from the Russian Empire.

The 20-th century has been less than easy for all three small countries, because 20 years of independence was quickly followed by occupation, first by the Soviets in 1940, after by Nazi Germany within the period 1941-1945 and then again by the Soviet Empire. The three republics lived under the occupation regime for almost five decades, only regaining independence in 1990 and 1991.

In the contemporary period, the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are enjoying unprecedented prosperity and a vibrant democracy, 25 years after gaining independence from the Soviet Union. But they are also concerned on how Russia's growing assertiveness, as well as friction between Moscow and the West, could affect their security.

Threats on the Doorstep

When listening to governmental officials, academics, business leaders and think tank experts from the Baltic countries, one common theme rapidly

FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

emerges: Russia is still widely seen as a threat. This fear is a result of history and geography, because Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are small, flat and easy to be invaded. Their position near the Baltic Sea and their strategic location at the crossroads of the European, Nordic and Russian markets have made these lands an attractive place for invaders, which explains why they have spent so many centuries under foreign power. Regional powers, such as Germany and Sweden, invaded the region in the past, but the latest memories obviously stem from the Soviet occupation after the World War II.

The late 1990s and early 2000s offered temporary relief to the region, as the three states have successfully overcome the transition period from the totalitarian Soviet regime to democracy and from the centrally planned economy to the free market economy, joined the European Union and NATO in 2004. The official Kremlin — for the first time in decades — did not look as aggressive as it used to be and had not enough resources to prevent the integration of three Baltic Republics to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. But gradual strengthening the geopolitical positions of Putin's Russia in the second decade of the 21-st century, clear example of which was Russian invasion into Georgia in 2008 and especially the Russian annexation of Crimea and support to the separatists band formations (separatist forces) in eastern Ukraine in 2014, reignited the Baltic region's traditional fears of Russian aggression. These fears do not necessarily stem from a potential invasion, but from other forms of aggression, including cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and support for subversive domestic groups. Clear examples of the aggressive measures from Moscow were cyberattacks on the information system of Estonia in 2007 and support to the pro-Russian political forces and communities in all three Baltic States.

Taking into consideration the existed realities of the last years, the Baltic countries have increased their military spending and sought to reduce their dependence on Russian energy. However, these states continue to import significant volume of the natural gas from Russia. At the same time, Russian financial resources are presented in the bank sectors of the Baltic States, and ethnic Russians

represent about a quarter of the population in Estonia and Latvia. While NATO membership ostensibly protects the region from any formal military attacks, the leaders of the Baltic States are fretting about the challenges of preventing and deterring other forms of economic, political and social aggression.

Geopolitical situation around the Baltic region after 2014

The issues, related to Russia's intentions, are also related to another concern in the Baltic region - the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance and stability of the Euro-Atlantic space. The win of Donald Trump as the U.S. President created uncertainty in the region, especially after he criticized Europe's low levels of military expenditure and, at least for a while, raised doubts about the White House's commitment to NATO's principle of collective defense. What America does is more important than what it says, and the reality on the ground is that the United States remains committed to the Baltic security. For example, the U.S. fighter jets remain an important part of NATO's air policing mission in the area, and the U.S. forces periodically participate in military exercises in the region.

After Presidential elections Trump expressed his position that the White House was contemplating permanent military base in Poland. Even if this idea never materializes, the musings provide a clear message of support to the region. This, however, does not signify that there are no disagreements between American and European allies in the contemporary period.

There are additional factors complicating the picture for the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian governments. For somebody, relations might seem to be good between the Baltic States and the European Union, but the same does not ring true for some of the Baltic nations' allies. Poland and Romania share the trio's sense of urgency regarding Russia, including a desire to reduce the region's dependence on Russian energy and keep NATO as engaged as possible in the region. However, Warsaw and Bucharest, to a less degree, are currently experiencing tension with the European Commission,

FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

because Brussels pays the primary attention to the deterioration of rule of law in those countries.

In general, to strengthen the security in the region, the relations between three Baltic States and the North Atlantic Alliance have been significantly promoted after the increasing of its military presence in the region. NATO deployed about 4500 military servicemen in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland. This process was developed according to the Decisions of the NATO Summit in 2016 – the Alliance decided to locate four multinational battalions. At the same time, the USA deployed a tank brigade in the Central and Eastern Europe and conducted military exercises in the Baltic region [1].

In the middle of 2018, the USA sent B-2 stealth-bombers to Europe, and other bombers and armed units for the exercises in the Baltic region [2].

In its turn, Russia also increased the number of its forces. Moscow deployed rockets and new armed units. According to the official Kremlin, those steps represented the keeping of balance because of the deployment NATO forces. In September 2018, Russia and Belarus conducted the joint military exercises in the region.

Aggressive policy of Russia in the Baltic region

In 2017, on the territory of Russia and Belarus, the joint strategic military exercises Zapad 2017 were held, in which, according to the official information, about 13 thousand military servicemen participated [5]. During that period, NATO member states and other European countries criticized the organizers, who officially declared less number of military servicemen, which participated in the military exercises (in comparison with the reality) with the purpose to limit the foreign observers.

One year later, Russia organized new exercises, in the Far East, the biggest military exercises after the disintegration of the USSR under the name Vostok 2018, where about 300 thousand military servicemen, 36 thousand tanks, more than 1000 planes and helicopters, about 100 ships, and also military units from China and Mongolia participated [12].

NATO replied by the organization of the military exercises under the name Trident Juncture. In October 25 - November 7, 2018, the Alliance organized the military exercises in the Baltic region. It was the biggest exercise of the Alliance since the end of the Cold war. 65 military ships, 250 plains, 10 thousand transport systems and 50 thousand military servicemen were involved. All NATO member states, Sweden and Finland participated [10].

Russia expressed its agitation as a result of those exercises. Within the information policy, Minister of Defense of Russia Sergey Shoygu pointed out that, in comparison to NATO, the Russian Federation was developing its military capabilities on its own territory as a result of the introduction the new armament and intensive training of the armed forces. The Minister of Defense also mentioned that, in the period of 2015-2018, the number of the military contingent of the North Atlantic Alliance in Baltic region, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, increased from 2 thousand to 15 thousand servicemen, and during the exercises, that contingent reached the number of 40-60 thousand militaries [11].

In general, one hundred years have passed since Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declared their independence, but the countries' external challenges — as well as their strategies — are much the same in 2018 as they were in 1918. For small countries surrounded by powerful neighbors, developing as many international alliances as possible is essential. NATO and the EU membership will remain the cornerstone of their foreign policy, and keeping the United States (which they see as the ultimate guarantor of their security) engaged in the region will be key. By the same token, friction within the Atlantic alliance and the political fragmentation in Europe represent serious threats to their security. Facing such challenges, the Baltic nations will continue to develop as many political, economic and military partnerships as possible to ensure that their hard-earned independence becomes the norm, instead of the exception, in a history marked by such turbulence.

Geopolitical and geo-strategic importance of the Black Sea region

After the collapse of the USSR, the new geopolitical realities were created in the global politics and especially in the post-Soviet space. Together with

FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

such a positive event as disintegration of the last totalitarian empire – the USSR, in the beginning of 1990s, several political and interethnic conflicts have been emerged in the post-Soviet space, first of all in the Black Sea region. Imperialistic ambitions of Russia have increased the tension in the area.

The Wider Black Sea region (like the Baltic region) has become a new strategic frontier for Europe, Russia and the United States in terms of energy security, frozen and festering conflicts, trade links, migration and other key areas. Prospects for the Black Sea in the 21st century will be shaped by the interaction between major external actors, the ambitions of states and peoples in the region, and the region's role as a crossroad of civilizations.

There are three groups of basic interests, represented in the Black Sea region today. First, there are the interests of the West divided quite explicitly between the US and the positions of the major European countries. Both, Washington and the EU powers pursue strategies for changes and transformation of the region around the Black Sea, motivated by different policy agendas, which are only partially coincided.

Second, there are interests of post-Soviet Russia and Turkey, as leading geopolitical players from the Region.

Third, we observe the interests of smaller Black Sea countries (Ukraine included, even if its size does not correspond to the definition of a “small country”). Those smaller countries are quite diverse and challenged by different policy agendas.

Militarization of the Black Sea region after annexation of Crimea

From 2000 to 2015, defense expenditures in the Black Sea region composed 2.5 - 2.4% of GDP, and the maximum (3.1%) was achieved in 2007. While in the first half of 2000-th, defense expenditures were reduced and the minimum (2.3% of GDP) was achieved in 2004, the second half of the decade, from 2005 to 2008, was characterized by an increasing in the expenditures. After 2008, in spite of the Russian-Georgian war, the economic crisis put an end to the raising of the militarization of the region and defense ex-

penditures in the Black Sea region, and they were sharply (by 10%) reduced in 2008 and 2009, from approximately 40 billion US dollars to 36 billion US dollars [3].

In the percentages of the GDP, the expenditures were stabilized at the level of around 3%. The most noticeable changes were observed from 2008 to 2010. In 2010, the countries of Black Sea region spent on their armed forces 2.6% of GDP, which was equal to approximately 34 billion US dollars and was the lowest index after 2005. However, after 2010, the negative consequences of the economic crisis began to step back, and a considerable and constant increase of the defense expenditures in the Black Sea region was observed again - by 10% from 34 billion US dollars in 2010 to 38 billion US dollars in 2013 [3].

Crimean crisis made NATO members to reconsider their attitude to the defense spending, which were decreased before because of the economic crisis. In June 2014, the US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel applied to the Allies to increase their military expenditures and to invest no less than 2% of GDP into the defense sector. As a reaction, Romania, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia declared their plans to increase their defense budgets [9].

New Strategy of NATO in Black Sea region after 2014

Military aggression of Russia against Georgia and Ukraine forced NATO and the USA to reconsider the issue related to the military presence in the Black Sea region. Main aspects of the new strategy of NATO were considered at the Summits of the Alliance in Wales and Warsaw.

Particularly, NATO Wales Summit, which was held in Newport in Wales on 4 and 5 September 2014, became one of the most important event after the occupation of Crimea by Russia. That Summit was described by Admiral James Stavridis as the most important since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

It is important to mention the main part of the Wales Summit Declaration, where, for the first time after the Cold War, Russia was recognized as an aggressor: “We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alli-

FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

ance, have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. **Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.**" [4].

Important decisions were adopted at the Warsaw Summit too, which was held in 2016. In the final Declaration, new security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area was mentioned. "There is an arc of insecurity and instability along NATO's periphery and beyond. The Alliance faces a range of security challenges and threats that originate both from the east and from the south; from state and non-state actors; from military forces and from terrorist, cyber, or hybrid attacks. Russia's aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability, fundamentally challenge the Alliance, have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace." [6].

Consequences of the policy of NATO in the Black Sea region after occupation of Crimea

Due to increased tensions, Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg declared the possibility to increase the military capabilities of the Alliance in the Black Sea region. NATO countries have declared their readiness to strengthen their contingents in the Baltic region and Eastern Europe.

The Great Britain, Germany and the USA have declared their plans to send battalions of their military personnel to the Eastern Europe and Baltic region to prevent a possible "invasion" from the Russian side. As it was mentioned in the newspaper "The Telegraph", Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Estonia can welcome 500-1000 militaries to demonstrate to Russia that any interference in the "Ukrainian style" will be followed by a reply from the NATO side. The discussion deals with the forces of the special operations, which are armed with anti-aircraft missiles, helicopters and attack aircraft [3].

Because of the increased tensions, the number of the NATO Response Forces has been increased

three times - to the 40 000 military servicemen. In its turn, in the period when Obama was a President, the White House declared releasing about 4 billion US dollars to prevent the Russian aggression. To resist the Russian aggression and support the European Allies, the budget includes 4,4 billion US dollars for the political, economic and public diplomacy, and also military support to neutralize the Russian capabilities of the aggression against NATO allies and partner states in Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia [3].

Perspectives of cooperation between two regions

Taking into account the common threats to the Baltic and Black Sea regions, before the NATO Summit in Poland, the Allies from Eastern Europe demanded a tougher response to Russia's 'posturing' at their meeting in Romania.

Particularly, in 2015 in Bucharest, leaders of nine Central, Eastern European and Baltic states (B9) said that they were gravely concerned by Russia's "continuing aggressive posturing" and called the Alliance to strengthen the eastern border of NATO.

"We will continue to act consistently in the spirit of NATO's unity and solidarity, as well as to strengthen the transatlantic bond, vital for the Alliance, in order to be ready for threats and challenges wherever they arise," they said [7].

In the joint declaration, the Presidents of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the Czech Republic's Speaker of the Parliament said that they would "stand firm on the need for Russia to return to respect of international law as well as of its international obligations, responsibilities and commitments as a pre-condition for a NATO – Russia relationship based on trust and confidence" [7].

Towards Sustainable Growth in Defense Expenditures in NATO members from Baltic and Black Sea regions

As a result of the Russian imperialistic policy, in 2017, all B9 countries spent significantly more on defense than in 2014: Lithuania and Latvia doubled their defense expenditures; Romania spent

FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS


over 50% more; Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary's defense budgets were 30% higher; and Poland, the Czech Republic and Estonia increased their budgets by about 15–25%. This is equal to a few billion dollars more, not only for new capabilities (five of the B9 countries exceeded the NATO goal to increase defense expenditures by 20% in 2017, one country was very close to the goal, and the two remaining states stood at 11% and 15% respectively) but also for operational engagement, including exercises [8].

In this regard, the B9, including NATO members from Baltic and Black Sea regions, stands out in the context of NATO-wide trends in defense expenditures. In 2017, the Allies spent 3.85% more than in 2014, while the bottom-line increase by the B9 countries was 15%. Out of all NATO member states, only Turkey and Canada increased their defense expenditures at a similar level in 2017, com-

pared to 2014. The other Allies either increased their budgets by a far more modest percentage or continued cutting. Further, in 2017, 12 NATO Allies spent 20% or more of their defense expenditures, with five of the B9 countries in this group.

In absolute numbers, the B9 spent in 2017 around 24 billion US dollars (about 18 billion US dollars in 2009). This roughly equaled the 2017 defense expenditures of Italy. Poland easily outweighed all its B9 partners with a budget of 11.5 billion US dollars. Second and third, respectively, were Romania, with 3.7 billion US dollars, and the Czech Republic, with 2.5 billion US dollars. The other six countries spent between 500 million and 1.6 billion US dollars, amounting to 5.6 billion US dollars in total (Fig. 1) [8].

What to do with Eastern Europe's Geopolitical “Grey zone”? (Post-Soviet part of the Black Sea



FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

Region) The Baltic experience for the competing approaches to increase Ukraine's, Moldova's and Georgia's security for next years

The Baltic and Adriatic Charters, signed by the USA with various post-communist countries in 1998 and 2003, and aimed to prepare them for future NATO membership, can serve as models for the temporary multilateral security structure for Ukraine and Georgia, as well as, perhaps, also for Moldova and Azerbaijan. A US-GUAM charter could provide elementary organizational structure to eastern Europe's grey zone during the interregnum, until these countries eventually become members of the EU, NATO and / or relevant security organizations that embed them properly in the international system [13].

The embarrassing story of building of Trans- and Eastern European institutions in the last quarter of a century illustrates the need for the US to get finally involved. An engagement of Washington has been and remains crucial for not only the Western but also Eastern European political stability. After their allying with the USA within the Baltic Charter, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia successfully entered NATO in 2004.

In the Western Balkans, the US Adriatic Charter has done that what was considered a wonder twenty years ago. In 2009, Croatia, a state that had not existed two decades earlier, and Albania, which was one of the Europe's most gruesome communist dictatorships, became NATO members. In 2017, Montenegro, which was bombed by NATO war planes, less than twenty years before, became NATO's 29-th member country. Later North Macedonia joined them, and Bosnia and Herzegovina's accession to NATO is being prepared.

In 2008, Georgia and Ukraine officially applied for starting NATO's Membership Action Plan. While these aspirations were rejected, in their Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 3, 2008, the 26 NATO member countries welcomed "Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspira-

tions for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO". The ambivalent status of Georgia and Ukraine as official future members of NATO, yet without roadmaps for entering the Alliance, was among the determinants of Moscow's occupation of former South Ossetian Autonomous District and Abkhazia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014.

Towards a Charter of the GUAM Group with the USA

The USA has learned partly lessons of its previous successes and the disaster of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. It signed bilateral Strategic Partnership Charters with Ukraine in December 2008 and with Georgia in January 2009. The two charters announced that the parties support the integration of Ukraine and Georgia into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, security cooperation, and their preparation for NATO membership. These two documents, however, did not send of a strong signal to Russia. They remained largely unknown for even the societies of the three signatory states.

Against this background, it is needed to expand these two current bilateral charters with Washington to a larger quasi-alliance. A new multilateral charter should tie demonstratively the USA with the EU's three associated Eastern partners - Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, as well as perhaps with Azerbaijan. This provisional semi-coalition could become a consequential upgrade for the GUAM group formed in 2001. It could be modelled on, or even go beyond, the Baltic and Adriatic Charters [13].

Such ideas have been voiced earlier several times. For instance, at the 2009 meeting of foreign ministers of the USA and the Adriatic and Baltic countries in Riga, the Lithuanian foreign minister Vygaudas Ušackas called for further NATO enlargement. He suggested to invite representatives of Ukraine and Georgia to such meetings of the ministers of the USA, Balkan and Baltic States. Mr. Ušackas noted that "Ukraine and Georgia,

FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

which aspire NATO membership, could make use of our experience in the conduct of military, political and economic reforms” [13].

A new multilateral US Charter for Eastern Europe and South Caucasus will not surely offer GUAM as strong protection as the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty provides for NATO members – for example, Baltic States. The US’s assurances in such a document would, most probably, even remain significantly below those, given to such countries as South Korea or Israel. Nevertheless, a US-GUAM Charter could provide elementary organizational structure to Eastern Europe’s gray zone. Even a very cautiously formulated US Charter for the GUAM countries would have considerable symbolic power, increase East European security, and raise the stakes of further escalation in the current post-Soviet gray zone for Moscow [13].

In this regard, it should be pointed out, that due to the fact, that in comparison with Baltic Charter, when all NATO member states expressed their readiness to admit the three Baltic States in the Alliance because of the consensus, a US-GUAM Charter can be somehow different due to the fact, that there is no consensus within NATO on the Alliance’s membership of Georgia and Ukraine. At the same time, Moldova is a neutral state and Azerbaijan joined the “non-alliance movement” in 2009. Thus, main specifics of the charter should take into consideration the supporting of the reforms in NATO partner countries – Azerbaijan and Moldova, in the field of security and defense, democracy etc. With regard to Georgia and Ukraine, taking into account that the main goal of foreign policy and national security of both states is NATO membership, but in the conditions of the absence the consensus within the Alliance, an alternative approach of a US-GUAM charter for Georgia and Ukraine can be acceleration of reforms in the fields of security and defense in both states, based on the experience of the Baltic States, and increased military presence of the US armed forces in Georgia and Ukraine as an alter-

native to NATO membership that could prevent any new possible military aggression from the Russian side.

Perspectives of cooperation between the civil societies of the Baltic and Black Sea Regions

Taking into consideration the fact, that one of the main foreign policy and national security priorities of the Black Sea countries is establishment closer relations with the countries of the Baltic region, and that the Baltic States express their huge interest toward the geopolitically important Black Sea region, there are common problems for the countries of the Black Sea and Baltic regions: energy security; policy of imperialism toward the countries of both regions from the Russian side; terrorism; WMD dissemination; strengthening trade relations etc. It is necessary to take into consideration the following: a) There is a lack of initiatives related to the development of cooperation between two regions; b) There is no road map on the Black Sea - Baltic Sea cooperation issues; c) There are almost no organizations in the countries of both regions, which are working on inter-regional cooperation. **Thus, one of the main purposes of the cooperation between two regions is to found network between civil society organizations in the countries of the Black Sea and Baltic regions.** Today, by organizing international conferences, implementing research activities, exchanging information on what is going on in each country of both regions, publishing books and bulletins, working out recommendations, representatives of the civil societies can make important contribution for the promoting interregional cooperation in various fields, which represent the common interests for the each country of both regions.

To determine joint efforts with participation of experts from Black Sea and Baltic regions. The joint initiatives will give an opportunity to discuss various topics, which represent the strategic interest for both regions in general, and particularly for the each country in both regions. Within the cooperation, the several working

FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

groups should be founded. Their work can focus on: a) main threats and challenges, which are in two regions, and ways of countering them; b) perspectives of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the Black Sea countries and the role of the Baltic States in this process; c) economic and energy projects, which can be implemented with participation of Black Sea and Baltic regions; d) the role of the civil society in the promotion of cooperation between two regions; e) sharing the experience of Baltic States to their colleagues from the Black Sea region in the different fields.

With regard to other main purposes of the initiatives, it should be pointed out the following: publishing books in English on all topics, related to analysis of the general situation in both regions and main obstacles and perspectives of the inter-regional cooperation; views from each country of both regions related to inter-regional cooperation and national security priorities; drafting topics, discussed during training courses, conferences and seminars, and other important issues related to processes in the Black Sea and Baltic regions; analysis of the Baltic States' experience on development of the democratic institutions, European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, socio-economic development etc.

One of the main purposes of the initiative is to organize one-semester study courses on the issues like "The experience of the Baltic States of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and Socio-Economic Development" and "Importance of the cooperation between Black Sea and Baltic regions" in the leading Universities of the Black Sea region.

It is necessary to arrange local seminars and workshops with participation of the leading experts from both regions and other countries, including governmental and non-governmental representatives, diplomats from the countries of the Black Sea and Baltic regions.

Furthermore, in the framework of the initiatives, think tanks from Black Sea and Baltic regions are going to cooperate with different governmental agencies and work out recommendations for the appropriate ministries on the different issues, related to the development cooperation between the Baltic and Black Sea regions and sharing experience of the Baltic States.

Conclusions

Organization of the network of representatives of the civil societies from the Black Sea and Baltic regions, cooperation between different structures, including government agencies, NGO-s, educational institutions, mass-media, scientific circles, young generations, should be promoted. This cooperation should include the organization of international conferences with participation of the above-mentioned target groups, distribution of the information related to the analysis of the current political, economic, social, military, cultural, educational and other events in various countries of the Black and Baltic Sea regions. Furthermore, it should include organization of lecture courses on regional and inter-regional cooperation issues, publishing appropriate books in English and the most important aspect – analyzing, considering the common threats and challenges, which are in two regions, and working out recommendations for appropriate governmental agencies and other institutions for the promoting cooperation in the various fields. The more concrete aspects are: strengthening cooperation for preventing common threats, increasing trade relations, providing energy security, sharing the experience of Baltic States, related to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, democratic institutions and principles of market economy, to their colleagues from the correspondent institutions in the Black Sea countries; increasing public awareness about both regions etc.

FOCUS ON: REGIONAL PROBLEMS

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The Montreux Convention: Geographical limits of Application. The New View of an Old Problem⁷

First of all, it should be noted that the authors of this article focused on the analysis of the Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, dated 1936, better known in the world as the Montreux Convention, and other norms of international law in the context of the possible impact of the mentioned international agreement on the terms of stay of warships of the non-Black Sea states in the waters of the Dnipro and Danube Rivers, and the Sea of Azov.

As numerous historical facts clearly demonstrate to us, for hundreds of years around the Black Sea and the Black Sea Straits, namely the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus, which connect the Black and Mediterranean Seas, there were international tensions and conflicts, caused by the extremely important geopolitical and geo-economic significance of these waterways.

On July 20, 1936, the Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits was concluded in the Swiss city of Montreux [1]. In accordance with the preamble, it was made to regulate transit and navigation in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term "Straits" in such manner as to safeguard, within the framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian states, in the times of peace or at war.

According to current data of the United Nations, ten states have ratified the Montreux Convention: Australia, Bulgaria, Greece, the United Kingdom

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Turkey, France, Yugoslavia (Federal Republic), and Japan [2].

According to the information published on the official web portal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the date of the Montreux Convention entry into force for Ukraine is April 3, 1992 [3]. However, it is clear from the content of the Convention that its geographical scope is limited to exclusively:

- the Dardanelles Strait;
- the Sea of Marmara;
- Bosphorus Strait;
- the Black Sea.

Given the above, it is obvious that the "territory" of the Montreux Convention does not cover the waters of the Dnieper and Danube Rivers, and the Sea of Azov. **As a result, the provisions of the Montreux Convention cannot be applied to the Dnieper, the Danube and the Black Sea under any circumstances.**

Attention should also be paid to the interesting fact that the Republic of Turkey is not a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea dated 1982 (hereinafter the UNCLOS) [4].

In the context of this article, we would like to draw special attention to the legal status of the Danube River, since Ukraine has the status of a Danube State under the Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, signed in Belgrade on August 18, 1948 (hereinafter – the Danube Convention) [5]. As we have already noted,

⁷ The publication was prepared in the framework of the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea Region through Greater Engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations" with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Black Sea Trust Fund or its partners.

FOCUS ON: NEW VIEWS ON OLD PROBLEMS




Fig. 1. Montreux Convention's zone of action.
(Zones out of the Montreux Convention is marked by green)

Source: The author

the Montreux Convention has no influence on the legal regime of the Danube, but there are certain prohibitions and restrictions for the navigation of warships on the river. Thus, according to Article 30 of the Danube Convention, "navigation of the Danube by the naval vessels of any non-Danubian country shall be prohibited." At the same time, "the military vessels of Danubian States may not navigate the Danube beyond the frontiers of the respective countries, whose flags they sail under, by arrangement between the Danubian States concerned."

It is also necessary to consider the legal status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait connecting the Black and Azov Seas. It should be noted that since 1992, Ukraine's position on the status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait has been unchanged: the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait should be subject to UNCLOS, without exceptions or restrictions. This fact is confirmed, in particular, by the lists of geographical coordinates officially transferred by Ukraine to the UN, which define the reference lines for the width of the territorial sea,

the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf in the Black and Azov Seas [6, 7].

Since 1996, Ukraine insisted on the delineation of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait with Russia according to the requirements of the International Law of the Sea, whereas Russia, in turn, advocated a "joint with Ukraine use" of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait in the absence of any delineation of maritime spaces. This is evidenced by the minutes of the meeting of Ukrainian and Russian delegations on the legal status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and the delineation of the continental shelf and exclusive (maritime) economic zone in the Black Sea dated October 17, 1996 [8].

In 1997, the Russian Federation ratified UNCLOS, and in 1999, Ukraine also became a party to this International Treaty [9, 10]. Despite the fact that Russia and Ukraine are parties to UNCLOS, the Russian political regime has forced the Ukrainian government in 2003, using threats, to sign and ratify the Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on cooperation in using the Sea

FOCUS ON: NEW VIEWS ON OLD PROBLEMS



Photo 1. USS Porter (DDG-78) passes through the Bosphorus.

Source: <https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/uss-porter-sails-into-black-sea-as-navy-boosts-patrols-in-region-1.593790>

of Azov and the Kerch Strait (hereinafter – Kerch Treaty), which directly contradicts the regulations of International Law of the Sea and is void under Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties dated 1969 [11, 12, 13, 14, 15].

As a result, the general restrictions on measures in the Sea of Azov for warships of the third states, allegedly established by the Kerch Treaty, have no legal force, and all vessels, ships and aircraft, including those of the United States/NATO, can exercise the right of passage through the Kerch Strait, which should not be hindered, and enter the Sea of Azov.

But after consideration of the certain features of the legal status of the Danube and the Sea of Azov, which are inextricably linked to the subject of this article, we will return to the Montreux Convention. Thus, according to Article 18, "Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there."

As Article 13 of the Montreux Convention defined, "the transit of vessels of war through the Straits shall be preceded by a notification given to the Turkish Government through the diplomatic channel. The normal period of notice shall be eight days; but it is desirable that in the case of non-Black Sea Powers this period should be increased to fifteen days. The notification shall specify the destination, name, type and number of the vessels, as also the date of entry for the outward passage and, if necessary, for the return journey. Any change of date shall be subject to three days' notice.

Entry into the Straits for the outward passage shall take place within a period of five days from the date given in the original notification. After the expiry of this period, a new notification shall be given under the same conditions as for the original notification." Taking into account the content of Articles 13 and 18 of the Montreux Convention, the non-Black Sea state sends a preliminary notification to the Turkish Government through diplo-

FOCUS ON: NEW VIEWS ON OLD PROBLEMS

matic channels, which, among other things, specifies the dates of passage of its warships through the Black Sea Straits at the entry into the Black Sea and the date of the return journey from the Black Sea Straits. At the same time, the period of stay in the Black Sea should not exceed 21 days.

At the same time, it is obvious that such a period of twenty-one days does not include the period of stay of warships of non-Black Sea States in the waters other than the Black Sea, after the initial entry into it.

For example, if an imaginary warship of a non-Black Sea State after passing through the Black Sea Straits was in the Black Sea for ten days and on the eleventh day of such a stay, this ship entered the Port of Kherson, located at the mouth of the Dnieper River, and continuously stayed in the port for three days, these three days spent in the Port of Kherson cannot be counted in the total period of stay of such ship in the Black Sea. But after the return of the mentioned imaginary ship to the Black Sea from the Port of Kherson, the period of this ship's stay the Black Sea is restored and is considered the eleventh day of stay in the Black Sea.

Taking into account all the above-mentioned norms of international law and factual circumstances, as well as an analysis of the well-known practice of applying Article 13 of the Montreux Convention by non-Black Sea States that are not parties to the Convention, the authors of the Article came to the following obvious conclusions:

- 1) The geographical scope of the Montreux Convention **is exclusively limited** to the areas of the Black Sea, the Bosphorus Strait, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles Strait;
- 2) The geographical area of the Montreux Convention application **does not apply to the wa-**

ters of the Dnieper and Danube Rivers and the Sea of Azov;

- 3) Navigation on the Danube by warships of all non-Danube states is prohibited;
- 4) The naval vessels of Danubian States may not navigate the Danube beyond the frontiers of the respective countries whose flags they fly save by arrangement between the Danubian States concerned.
- 5) The Kerch Treaty is null and void, **and the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait are subjects to the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;**
- 6) After passage in the Black Sea Straits at the entry to the Black Sea, **to the total period of stay in the Black Sea for the warships of non-Black Sea States cannot be counted as a period of stay of such ships in the waters of the Dnieper and/or the Danube and/or the Sea of Azov;**
- 7) Some non-Black Sea States that have not ratified the Montreux Convention and are not parties to it, in particular, the United States of America, make efforts to adhere to the provisions of this Convention, and notify the Turkish Government through diplomatic channels about the passage of the Black Sea Straits by their warships.

Thus, warships of different classes of non-Black Sea countries with a certain draft can enter the mouth of the Dnieper and their presence there is not included in the 21-day period of stay in the Black Sea, regulated by the Montreux Convention.

FOCUS ON: NEW VIEWS ON OLD PROBLEMS

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Russia: Crisis Scenarios⁸

The Covid-19 epidemic, the late and chaotic reaction of the Kremlin to it, the fall in oil prices and the degradation of the "ruling vertical" caused a systemic crisis in Russia. At the time of this article writing in late May 2020, it is impossible to reasonably outline the most likely scenario for its development. Various scenarios can be implemented, ranging from the establishment of a more severe, as compared to current, regime of the military-fascist type, to the collapse of the country.

The economy fall and the drop in living standards

The dynamics of the socio-political situation in Russia largely depends on the depth of the economic fall. According to the most optimistic, but obviously far from reality, estimates, Russia's GDP will fall this year by 2-4%, and according to more realistic estimates – up to 12% and

even 20%. At the end of April, the Central Bank of Russia published the first and the only current official forecast, according to which in 2020 Russian GDP will fall by 4-6% [1]. Economists close to the Kremlin also often refer to the studies carried out in March-early April 2020 by the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which suggest that the fall in Russia's GDP will be about 5%. This is quite acceptable to the Kremlin, since, according to the estimates of the IMF, the GDP of the developed countries will decrease by 6.1% in 2020 [2]. In this case, the situation in Russia will be better than in the West, and therefore, there is no reason to reproach Putin for blatant disregard for the vital interests of the Russians.

Methods for these estimates are not provided. But the key factor is that today we, with more or less confidence, can talk about the most likely scenarios, and about the marginal ones.

Table 1

Scenarios for the development of the Russian economy in 2020 according to McKinsey&Company [3]

Scenarios	Duration of quarantine measures	GDP fall (%)	Consumption drop	Decline of investment
Optimistic	By the end of Q2	3.8	by 4.9 trillion rubles.	by 2.1 trillion rubles.
Pessimistic	By the end of the year ^{a)}	10.2	by 10.5 trillion rubles.	by 3.9 trillion rubles.

^{a)} The assumed global economy fall is 5.7%

For example, the large consulting company McKinsey&Company assumes that in the best-case scenario, GDP will fall by 3.8% in 2020, and will return to pre-crisis values in Q2 2021. In the worst-case scenario, GDP will fall by 10.2% this

year and recover only in Q2 2023. These scenarios were calculated based on the duration of the quarantine restrictions.

A more detailed picture of the future of the Russian economy is presented by a study published at the end of April 2020 by The Gaidar Institute. It takes into account not only the duration of the quarantine but also the dynamics of oil prices. In addition, it was designed not so much for propaganda purposes as for the Russian government.

⁸ The publication was prepared in the framework of the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea Region through Greater Engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations" with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Black Sea Trust Fund or its partners.

Table 2

Three scenarios for the development of the Russian economy from The Gaidar Institute [4]

CONDITIONS				
	2019	Scenarios for 2020		
		I	II	III
Duration of quarantine measures in Russia, months	-	2	2	6
The price of Urals oil, US\$/barrel	63.5	43.5	32.0	32.0
Growth/drop in oil exports, %%	+3	- 10	0	- 10
Global GDP growth/drop, %%	+2.9	- 1.5	- 1.5	- 5.0
ESTIMATES				
GDP growth/drop, %%	+ 1.3	- 7.0	- 8.0	-12.0
Growth/drop in real income, %%	+ 0.8	-3.5	-4.5	-6.5
Unemployment, % of the EAP ^{a)}	4.6	8	8	12
Revenues from hydrocarbon exports, US \$billion	237.9	150	123	110

^{a)} economically active population

The most "optimistic" I scenario was calculated based on the average annual price of one barrel of Urals oil equal to USD 43.5 (cut-off price), the completion of quarantine measures in early June 2020, and a decrease in world GDP by 1.5 per cent. It is already clear that the first and last conditions will not be met, but, nevertheless, even in this case, the fall in GDP will not be 5%, as the IMF suggests, but 7% and the revenues from hydrocarbon exports will reduce by almost USD 90 billion. In addition, we can expect that the average annual price of Urals oil will be slightly lower than expected in II and III scenarios.

In April 2020, the first professional estimates of oil price dynamics were published. Both OPEC and the International Energy Agency have come to the same conclusion that the world's oil demand in 2020 will fall by about 9 million barrels per day, which is by 9% compared to 2019. This will certainly result in low prices for hydrocarbons. May estimates of the US State Energy Information Administration assumed that in 2020 the average price for Brent oil will be US\$ 34 per barrel (*Fig. 1*). Accordingly, the price of one barrel of Urals oil can be about US\$ 30.

The reliability of these and other today's forecasts is low. The prospects for global economic recovery are unclear; it is uncertain whether it will follow a V-shaped or L-shaped trajectory, which, in turn, will determine the dynamics of oil prices. It is possible that the Covid-19 epidemic in Russia will not end by the fall, and quarantine measures will be extended there. Finally, experts say that there is a high probability of a "second wave" of pandemics in the US and Europe, which may again lead to a global decline.

But even if the events develop according to a relatively favourable scenario, a very serious economic and social crisis is inevitable in Russia. Its parameters will be somewhere between the described by The Gaidar Institute scenarios II and III: GDP will fall by 10-12%, which means it will be deeper than the global crisis of 2008-2009. The real income of the population will decrease by 6.0-6.5%, from 10 to 12% of the economically active population (at least twice as much as in 2019) will remain unemployed, and export revenues will decrease by US\$120-130 billion, i.e. by about half. At the same time, the situation for the population is worse than during the crisis of 2008-2009. At that time, the Russian authorities

FOCUS ON: RUSSIA FROM INSIDE




Fig. 1. Brent oil prices, 2019-2021, US\$.
(US Energy Information Administration estimates in early May 2020) [5]

supported the growth of real incomes of the population (by 2.4% and 3.0%, respectively) while reducing the level of poverty in the country, while after 2014, the Kremlin has consistently implemented a policy of curbing the population's income and consumer demand.

The complexity of the current situation in Russia is caused not only by the delay in taking measures to combat coronavirus, but also by the specifics of these measures themselves. Strategies in this area assume either the maximum reduction of morbidity, that is, saving people, or prioritize saving the economy at the cost of mortality increase. But the Kremlin has taken a special Russian path, demonstrating, as it should in such cases, terrible incompetence. First, Putin dealt a blow to the economy and incomes, declaring the "days off," i.e. unpaid days, which did not stop the increase in the disease burden, and then, in the midst of the epidemic, lifted restrictions designed to protect the people, and ordered to spend Grand Parade on June 24, 2020, which is likely to result in the new outbreak.

Socio-political crisis

The socio-political consequences of the epidemic and the fall in oil prices will start to fully manifest in the fall and winter of 2020-2021. For example, Pavlo Salin, Director of the Centre for Political Science Research at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, noted: "By the fall, the government

will face much more serious challenges, and not the medical ones, as at the moment. This will be a long-term socio-economic crisis, associated with the consequences of coronavirus, forced holidays, and a fall in oil prices. We will need to do something, because the situation is very bad for the Kremlin. Given the fact that the population is very tired, and the government is facing a serious moral wear, the big from a socio-political point of view question is what will be the result of this entire additional negative in the fall. The government is in an urgent need of steps that could turn the situation around. And it has practically no such effective steps" [6].

But this is only one aspect of the growing political crisis in Russia. Basically, it is caused by the Kremlin's violation of two pillars of the current regime: informal "agreements" between the government and the population; informal "agreements" between Putin and his inner circle, on the one hand, and the bureaucracy, on the other. The first ensured a more or less satisfactory standard of living for the masses in exchange for loyalty to Putin and political inertia. The second involved transformation of the entire system of state administration into a strictly hierarchical pyramid, in which all significant decisions were concentrated in the hands of the President and those closest to him, while other bureaucracy, including the ministers and the governors, turned into unquestioning executors of these decisions, receiving in exchange the opportunity to exploit their position in the power system in their own interests.

FOCUS ON: RUSSIA FROM INSIDE

The Kremlin violated the first agreement by refusing to allocate the necessary funds to support the population and businesses during the collapse of economic activities and "self-isolation", as was done in the United States and most European countries. For these purposes, Russia expects to spend from 2% to 2.5% of GDP, while the United States expect to spend up to 20%, and the European Union and Japan – about 10% of GDP. As a result, the standard of living in the country has fallen, primarily in the social strata that do not have large savings. But the hardest hit took small and medium businesses, which employ about a quarter of the economically active population, 18-19 million people, and previously were one of the main social pillars of the regime.

As a result, the core of support for Putin from those who treat him with clear approval, sympathy, and even admiration has almost halved – from 59% to 28% (*Fig. 2*).

Those who sympathize with Putin are mainly peripheral groups: elderly people, pensioners employed in the public sector of the economy, public sector employees with a low level of education [8]. Discontent with the government is growing, especially among people aged 18-39 with higher education who live in large cities. Among young people aged 18-25, only 12% trust Putin, and in the older age category – 26-39 years – 17% [9].

Relations between the Kremlin and the highest layer of the bureaucracy have become noticeably more complicated. For the latter, it is no secret that Putin made two big mistakes. First, he defiantly withdrew from the OPEC+ Agreement, which triggered an accelerated fall in oil prices. Secondly, he is just as defiantly "self-isolated" from countering the epidemic, giving away the responsibility (including for failures that are fraught with mass protests) to the government and regional elites, without providing them with real resources. The discontent of the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy, especially local, is amplified by the destruction of small and medium businesses that are closely intertwined with it.

In parallel with Putin and the Presidential Administration, new centres of influence, if not power, have emerged. They are directly responsible for fighting the epidemic: the highest groups of regional elites guided by Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin and government departments under the supervision of the Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova. The confrontation between supporters of the strengthening of authoritarian regime and state regulation of the economy and the supporters of a relatively soft authoritarian system and a market economy has worsened.

As a result, the system of power with the dominant role of the centre led by the "absolute lead-




Fig. 2. Trust to Putin, 2017-2020, % [7].

FOCUS ON: RUSSIA FROM INSIDE

er", by the very nature of this type of regime, had to lead the fight against the pandemic, but it turned out to be fragmented. As the well-known Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova wrote, the Kremlin's refusal to make directive decisions is undermining a state, built like a pyramid. The centre has renounced responsibility, and the gutters cannot accept it without the means and will. "Now this threat is not felt, because the regional elite do not have the courage to raise their voice. But what if it doesn't want to take the blame for the centre's failures when it faces a desperate population?" [10] The question is relevant. But we will most likely get an answer to it in the fall or winter this year.

Four scenarios for the further political development of Russia

"Russia after Putin," Vladimir Pastukhov an employee of the University of London said, "is very likely to survive a less or more extensive turmoil, collapse, or return to the old autocratic track, held together by the iron hand of the new leader." [11] These two options are possible, but do not exhaust the entire spectrum of Russia's political trajectories.

The first scenario assumes the start of the mass protests caused by a fall in living standards and the refusal of the authorities to meet the demands of discriminated segments of the population. Sociologists note the accumulation of negative emotions in the mass consciousness: anxiety, irritation, fear to lose job and income, dissatisfaction with the government. The Levada Centre estimates that in May 2020, about half of the respondents were in this mood. In the fall this year, when the socio-economic consequences of the Covid-19 epidemic and the drop in oil prices are fully manifested, dissatisfaction with the authorities will significantly expand. However, it may not itself result in large protests, especially since there are no effective and organized opposition forces in the country that can lead the actions of the masses and give them an acute political orientation. "There is no organization, party, or real social forces," Lev Gudkov, the Head of the Levada Centre says, "that could accumulate discontent with the government in open, purposeful, and consistent political actions. In addition, the most critical of the regime groups are characterized by

a passive attitude to politics and an unwillingness to participate in it." [12]

History also shows that for a negative attitude to the government to result in mass protest actions, some kind of a trigger, an event that pushes people to go out on the streets with demands for power, is required. Such an event in Russia could be, for example, a new outbreak of the epidemic, a significant fall in living standards and the Kremlin's refusal to compensate for it. The ability of the government to suppress mass protests by force depends largely on the scale and speed of their spread. Experts believe, in particular, that the simultaneous appearance of several hundred thousand people on the streets in Moscow (3-5% of the Moscow population) and several dozen thousands of people in St. Petersburg and other major cities can paralyze the National Guard, the Police and the Army and even encourage them to switch to the side of the protesters. In this case, two other scenarios can be implemented: "deputinization," the collapse of the power system and, possibly, the entire country.

The second scenario, "deputinization", is named by analogy with destalinization of the mid-1950s. It can be realized not only as a result of mass protests or due to high probability of such protests, but also due to the belief of elites that the preservation of the system created by Putin and the positions of its upper layers requires a change of the leader and his inner circle. The reasons for dissatisfaction with Putin have already been mentioned: the belated introduction of quarantine measures; ignorant withdrawal from the OPEC+ Agreement; "self-isolation" and shifting responsibility for fighting the epidemic to the regional authorities without providing them with the necessary resources. In addition, the highest circles of the Russian establishment cannot fail to understand that the continuation of an acute confrontation with the West is fraught with severe economic consequences, the possibility of armed conflict, and a threat to their personal assets in Europe and the United States.

This scenario is likely if the political and economic situation worsens. But if the latter persist in their current state, "deputinization" is unlikely. Possible candidates for the highest power understand that in a crisis, power seizure is associated

FOCUS ON: RUSSIA FROM INSIDE

with a huge responsibility, and the risk of not coping with the crisis is very high. There are no legal ways to change the President, except for an extremely long and obviously doomed impeachment procedure. The rising of a few people from the top leadership, like the "Anti-Khrushchev" plot of 1964, requires trust from people who are controlled by the secret services. Finally, a change in the country's leadership will inevitably entail a risky power struggle and destabilization of the state administration, for which no one is prepared.

The third scenario provides for the restoration of the "Putin's vertical" by the end of this year. Having consciously transferred responsibility for Covid-19 epidemic combating to the government and regional elites, Putin understands that power may slip out of his hands. Therefore, as soon as (and if) the epidemic goes down, he will most likely take measures to restore an absolute power. Today, the Presidential Administration is considering the possible abolition of the electability of the heads of Federal Subjects, updating the Governors' corpus and other measures to strengthen control over regional elites. If Putin feels a growing threat to his position, we cannot rule out tougher measures, including a large-scale "shake-up" of the top echelon of the bureaucratic and political vertical and widespread repression under the pretext of corruption combating. This scenario may be most likely in the event of mass protests and the resulting attempts of some elite representatives to change the country's leadership to calm down the population and preserve the regime. However, the harsher the repressions against the establishment are, the more it will push the regional elites to withdraw from central control.

The fourth scenario is the collapse of Russia. History shows that the collapse of geographically integrated empires, of which modern Russia is a special variant, was caused by a combination of two factors: the rise of national movements, on the one hand, and the weakening of central power, up to and including its paralysis, on the other. The latter may come this fall following mass protests in the largest cities, accompanied by contradictions on tactics towards the protesters – a violent suppression with mass victims or taking their conditions and changing the top leadership

– within the ruling elite. Disputes about the nomination of a successor and a struggle for power and bureaucratic power groups will add. The paralysis of the centre creates a power vacuum, which is filled by regional elites who want to withdraw from the control of the centre, concentrate control over the economic resources of the region, prevent the collapse of the management system and the transformation of the political crisis into chaos, or protect themselves from persecution. In Russia, separatist processes are stimulated not so much by national or ethnically predetermined factors and aspirations, although they play a serious role in the Volga Region and the North Caucasus, as by regional interests, which in some cases contradict the interests of Moscow.

Foreign policy scenarios: moderation or aggression?

The probability of these scenarios cannot be reasonably estimated: the uncertainties are too high. And yet the most probable is the combination of the economic fall and fall in living standards, the growing discontent, the real prospect of mass protests and the disappointment of the establishment by the top leaders' inability to effectively address the pressing problems facing the country, and, simultaneously, to defend the interests of the ruling class. In other words, the regime will not fall, but will be significantly weakened. Many experts believe that this will lead to foreign policy moderation and search for ways to reduce tensions with the West. This development cannot be completely ruled out, especially if the country is "deputinized". But in general, supporters of this point of view naively or deliberately underestimate the danger of Putin's Russia.

A splash of the Kremlin's aggression in the fall of this year is more likely. The reason for that is not so much the desire to raise Putin's rating fall in mass consciousness with the help of a "small and victorious war" as the desire to demonstrate to the elite that he is able to solve deep foreign policy problems, be tough in relations with neighbouring countries and, most importantly, the West, and to substantiate potential wave of repressions by the need to unite the nation in the face of external threats. This scenario is especially likely since the West, economically and politically weakened by the Covid-19 pandemic and focused on its own

FOCUS ON: RUSSIA FROM INSIDE

problems (as the Kremlin may believe), will not be able to fight back against Russian aggression, especially if it does not affect NATO member-states, but is limited to Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia or Northern Kazakhstan. Finally, the combat capability of the Russian Armed Forces has not yet declined due to the epidemic and the fall in oil prices.

Accordingly, we can expect an increase in Russian military pressure on Ukraine reaching the use of the armed force. The initial episode may be the invasion of Russian troops in Northern Tavria at the end of the summer under the pretext of providing water to the population of Crimea. Another possible option is armed provocations in the East of Ukraine, which may develop into a limited war that should end with the occupation of the entire territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, their annexation or, more likely, transformation into pseudo-independent states such as Abkhazia or South Ossetia. The possibility of this is evidenced by the fact that the Russian establishment still believes that the occupied territories should not be returned to Ukraine, but should be united with Russia.

Another direction of Russian aggression is Belarus, which occupies a key strategic position in the Baltic region. In the event of an armed conflict with NATO, the withdrawal of Russian troops to the Suwalki corridor and their collision with large forces of the North Atlantic Alliance, the result, if the use or threat of nuclear weapons use is excluded, will largely be determined by the participation (or non-participation) of the Belarusian Army in the fighting. President Lukashenko's harsh rebuff to the Kremlin's claims to "reunite" Belarus with Russia and the latter's loss of the ability to pressure Minsk with oil supplies are pushing Moscow to use force, including military, methods of annexing Belarus.

Inclusion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Russia, an attempt to annex the northern regions of Kazakhstan, and a new war against Georgia are also possible. The main motive for the Kremlin's actions in each of these cases may be not so much used to achieve a strategic win in the confrontation with the West, but rather to demonstrate to the Russian population and elites Putin's determination and political potential.

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FOCUS ON: RUSSIA FROM INSIDE

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Sanctions: Impacts on the Russian Energy Sector⁹

The introduction of sanctions by individual countries and international organizations, in the context of globalized relations, has become one of the main real working tools to impact the behaviour of individual players in the international arena. However, can sanction restrictions really change the behaviour of such a player as Russia in the international arena? What should the conditions for imposing sanctions to achieve the desired result be?

To answer these questions, we will analyze the efficiency of the sanctions' regime imposition against the Russian Federation by the international community due to the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine [1]. At the same time, the focus will be made on assessing the efficiency of the imposed sanctions in terms of restrictions on the transfer of energy technologies or the implementation of Russia's geopolitical infrastructure projects.

Review of the sanctions regime implementation process

In the framework of the study, a review of the impact of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation primarily by the US [2] and the EU [3] to change its behaviour in the international arena, was performed. The sanctions were staged, starting from the introduction of visa sanctions and the blocking of assets, imposed on certain individuals, to the sectoral economic sanctions (imposed on individual industries, companies, or even individual infrastructure projects in the energy sector). Usually, the strengthening of sanctions was only the result of a significant violation of the international law by Russia and/or an escalation of the situation.

Thus, after the introduction of the first stage of sanctions in March 2014 (visa restrictions and asset freezing imposed on individuals and certain legal entities due to violations of the territorial integrity of Ukraine), the next time the EU and the US tightened sanctions only at the end of July 2014 (in response to the shooting down of MH17 Malaysian passenger flight). The sanctions were strengthened by sectoral economic restrictions, in particular sanctions imposed on Russian banks and Russian companies' access to capital markets, as well as on the implementation of individual projects in the energy sector by prohibiting investment in energy projects and the export and re-export of high-tech equipment to Russia.

Later, the EU and the US mainly clarified and expanded the list of companies subject to the sanctions regime. In particular, sanctions were imposed on specific economic entities of the Russian energy sector (Rosneft, Transneft, Gazpromneft, Gazprom, LUKOIL, and Surgutneftegaz). In 2016, the United States expanded sanctions, adding companies related to the construction of the Kerch Bridge and Gazprom's subsidiaries to the sanctions list.

In 2017 (due to Russia's interference in the US election), the US passed a law that introduced additional economic restraint measures against Russian companies and transactions with them. For example, the penalties should have been charged on companies, including European that will cooperate with Russian Gazprom in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. In the same year, the EU and the US expanded sanctions on companies and individuals involved in the illegal import of gas turbines from the German Siemens to the occupied Crimea (for more information about the mechanism used to circumvent the sanctions, see *Table 1*).

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Source: https://dt.ua/ECONOMICS/rosiya-provela-viprobuvannya-turbin-siemens-v-aneksovanomu-krimu-281881_.html

No new sanctions were imposed in 2018 and 2019. The EU and the US only clarified the list of individuals subject to sanctions and extended the validity of the previously imposed sanctions. An exception was the introduction of "secondary sanctions" by the United States in December 2019 on companies involved in the implementation of energy projects (agreements), in particular, in terms of restricting the sale of Venezuelan oil by Rosneft subsidiaries or the continuation of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, etc.

General macroeconomic assessment of the sanctions' impact

The sanctions imposed had a certain effect on the macroeconomic situation in Russia. The growth of Russia's internal and external debt, the inability to access sources of external borrowing, and the fall in oil prices led to the collapse of the Russian ruble, which reflected in the rapid withdrawal of capital from Russia. During 2014, the total amount of withdrawn capital was US\$ 151.5 billion, which by US \$ 90 billion exceeded the capital withdrawal in 2013 [4]. The inability to borrow from abroad has also led to a rapid increase in Russia's domes-

tic debt. According to the results of 2017, this debt increased by 18.8% (to 7 trillion and 247.1 billion rubles).

The result was a significant acceleration of inflation, the weakening of the ruble, and an increase in the bank system interest rates [4]. In February 2018, Russia liquidated the Reserve Fund, exhausted to cover the deficit of the state budget during the previous years.

In general, Bloomberg Economics' research estimates the loss of the Russian economy during the sanctions period (2014-2018) at 6%¹⁰ compared to the indicators that could have been reached without restrictive measures [5]. At the same time, the data obtained show that despite the sanctions' impact on Russia; they did not cause the shock that could have been expected. Although the sanctions

¹⁰ It should be noted that in addition to the sanctions, such indicators of decline are related to the fall in oil prices, which cannot be considered a result of sanctions. Oil prices fell during 2014 from about US\$ 115 to US\$ 60 per barrel. After a slight recovery in early 2015, oil prices were falling for the rest of the year. The lowest price was set on January 20, 2016, when a barrel of oil was traded at US\$ 27.1. Later, the price of oil began to rise, and during 2018 they exceeded US\$70, whereas in 2019 they stabilized at US\$60 per barrel.

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

imposed have worsened the macroeconomic situation in Russia and led to a general decline in the incomes of business entities and the standard of living of the Russian citizens, Russia's behaviour in the international arena has not changed.

Moreover, according to the Russian President, the impact of the imposed sanctions was generally insignificant. In March 2020, Vladimir Putin noted that Russia had lost an estimated US\$ 50 billion. The United States, however, received about the same amount due to the development of those areas of economic activity, sectors of the economy and technologies that were previously provided by imports [6].

The Russian economy has partially adapted to the restrictions imposed: through import substitution mechanisms, through reorientation of trade (including through intermediary countries), or through the introduction of schemes to circumvent sanctions. In general, after the fall in trade in 2014-2016, starting from 2017, the volume of foreign trade between Russia and the United States, Germany, the Netherlands and the entire EU started to grow (at a rate of 8-16%) [7].

In Russia's energy sector, the consequences of the sanctions were more noticeable. Russian companies were forced to suspend certain projects with foreign partners (projects in the Kara Sea and Siberia), including the hydrocarbon production in the Black Sea (the joint project of Rosneft and Exxon-Mobil). In addition, due to restrictions on technology transfer, it has become much more difficult for Russian companies to get access to modern oil and gas production technologies. Russian energy companies, which addressed the Russian government for assistance in funding current operating activities or individual projects (Rosneft, Gazprom, and Novatek), are facing serious challenges. However, in the energy sector, the introduction of sanctions in 2014-2018 also did not create significant obstacles for Russia.

The real threats arise in the long term. According to Russian experts, production support is possible through fundamental development of existing conventional oil fields using production intensification methods (hydraulic fracturing, tertiary methods of oil recovery enhancement, etc.), through the development of unconventional oil reserves onshore

or through the development of offshore fields (including on the Arctic shelf). At the same time, Russian companies now have almost no domestic technologies and equipment for production of unconventional and offshore reserves, and access to foreign technologies is restricted by sanctions [8].

Separately, we should note that the long-term threats are amplified by the competition of other producing countries in the world markets.

Motivation for sanctions regimes

A review of the application of sanctions regimes shows that there are factors that significantly limit their efficiency. An analysis of the sanctions' stages and their application clearly indicates a rather cautious approach to their imposition, strengthening or monitoring of compliance.

First of all, we should note the systemic restrictions on the application of sanctions. The impact of sanctions is also reflected on the countries that impose them. Unwillingness to lose revenues from trade with Russia, access to the Russian energy market (sale of energy technologies, share in the domestic Russian energy market, and production of energy resources) significantly reduced the sanctions' efficiency. This is why there are differences in the severity of compliance with sanctions. Thus, EU sanctions are more lenient than those imposed by the US. Obviously, their level, as well as the clarity of compliance, is related to the significant dependence of the EU economies on Russia (in particular in the field of energy supply) and the presence of the "Pro-Russian lobby" in the EU from among the European politicians or officials. Thus, individual officials and political leaders of Greece (2016), Slovakia (2014), Hungary (2015-2019), the Czech Republic (2016, 2018), Cyprus (2014), Germany (2018), France (2018), and Italy (2016, 2019) opposed the expansion of sanctions or their extension [3].

Another aspect of the sanctions' efficiency is institutional preparedness and personal determination to comply with sanctions. One of the main goals of the sanctions was to create instruments of pressure on the Russian leadership (Russian officials, oligarchs and their businesses). Along with that, the vague legal provisions on the imposition of sanctions allow free enough interpretation of the legis-

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

lation and monitoring of compliance with the imposed sanctions. For example, the US Law of 2017 On Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act – CAATSA – provided for the possibility of imposing sanctions on Russia's export gas pipelines (for example, the Nord Stream 2 or TurkStream project). However, the US President's decision to impose sanctions became possible under two conditions: 1) a threat to the national interests of the United States; 2) sanctions' imposition *based on preliminary consultations with the European allies*" [9]. During the political turbulence in the United States (the investigation into Russia's assistance to D. Trump during the presidential campaign) – is the wording of the conditions for sanctions imposition, due to which they were actually blocked for a long time.

Separately, it should be noted that the US President delegated the right to apply the sanctions to the US Treasury Department. During the period of sanctions, the US Treasury made several dozen decisions regarding the "postponement of the application of the sanctions regime" or the removal of individuals or legal entities from the "sanctions list." An example of this is the decision of the US Treasury to ease import duties on aluminium, as well as operations with the assets of O. Derypaska (Rusal, EN+ and Gaz Group), which were included in the sanctions list [10].

Separately, it should be noted that certain companies openly violated the sanctions regime. There were significant delays in responding to such violations on the part of the governments of the respective countries. An example of this is the violation of restrictions on the supply of equipment to the territory of the occupied Crimea, such as the supply of gas turbines by Siemens for the construction of TPPs in Crimea (Table 1), the participation of EU companies in the construction of the Kerch Bridge [11], the development of offshore projects near Crimea [12], and so on.

We should not exclude Russia's use of traditional Soviet schemes to gain access to the latest Western technologies, in particular - industrial espionage. In his speech at the Investment Forum "Russia Calling!" in November 2019, V. Putin openly and sarcastic recalled presence of such tools in the arsenal of Russia [13].

At the same time, the powerful impact of the transformation of the world energy market caused by the "shale revolution" on the effectiveness of the sanctions should be noted separately. The United States has turned from an importer to an exporter of oil and natural gas, which led to the emergence of interest in expanding markets. One of the ways to ensure this was to ensure the supply of liquefied gas from the United States (over 112 billion cubic meters from 2020) [14]. In July 2018, the President of the United States and the President of the European Commission confirmed their intents to expand strategic cooperation in the energy sector, in particular in terms of liquefied gas supplies from the United States to increase the level of energy security of the EU [15]. The result was a steady increase in natural gas supplies from the United States to the European countries from 1 billion cubic meters (in 2017) to over 17 billion cubic meters (in 2019).

This task was consistent with the sanctions policy against Russia, in particular, restriction of the energy projects. It was in 2018 when the work on legislative sanctions strengthening against the construction of the Nord Stream 2 became more active. Officials from the US Presidential Administration warned a group of companies involved in the Nord Stream 2 project that they may face sanctions according to the CAATSA law if they continue implementation of this project [16].

In May 2019, a bill was registered in the US Senate, which provided for the imposition of additional sanctions on companies that implement the Nord Stream 2 project (in particular, companies that provided "technological" support for the construction of the Russian gas pipeline). At the end of 2019, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act – DASKA – was adopted and imposed such sanctions [17].

With these sanctions, the United States achieved the desired result, as the Swiss Allseas Group, which provided services on the pipes lying, ceased the works immediately [18]. Russia stated that it will be able to complete the pipeline (160 km remained) on its own, but this will require additional time (re-equipment of a single Russian pipe-laying vessel Academic Chersky) [19].

Conclusions and recommendations

The analysis shows the ambiguity of the sanctions process, their effectiveness and efficiency, as a tool of influence. In the short term, the desired results from the sanctions are achieved in combination with other factors of influence, depending on the specific situation in foreign and domestic markets. At the same time, in the long term, the application of sanctions against a country leads to its inevitable technological and economic lag, which means that it weakens the competitive advantages of this country and its ability to withstand a long-term confrontation.

At the same time, it should be noted that the vagueness of wording in the adopted legislative acts (imposing sanctions) allows a fairly "flexible" approach to the application of certain provisions, depending on the specific factors (for example, geopolitical interests, private interests of political figures, agreements on asset control), which go beyond the stated goals of sanctions applied. Therefore, we should not exclude the possibility of manipulating the sanctions regimes for "political agreements" between countries, political leaders or corporations.

Sanctions imposition on Russia helped Ukraine achieve a number of significant results and hopes to further reduction in dependence on Russia, in particular: the possibility to preserve transit of natural gas from Russia to EU via Ukrainian territory until 2025, the long term diversification of natural gas supplies, and the possibility of the formation of a trading platform based on domestic infrastructure (attract traders to gas import and storage in Ukrainian underground gas storage facilities with the subsequent sale to the markets of the EU countries).

The imposition of the sanctions regimes requires the coordination of the entire range of issues and factors, which demand a detailed study of various decision-making aspects (assessment of goals, vulnerabilities, and expected results), stages of sanctions and monitoring their implementation. At the same time, to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the sanctions regimes, it is critical to ensure that at least the following conditions are met:

- sanctions in legislative acts should be formulated as clearly as possible to avoid alternative interpretation (the lack of a clear wording of the sanctions is a reason for not applying or avoiding them);
- sanctions must serve a clearly defined and achievable political goals (without this, they will not receive sufficient support from persons involved in their implementation and monitoring of their compliance);
- sanctions should help national entities that will assist the country in implementation and monitoring compliance with sanctions (without the *interested national entities, individuals and companies*, the efficiency of public authorities will be low);
- sanctions should be used together with other instruments of influence, including diplomacy, economic assistance, and support, as well as coordination with the actions of security and defense players (sanctions themselves do not often achieve the goals and need support from other areas);
- sanctions work well if they are coordinated with the actions of other countries and international partners with similar goals (without this, the schemes will be created to circumvent the applied sanctions);
- the introduction of sanctions should be accompanied by public monitoring of their compliance (public assessment of the effectiveness of the imposed restrictions will reduce the level of actions inconsistency or the use of schemes to "circumvent" sanctions);
- the application of sanctions should be based on the strategic goals and national interests (sanctions are more effective and efficient in the long term, which requires maintenance and adapting of the sanctions regimes at the change of power teams).

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

Table 1

Options for circumvention of the sanctions on the example of delivery of gas turbines to the territory of the annexed Crimea by Siemens

Date	Action	Notes
February 20 - March 17, 2014	Crimea is seized and annexed by the Russian Federation	
	The first set of sanctions is adopted by the EU and the US	
March 26, 2014	Siemens CEO, Joe Käser visits Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. After the visit Käser says in an interview with German ZDF Channel that the visit was planned for a long time, and that the "short-term turbulence" should not seriously affect the plans for cooperation with Russia, and expresses readiness to continue localization of turbine production.	Vladimir Putin notes the successful cooperation during the previous years ¹¹ and expressed hope that "relations will develop as sustainably".
August 2014	The Federal Target Programme Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol until 2020 is adopted. V. Putin approves Tekhnopromexport's participation in the construction of a TPP in Crimea. Tekhnopromexport is expected to become an investor in the project with the possible support of the state-owned VTB and Sberbank banks.	A General scheme for circumventing sanctions is defined.
2015	Tekhnopromexport PA OJSC, the contractor of the project for the construction of power plants, is reformatted. In the structure of Tekhnopromexport PA OJSC, the Tekhnopromexport PA LLC is established. It becomes responsible for the TPP construction projects in Crimea.	"Cover-up" operation begins. Tekhnopromexport PA OJSC concludes a contract with Siemens for the supply of turbines, and then resells them to Tekhnopromexport PA LLC.
March 10, 2015	A contract is signed for the supply of four turbines between Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies LLC (subsidiary of Siemens) and Tekhnopromexport PA OJSC for the construction of a thermal power plant on the Taman Peninsula of the Krasnodar territory.	A contract base for the deliveries of Siemens turbines to Crimea is formed, under the guise of deliveries to the Krasnodar territory.
June 30, 2015	Vedomosti newspaper reports that the contract for the supply of four turbines between Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies LLC and Tekhnopromexport PA OJSC for the construction of a thermal power plant on the Taman Peninsula of the Krasnodar territory is only a formality to circumvent the sanctions.	Representatives of Rotech, Tekhnopromexport, Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies and Siemens in Russia refuse to comment.
July 2, 2015	Reuters publishes its investigation into possible violations of the sanctions regime.	There is no reaction from either Siemens or Tekhnopromexport or from the governments of the countries to the information and appeals from the world media.
September 13, 2015	The construction of the Sevastopol Thermal Power Plants starts.	

¹¹ Siemens achieved its success in the Russian market of gas turbine technologies, including through the use of non-transparent contracts with the Russian companies. A corruption case was initiated against Siemens, and the company admitted the use of the bribe practices. <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/siemens-subsidiary-admits-guilt-in-russian-bribery-case-29512>. In 2008, the company was found guilty of corruption and other corruption cases in the world, and paid US\$1.6 billion to USA to settle the case under a corruption investigation in the United States. <https://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/04/30/siemens-under-investigation-for-payments-to-russian-company/>.

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

Date	Action	Notes
August 6, 2016	Reuters reports that Siemens turbines are being prepared for delivery to Crimea. Two power plants under construction in Crimea are "compatible" only with Siemens turbines, writes Reuters.	There is no reaction from either Siemens or Tekhnopromexport or from the governments of the countries to the information and appeals from the world media.
October 8, 2015	By the order of the Russian Government No. 2004 dated October 8, 2015, the territorial planning scheme for Crimea is approved and mentions the construction of the Sevastopol and Simferopol TPPs.	It indicates the purposefulness of the Russian Federation's actions for the supply of Siemens turbines to Crimea (they match in capacity).
October 16, 2015	Tekhnopromexport PA OJSC enters into a contract with Tekhnopromexport PA LLC, which provides for the delivery of four gas turbine units that correspond to the description of the ones purchased from Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies LLC. Later, Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Dmitry Manturov says that the Russian side has provided maximum legal correctness using Siemens technologies in the production of turbines for thermal power plants in Crimea.	The implementation of the sanctions circumvention scheme is in full swing. A legal scheme for "circumvention" and subsequent "face saving" is being formed. ¹²
September 2016	On September 21-22, 2016, Vladimir Putin meets Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Economy of Germany S. Gabriel. The German delegation includes representatives of German business, in particular, Siemens Board Member Siegfried Russwurm. According to the results of the meeting with S. Gabriel says: "We discussed the issue of legal regulation of investments and import sanctions."	S. Gabriel notes the priority of economic cooperation of Germany and Russia and calls for a gradual lifting of sanctions imposed on Russia over its occupation of Crimea.
October 16-28, 2016	Tekhnopromexport JSC transfers the turbines to Tekhnopromexport LLC, which should deliver them to Crimea.	
March 16, 2017	German Siemens Concern informs its fulfilment of the contract with Tekhnopromexport PA JSC on the supply of four gas turbines.	
July 5, 2017	Reuters reports that Siemens turbines were delivered to Crimea to circumvent the sanctions. Lawyers claim that there is no legal precedent as to whether Siemens can be held liable if a third party brought the turbines to Crimea.	The European Commission declines to comment, saying that EU member-states should adhere to the rules of sanctions against their companies.
July 6, 2017	Siemens states it did not supply turbines to the Peninsula. The Russian side claims that the turbines in the Krasnodar territory were purchased on the secondary market and upgraded at Russian mills of Rotech for the needs of the project.	Siemens' "save face" scheme is made public.
July 10, 2017	Siemens says that two of the four gas turbines delivered to Russia were moved to Crimea against their will.	
July 11, 2017	Siemens files the lawsuit in the case of supply of turbines to Crimea. The defendants in the Siemens' case are Tekhnopromexport PA OJSC, Tekhnopromexport PA LLC, and Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies.	Siemens demonstrates public activity and files a lawsuit in the Moscow Court. The ruling in this situation is known in advance.
July 28, 2017	The Moscow Court of Appeal rejects Siemens' claim on arresting the turbines for thermal power plants supplied to the structures of the Russian Rotech, and illegally moved to the occupied Crimea.	The Russian court predictably rejects Siemens' claim.

¹² The fact of transfer of the property rights to the new owner formally suggests that the agreement is concluded on the secondary market, and the resale of turbines is the right of the buyer. If there are any restrictions related to the ban on the supply of turbines to Crimea, and they are provided for in the contract, in case of court appeal "they will be considered null and void, since they are intended to limit the right of the owner to dispose his property."

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

Date	Action	Notes
August 4, 2017	The EU Council imposes sanctions for the supply of Siemens turbines to Crimea. Restrictive measures are introduced against the Deputy Minister of Energy of Russia A. Cherezov and Director of the Department of the Ministry of Energy E. Grabchak. In addition, sanctions are imposed against Tekhnopromexport PA OJSC, Tekhnopromexport PA LLC and Interavtomatika JSC.	
November 09, 2017	Siemens wants back to Russia. Despite the scandal with the supply of turbines to Crimea, Siemens continues to develop cooperation with Russia.	Siemens decides to continue cooperation after the Russian court rejects the claim.
December 19, 2017	On December 18, the German Concern Siemens signs a contract for the construction of a 495 MW combined-cycle power plant in Nizhnekamsk.	
March 16, 2018	Gazprom announces that the Chair of the monopoly O. Miller and the Chairman of the Board of Siemens J. Käser agreed to supply gas turbines for Grozny TPP with a capacity of up to 360 MW.	
May 2018	The Hamburg Prosecutor's Office in May launches an investigation into the supply of Siemens gas turbines to Crimea against three employees of the company's industrial concern in St. Petersburg.	In the future, the head of the company's Representative Office in Russia will be changed.
July 5, 2018	Siemens plans to increase the depth of localization of energy gas turbines production in Russia to 90%. The head of the Concern in Russia Dietrich Meller informs. We are talking about high-power turbines that are produced at the sites of the Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies JV. "We have reached the localization level of 60% - this is not far from the required 90%."	Siemens agrees to transfer critical technologies.
September 5, 2018	Siemens potentially agrees to transfer blade manufacturing technologies to Russia. Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies can bring the localization of high-capacity gas turbine production in Russia to 100%. At the end of August, Vladimir Putin speaks about the desired level of localization of equipment at 100%. Without full localization, including the hot part, Siemens equipment risks to be excluded from the Russian TPP Modernization Programme with a cost of about 1.35 trillion rubles.	Siemens agrees to transfer critical technologies.
October 16, 2018	The Supreme court of the Russian Federation refuses to consider the appeal of Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies and the German Siemens AG on the decision of the lower courts, which consistently denied the claim to the structures of Rostech JSC and Tekhnopromexport LLC. Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies demands that the company return four large-capacity gas turbines produced on the order of Tekhnopromexport.	The "save face" scheme by Siemens ends.
January 28, 2019	The first stages of the Simferopol and Sevastopol TPPs – power units and all relevant infrastructure – are commissioned.	The sanctions circumvention scheme successfully ends.

FOCUS ON: COUNTERING RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION

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Law Enforcement Agencies of Ukraine and Occupation of Crimea¹³

Six years that have passed since the start of the Russian aggression allow us to determine the evolution of the Ukrainian state's reflection on occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea. One of the most specific dimensions of this response is the activity of Ukrainian authorities, which in the post-Soviet countries are formally called law enforcement (police, security, specialized regime agencies and the Prosecutor's Office).

Despite the contraversion of this term, and in terms of an obvious lack of the rule of law in such countries, it is better to call these bodies the law enforcement agencies. Their key feature is exclusion from the National Armed Forces but, at the same time, the presence of statutory relations, armament, oath, etc.

It should be noted at once that the beginning of the occupation of Crimea in February-March 2014 led to the mass withdrawal of Ukrainian security forces, positioned on the Peninsula, from their duties. This behaviour became characteristic for the absolute majority of servicemen and was at best a form of voluntary resignation or forced dismissal by the occupiers after the Russian annexation of Crimea, primarily during the so-called "grace period" before the end of 2014, with the subsequent residence of the person in Crimea or departure to the territory controlled by Ukraine. Official property, official and secret information, and archives were mostly not destroyed, weapons, special equipment, flags and seals were mostly handed over to the occupation authorities.

At the same time, this was accompanied by a mass collaboration of Ukrainian security forces with the occupiers [1], which became most characteristic of officers of the Internal Affairs Ministry, Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) and Foreign Intelligence Service (FISU) of Ukraine, and the State Protective Service (there were many objects in Crimea that had a special regime). The initiative withdrawal from Crimea of the ship-boat group of the State Border Service of Ukraine (SBSU) to Odesa from Sevastopol and Mariupol from Kerch, the behaviour of individual SSU officers should be considered certain exceptions. (In more detail, the problems of Russian agents and collaborations of security forces are described in the piece of the expert group of the Centre for Global Studies Strategy XXI: "Russian agents of influence in Ukraine: the destruction of the defense and security sector," in No.1(37) of the journal).

Thus, the role of the security forces in protecting the state interests of Ukraine in Crimea was generally extremely negative, and as of March 2014, the relevant territorial divisions of the security forces de facto ceased to exist. These processes were absolutely similar both for territorial divisions in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC), and for the city of Sevastopol.

The certain natural exceptions were the inter-regional divisions that had structures outside Crimea – the Azov-Black Sea Division of the SSS of Ukraine, the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the Prydniprovskaya Railway, the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Southern Region of Ukraine. A small part of the officers of the divisions of security forces that left Crimea without cooperation with the occupiers, during 2014-2015 joined the Central Divisions or territorial apparatus of the Ukrainian security forces.

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FOCUS ON: CRIMEAN DOSSIER

The escalation of Russian aggression in the East of Ukraine led to the special organization of the counteraction system in the format of the Anti-Terrorist Operation of Ukraine (ATO) with the formation of the ATO Headquarters under the leadership of the SSU. The ATO headquarters had an interregional function and actually a national significance. The territorial bodies of the Ukrainian security forces operating in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were also subordinate to it indirectly, in terms of the organization of counteraction to aggression. In contrast to the situation in the East of Ukraine, the ATO Headquarters did not coordinate the actions of the security forces on the issues of Crimea and their territorial divisions ceased to exist.

During the initial period of occupation, procedural and operational response to the actions of the aggressor in Crimea was assigned to the Central Structural Divisions of the Prosecutor General's Office, the SSU and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, and there was no single centre for coordinating their activities. Independently, the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine approved the decisions to restore their own regional divisions in Crimea.

This autonomy comes from different organizational procedures for such restoration and the consideration of the issue by the President, the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Internal Affairs, respectively, at different times and under different conditions. These procedures can be tracked from Government decrees, available departmental documents, media materials, and information from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs, and Public Organizations (EDRPOU) regarding the relevant legal entities.

In particular, the acting Prosecutor General of Ukraine signed Order No. 33sh dated June 12, 2014, which reorganized the ARC Prosecutor's Office and relocated it to the city of Kyiv. At the same time, the ARC Prosecutor's Office remained the same legal entity (EDRPOU 02911088) as before 2014. The regime of its operation in the controlled territory was determined by the orders of the Prosecutor's General Office of Ukraine No. 18gn dated March 27, 2015, No. 88 dated Febru-

ary 16, 2016, No. 414 dated December 23, 2015 and No. 46 dated February 13, 2017. These orders, in particular, approved the Procedure for the activities of the Prosecutor's Office in connection with the temporary occupation of the territory of the ARC and the city of Sevastopol, and the ARC Prosecutor's Office was also assigned the duties of the Prosecutor's Office of Sevastopol.

It is very interesting that the Prosecutor of Sevastopol, as a separate legal entity, (EDRPOU 22275105) had to be liquidated by the bodies of Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine. However, the latter failed and it still formally exists in the registers, is formally represented by the Prosecutor of Sevastopol Ihor Pilat [2]. In fact, I. Pilat terminated his duties as City Prosecutor in March 2014. There is no reliable information from open sources about his collaboration with the invaders, or about his departure from the occupied Crimea.

The formation of the ARC Prosecutor's Office was primarily a political move, as at that time the majority of cases associated with the occupation of Crimea, were initiated and considered by the Divisions of the Prosecutor's General Office, Prosecutor's Office of Kherson Region and the Military Prosecutor of the Southern Region.

Vasyl Synchuk was appointed Prosecutor General of Ukraine on August 26, 2014, Gunduz Mamedov was appointed Prosecutor General of the ARC on August 29, 2016, and Ihor Ponochozny was appointed to this position on October 22, 2019 [3]. All these prosecutors in 2014 were not related to the ARC Prosecutor's Office and did not work in the Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine in Crimea.

It is interesting that during their appointments, by definition the requirement of para 2, cl. 25, part 2, Article 26 of the current Constitution of the ARC dated 1998, approved by the Law of Ukraine No. 350-XIV dated December 23, 1998 was not observed. According to it the appointment of the Prosecutor of the ARC shall be agreed with the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC (which is impossible in the conditions of termination of the activities of the Autonomy authorities). This legal conflict, which the Prosecutor's Office clearly forgot, could easily be avoided through the formation of

FOCUS ON: CRIMEAN DOSSIER

a new legal entity and, accordingly, a different status of the Prosecutor, who would chair such entity (for example, through the formation of the ARC Prosecutor's Office and the city of Sevastopol, etc.)

This more legally competent way, but with a noticeable delay, was adopted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. First, by the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 730 dated September 16, 2015, the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in the ARC and its 26 divisions with the status of legal entities were liquidated, as well as the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the City of Sevastopol, but without formal liquidation of its divisions [4].

This led to incidents, however, not as bright as with the Prosecutor's Office of Sevastopol. For example, there is still formally a Battalion of the Patrol Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in the city of Sevastopol (EDRPOU 08806197), and it is still formally chaired by Serhiy Khatuntsev, who in 2014 actually joined the occupiers in the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in the city of Sevastopol [5].

Together with the liquidation of two Crimean divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Government Decree No. 730 dated 2015 established the Interregional Main Directorate of the National Police (MDNP) in the ARC and the city of Sevastopol (EDRPOU 40108756). This MDNP was stationed in Odesa and Ivan Katerynychuk was appointed its first Head. He was transferred from the position of Head of the Odesa Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [6].

This deployment, in fact, on the territory of other divisions (first in the premises of the Regional Office for the organized crime combating, and then in the building of the Odesa City Administration) was explained by the fact that MDNP was formed to solve a purely utilitarian urgent task – registration and search for hundreds of people in the framework of proceedings initiated after the occupation of Crimea. Since most of these indi-

viduals were deserters at that time, and the investigation was conducted by the Military Prosecutor's Office stationed in Odesa, the MDNP was placed in the same city. From December 2016 to December 2018 MDNP was headed by Anatoly Bakhchyvanzhy, and since May 2019 this position was taken by Vitaly Stryzhak.

In 2018, the initiated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the Representation of the President of Ukraine in ARC transfer of MDNP from Odesa to Kherson and the areas close to Crimea in the Kherson region continued. Since January 2019, this transfer has been legalized. Interestingly, MDNP in Crimea and Sevastopol not only became legal entities different from the "pre-war" Crimean Main Directorate of the MIA, but did not become the successors of the Main Directorate of the MIA of Ukraine in ARC.

This, for example, is confirmed by the decision of the Cherkasy District Administrative Court in the case No. 580/724/19 dated July 03, 2019. As the court adds, considering the claim of a former policeman on the appointment of a pension, the "materials that relate to the former personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the ARC, from the temporarily occupied territory were not transferred" [7].

The non-public formation of the Crimean MDNP in Odesa in 2015 and its long, through the resistance of a number of officials, transfer to Kherson in 2018-2019 over the past five years have led to numerous, including artificial, jurisdiction collisions in the proceedings given for consideration to this Directorate [8; 9].

Regional bodies of the SSU in Crimea also had an interesting restoration way. First of all it is worth pointing out an extremely typical and little-known decision of the Ukrainian authorities of the times of Viktor Yanukovych, who in October-November 2013, even before the events of the Revolution of Dignity, quietly terminated the existence of the Interregional Department of Military Counterintelligence of SSU in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol stationed in Sevastopol (EDRPOU 08223337) [10]. It is obvious that this Department should have been responsible

FOCUS ON: CRIMEAN DOSSIER

for the state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Crimea and, accordingly, for their ability to counteract the bribery and provocation of the Russians. Open sources do not provide any data on the relevant events that preceded the occupation, but Wikipedia describes the actions of the Head of this Department, Vadym Kovalchyuk, after the beginning of the occupation of Crimea. As this resource informs, V. Kovalchyuk "secretly left Crimea", and in the spring of 2014 he managed to evacuate part of the documents and part of the personnel of the DMCI from the Crimean Peninsula to Kyiv. A number of senior SSU officials did leave Crimea in compliance with the order of the SSU Head No. 44 dated March 24, 2014. It is interesting that the Heads of the SSU Directorates appointed in March 2014 in the ARC (Oleh Absalyamov) and in Sevastopol (Mykhaylo Salva) did not become de jure heads of the corresponding legal entities in the registers.

Only in 2016 Ukraine has restored the SSU's MD in the ARC (stationed in Kherson), as the legal entity identical to the "pre-war" SSU's MD in the ARC (EDRPOU 20001817). At the same time, the name of the Head of this legal entity, Gennady Kalachov, was finally replaced in the registers with the new SSU's MD Head, Danyla Dotsenko [11].

In 2017, Oleksandr Shmitko was appointed the Head of the SSU's MD, and in November 2019 he was replaced by Yevhen Netuzhylov. It can be argued that to SSU's MD, in contrast to the MDNP and the ARC Prosecutor's Office, the Ukrainian authorities assigned certain real tasks and expectations to counter Russian aggression, at least for the initial period of 2016-2018. This was conditioned by the location of the SSU's MD in Kherson.

However, as in the case of the Prosecutor's Office, the SSU forgot to liquidate the actual office of the SSU in the city Sevastopol as a legal entity (EDRPOU 20000976), which still exists and is still formally represented according to the Register by its Head appointed before March 2014 – Peter Zyma [12].

In real life, P. Zyma actively collaborated with the enemy and made one of the most successful careers among Ukrainian security forces. He was transferred to Moscow and at a certain stage performed the tasks of forming the punitive security agencies in the Russian-occupied Donetsk [13].

Azov-Black Sea Regional Department (ABSRD) of SBSU had a little better situation with the territorial bodies of the security forces, which still have their own infrastructure in the Kherson region and in 2015-2020 functioned in government-controlled areas, changing its legal address (EDRPOU 23311274) from Simferopol to Kherson and providing first and foremost the protection of the administrative border of the ARC. ABSRD was headed by Andriy Ihnatiev (October 2016-August 2018), Oleksandr Pimenov (August 2018-March 2019), Volodymyr Bondar (April-December 2019) [14].

After the change of power in Ukraine the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 43 dated on February 05, 2020 and the order of ABSRD Administration No. 19 dated February 20, 2020 eliminated the ABSRD SBSU [15], its structure, and the property was transferred to the Southern Regional Directorate of SBSU, which is now stationed in the city of Odesa [16]. The Kherson and Berdyansk Border Detachments of the Southern Regional Directorate now provide protection of the administrative border with the ARC [17; 18]. Also, the Main Directorate of the SFS in the Kherson region, the ARC and the city of Sevastopol, stationed at Kherson, has certain force functions in Crimea.

As already mentioned above, formal mechanisms for coordinating the actions of the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies in relation to Crimea, similar to ATO Headquarters in the East, have not been created in Ukraine in 2014. Since 2016, attempts to coordinate these bodies have been made by the ARC Prosecutor's Office. Despite the limited powers of the supervisory authority, in particular in the areas of operational work and counterintelligence, this activity was carried out with obvious abuse of authority and had clearly not typical for the Prosecutor's Office political nature.

FOCUS ON: CRIMEAN DOSSIER

In 2017-2018, attempts to coordinate law enforcement agencies to counter Russian aggression were made by the Representation of the President of Ukraine in the ARC, for which purpose a special task force was created by the Permanent Representative's Order No. 22 dated September 14, 2017 [19].

Approved by the Order of the Representative No. 17 dated June 20, 2018, the Plan of urgent measures on counteraction to the Russian aggression from Crimea, protection of the interests of the state, citizens of Ukraine and Ukrainian legal entities in Crimea in 2018-2019 the objectives of Section 6 "Safety and Rights Protection" include: the relocation of law enforcement bodies on Crimea to the Kherson region; practical establishment of special regimes for waters and territories close to the line of differentiation; regulation of procedure for visiting Crimea by Ukrainian citizens, who are officials and carriers of state secrets; the involvement of Divisions of National Guard of Ukraine in the tasks in the areas adjacent to Crimea; strengthening of the SBSU in the areas adjacent to Crimea; deployment of the Marine Protection forces of the SBSU at the coast of the Sea of Azov adjacent to Crimea [20].

In the report of the Representative Office submitted to the Presidential Administration and Parliamentary Committees, dated August 2018 (Analytical and Information Note on the activities of the punitive bodies of the occupation authorities of the Russian Federation on the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and law-enforcement bodies of Ukraine in the ARC, and the city of Sevastopol) the key problems of the organization of Ukrainian security forces in relation to Crimea included:

- the remoteness of the location of the ARC Prosecutor's Office and the MDNP from Crimea, the artificial geographical "discontinuity" of law enforcement agencies of Ukraine in relation to Crimea between Kherson, Odesa, and Kyiv;
- the need to improve human resources and logistics divisions of the ARC Prosecutor's Office, MDNP, SSU's MD stationed now and in future in Kherson region with limited local resources;

- politicization by the leadership of the ARC Prosecutor's Office of its own activities and systematic evasion of the ARC Prosecutor's Office from interaction with the Representation;
- uncertainty of the criminal law policy in relation to persons who cooperate with the Russian Federation in Crimea, participate in the occupation authorities;
- lack of legal procedural mechanisms for imposing sanctions;
- presence of customs authorities at entry/exit checkpoints and customs control;
- low level of counteraction to organized crime and corruption in the Kherson region, in particular, such that has direct links and coordination from Crimea, signs of loss of effective state regulation in some areas of the region, close to Crimea;
- lack of effective interaction and clear distribution of powers between the Prosecutor's Office, the SSU and the National Police in the Kherson region and the ARC, respectively, especially in the context of large-scale inter-regional crime (illegal transportation to/from Crimea, illegal movement of goods and services to Crimea, ecocide by chemical enterprises in the Northern Crimea, provocations by Russian security forces in the water areas, etc.);
- issues related to legally non-regulated principles of investigative actions, operational and search and other measures performed by the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine in Crimea (as follows from the letter of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine No. 14/2/2-67-1474 dated October 2, 2014 and others) [19].

However, all attempts to coordinate the security forces on the issues of Crimea were curtailed by the new leadership of the Representation in June 2019, after the change of the highest power in Ukraine. The Representation moved from Kherson to Kyiv in March 2020, and even the corresponding text of the above-mentioned analytical

FOCUS ON: CRIMEAN DOSSIER

report was removed from the official website of Representation [3]. Some publications of 2019 even refer to Representation as to the "Press Service of the ARC Prosecutor's Office" [21].

In 2019-2020, in addition to controversial personnel changes in the regional "Crimean" law enforcement agencies, the elimination of the ABSRD SBSU, we also observe a decrease in their procedural and operational activity, as compared to 2015-2018. Summing up, we should note that

the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine in 2013-2014 were completely powerless tools in combating the preparation and implementation of the occupation of Crimea. Attempts to use the newly created and restored power structures of Ukraine in 2014-2019 to counter Russian aggression from Crimea and prepare conditions for de-occupation had rather negative, and at best targeted and tactical, result, accompanied by numerous personnel, organizational and legal errors of judgement.

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
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Moldova's 'Energy Split': To EU or EAEU?¹⁴

The energy sector of Moldova is characterized by two dependencies: the first is on Russian gas, the debt for which has already exceeded the amount of US\$6.2 billion and the second is on electricity supplies from the pro-Russian Transnistria, which is not controlled by Chisinau, where the Moldovan SRPP is located. Moldova has been a member of the Energy Community Treaty since 2010. The Association agreement between Moldova and the EU has been in force since 2014. At the same time, Moldova since 2018 has been participating as an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), created by the Russian Federation for the reintegration of the post-Soviet space. The latter

With European aspirations for the gas market, the country is closely linked to the Russian Federation and Gazprom. This dual orientation hinders the possibility of integration into the European gas market. Multi-vector nature creates uncertainty and slows down the development of the gas market.

Implementation of the European gas legislation. According to the latest report of the Energy Community, Moldova has enough issues with the implementation of the European gas regulations [1] (Fig. 1).



is a consequence of the gradual geopolitical re-orientation of Moldova, which Russia does from within the country, using local agents of influence and pro-Russian political forces.

Moldova's gas sector

So far, no decisions have been made on the third-party access and market opening. The relevant acts are still drafts. Taking into account the obligations to Energy Community, the Law of Moldova On Natural Gas [2] sets requirements for the unbundling of transmission system operators and certification procedures in accordance with the EU legislation. Before January 1, 2020, Moldova used a derogation (from the Directive requirements), provided by the Council of Ministers of the Energy Community regarding the unbundling and certification of operators (TSO) required by the Third Energy Package.

¹⁴ The publication was prepared in the framework of the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea Region through Greater Engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations" with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Black Sea Trust Fund or its partners.

FOCUS ON: MOLDOVA

In 2019, Moldovagaz as the owner of two GTS Operators, developed an unbundling plan and submitted it for approval to the Moldovan Energy Regulatory Authority (ANRE). However, the plan raised doubts as it did not clearly define the unbundling model and was eventually rejected. **The new unbundling plan**, developed in August 2019 in collaboration with the Energy Community Secretariat, implies an independent transmission operator (ITO) model. It is still being discussed.

Third-party access to the network. Currently, Moldovatransgaz actually prohibits access to gas transportation facilities for users, which are not the shareholders of their owner – Moldovagaz. Two years ago, ANRE and the Secretariat prepared Network Codes for gas transmission and distribution for Moldova, which fully comply with the legislation. However, none of the codes has been adopted yet.


On European interconnectivity requirements. The diversification of gas supplies to Moldova primarily depends on the launch of the Iasi-Ungheni gas pipeline (*PMI Gas 18 in the list of Projects of Mutual Interest of the EU*), and in particular, on its designed extension to Chisinau. To promote the project, the state-owned company Vestmoldtransgas was established as the third Moldovan operator. In 2018, it was privatized and sold to the Romanian Transgaz, along with a commitment to invest in construction.

***For reference:** the Ungheni-Chisinau gas pipeline, 120 kilometres long, will transport 1.5 bcm of gas annually from Romania to Moldova. Romanian Transgaz should invest up to Euro 93 million in construction and expected to receive a grant from the European Foundations in the amount of Euro 46 million. Another option for diversification is reverse flow on the Trans-Balkan pipeline (project PECEI GAS_25).*

According to the Energy Community Secretariat, Regulation 703/2015/EU [3] (Interoperability and Data Exchange Code) has not yet been implemented in Moldova and is not being applied. However, it is reported that the new inter-operator agreement with GTSOU has already been concluded according to the European rules.

Until recently, Russian gas (about 20 bcm per year) was transited through Moldova to Turkey and the Western Balkans. This allowed, according to public data, receiving over US\$ 60 million per year for transportation services, including almost US\$ 26 for gas transit, received by Tiraspoltransgaz per year.

After the introduction of TurkStream, Gazprom stopped supplying gas in this direction (*Fig. 2*), which caused an economic strike on network operators Moldovagaz and Moldova as a whole. One of the consequences of transit cessation was the new tariff for gas transportation in Moldova, which increased 8 times. It is significant that the decision that deprived Moldova of transit revenues was made by the largest shareholder of Moldovagaz JSC – Russian Gazprom.



Currently, Moldovatransgaz and Tiraspoltransgaz, both subsidiaries of Moldovagaz, have not yet passed the unbundling procedure. Tiraspoltransgaz provides gas transportation on the left Bank of the Dniester River. Another operator (TSO) – Vestmoldtransgas, which is now owned by the Romanian Transgaz, is also not yet certified under the European legislation.

The Law of Moldova On Natural Gas also applies the requirement of unbundling to distribution network operators. However, companies that serve fewer than 100,000 consumers now have exemptions to this requirement. Out of the 25 existing operators (DSO), only Chisinaugaz (a 100% subsidiary of Moldovagaz) falls under this requirement.

FOCUS ON: MOLDOVA


Thus, now the gas market in Moldova is monopolized. Moldovagaz JSC is responsible for all segments of the gas market, both for gas transportation/transit and for gas imports, 99% of which is purchased from Gazprom, which violates the European requirement on supply of 30% of gas from a single source. However, there are already technical possibilities for diversification.

At the end of December 2019, the operator of GTS of Ukraine, Moldovatransgaz LLC and Moldovagaz JSC signed the interconnection agreement on interaction, in accordance with the EU gas legislation. It should be noted that this is a very important event that allows using gas transportation capacities that were previously blocked by Gazprom. This opens up the opportunities to diversify exports for Moldova as well. Ukraine has been importing gas from the EU market for a long time. Moldova has such opportunities now. In the spring of the last year, Ukrtransgaz, due to the delay in the construction of the Romania-Moldova Interconnector, reported that Moldova's suppliers can take advantage of the Ukrainian GTS, which will allow Moldova independently importing gas from the EU market.


In addition, Ukrtransgaz offered the Moldovan side the opportunity to create its own security gas

reserve in Ukrainian underground storage facilities to ensure uninterrupted gas supplies to Moldovan consumers in the fall and winter periods. The total capacity at the connections points between Moldova and Ukraine allows transporting up to 15 million cubic meters of gas per day, which fully covers the needs of consumers in Moldova. Ukrainian Operator (GTSOU) in February 2020 reported that if Moldova buys gas from the EU with delivery via Ukraine, 1 thousand cubic meters of gas at the point of entry to Moldova will cost 16 % less than from Gazprom. This is confirmed by the situation in the EU markets (*Fig. 4*).

However, Moldova continues to buy the entire gas volume from Gazprom. This is not surprising. It is enough to know the shareholders of Moldovagaz. Gazprom owns the largest share of 50% [4]. Another 13.44% are owned by an enterprise from the non-controlled by Moldova territory on the left bank of the Dniester River. Management bodies of Moldovagaz also operate under the dominance of Gazprom's personnel. For example, the Supervisory Board is chaired by Elena Burmistrova, Deputy Chairman of the Gazprom Management Board and General Director of Gazpromexport LLC. In general, out of the six members of the Council, four are employees of Gazprom. The same applies to the Board of Directors. Of the nine members of



FOCUS ON: MOLDOVA



the Management Board, five simultaneously work for Gazprom as heads of departments, offices and divisions.

As the financial report of Moldovagaz for 2018 [5] states, one of the company's goals is to import **Russian gas**, and Moldovagaz PJSC "is highly dependent on one of the shareholders – Gazprom PJSC". And this is true. The debt to its shareholder (Gazprom PJSC) and affiliated to it Factoring-Finance LLC as of December 31, 2018, according to various estimates, amounts to US\$ 5-7 debt. The lion's share of debts is justified by non-payments from the areas on the left bank of the Dniester. Typically, the independent auditor (PWC) refused to provide an opinion on the financial statements [6]. Regarding the debt issues, the mentioned report indicates that Moldovagaz JSC is in the process of discussing the issues of natural gas supplies to the Transnistria region and related debts with all stakeholders. At the beginning of this year, it was reported that Gazprom PJSC, the largest shareholder of Moldovagaz, appealed to the International Arbitration at the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (RChCI) with a claim to recover from Moldovagaz JSC US\$ 246.41 million debt. This is stated in the Q4 2019 report [7]. Earlier, in June 2019, the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation upheld Gazprom's claim

on recovery of debts from Moldovagaz for natural gas delivered in 2016.

Therefore, to sum up, we can note the following:

- the gas market of Moldova continues to be a monopoly, and the source of gas imports is 100% Russian Gazprom;
- further implementation of the European gas legislation, the possibility of gas imports from the EU market through Ukraine, and the implementation of new infrastructure projects can diversify the sources and routes of gas supplies, increase Moldova's energy security, and increase the economic attractiveness of imports. However, these processes are being slowed down by Gazprom.
- Meanwhile, the Contract on the terms of natural gas supply to Moldova in 2007-2019 has been extended until December 31, 2020. The Contract on the conditions of natural gas transit through the territory of Moldova in 2011-2019 will also be valid. Nevertheless, the transit itself is no longer there. To calculate the price of gas imports to Moldova, the "European" formula based on the arithmetic mean of the gas sales price of Gazprom to non-CIS countries and the price of a petroleum product

FOCUS ON: MOLDOVA

basket will continue to apply in contrast to the European market, where the prices are based on indicators of liquid gas hubs. As known, by 2025 the EAEU plans to agree on the principles of a single gas market, including a single pricing formula.


Moldova's electricity sector

Inter RAO is an equally powerful weapon for Gazprom's influence and expansion into the markets of neighbouring countries. Russia has been using the power industry to influence Moldova for many years. Moldavian SRPP (State Regional Power Plant), located in Dniestrovsk on the territory uncontrolled by Chisinau, actually belongs to the Russian Inter RAO UES, and is the main supplier of electricity to Moldova. Russian natural gas is used for electricity generating. It is supplied by Moldovagaz JSC, but at the level of Tiraspoltransgaz, no payment is made for the gas consumed. Consequently, Moldova's debt increases, as it has to pay twice – for natural gas consumed by Transnistria, and for imported electricity. The purchase

of electricity in Moldova is performed by Energom State Enterprise.

From 2014 to 2017, when Moldova bought electricity exclusively from the Moldovan SRPP, the following scheme was in effect: *"free" Russian gas – contract with the Moldavian SRPP – the intermediary company – withdrawal of money to offshore accounts.* In 2014, Energocapital became an intermediary between the Moldovan SRPP and Energom. Energocapital disguised a fugitive oligarch, who is now hiding abroad, Vlad Plakhotnyuk (then only the Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Party) and his "allies" in Transnistria in the person of the former "President" Yevgeny Shevchuk.

The scheme was as follows. The company was registered in Tiraspol three weeks before DTEK, which got access to the export section from Ukrenergo, refused to supply electricity to Moldova through military actions and instability of generation in Ukraine. In just three business days, Ener-



FOCUS ON: MOLDOVA

gocapital received a six-month license to sell electricity from the Moldovan Regulator (the National Energy Regulatory Agency, the majority in which was formed by Plakhotnyuk's people). Before 2017, the license has been 4 times extended.

The Regulator explained the need for Energocapital by "disagreements between business partners in Chisinau, Tiraspol and Moscow." Allegedly, the intermediary will allow the parties to agree, and almost guarantee the security of supplies. From December 2014 till the end of March 2017, the total estimated amount of electricity supplies transferred through Plakhotnyuk's company was about US\$ 400 million debt.

Two companies are the founders of Energocapital JSC: Bas Market from Tiraspol and Ornamental Art Limited from Hong Kong (according to the investigation of the Moldovan publication *rise.md*). Bas Market was already liquidated at the end of 2015, and the Hong Kong Company remained the sole owner of the intermediary. The owners of Ornamental Art Limited are hidden too deep in offshore companies, which are clearly reflected in the diagram below provided by the Moldovan edition *Rise* (*Fig. 5*) [8].

The Moldovan SRPP received Russian gas from the Transnistria's Tiraspoltransgaz, for which it did not pay, generated electricity from it, which then sold through Energocapital to Moldova. Energocapital transferred the received money to offshore companies through Plakhotnyuk's Victoria-bank. The case with this scheme surfaced when the government changed in Transnistria.

Back in the spring of 2016, Ukraine, having adjusted the operation of the energy system, planned to resume exports to Moldova, but this contradicted Plakhotnyuk's business interests. In April 2017, exports from Ukraine were still restored. DTEK and Energocom signed a contract for the supply of Ukrainian electricity from April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018 (later this contract was extended for another year, and then for another year).

With the rise of pro-Russian President Ihor Dodon to power in 2016, Moscow wanted to make the electricity supply chain more transparent. Both parties, Moldovan and Transnistria, with an updated angle of view in favour of the Russian Fed-

eration, decided to eliminate the Energocapital intermediary. Consequently, the Moldovan Energocom state enterprise started purchasing electricity directly from the Moldovan SRPP and DTEK Pavlogradvuhillya.

With the arrival of the pro-European government led by Maya Sandu in June 2019, the intentions to isolate from the Russian Federation and strengthen energy independence were announced. In particular, there were statements that Moldova would terminate the contract for electricity supplies from Transnistria and cover the entire deficit by importing from Ukraine. However, these statements with the resignation of the Sandu government in November 2019 remained just intentions, and with the arrival of socialists, the schemes for electricity trade with Transnistria were preserved, although Plakhotnyuk's intermediary was liquidated.

At the moment, the situation looks as described below. According to the results of Q1 2020, the export of electricity from Ukraine to Moldova amounted to 130.3 million kWh. The contract between Energocom and Moldovan SRPP for the supply of electricity ended on March 31, 2020 and was extended by the Commission for Emergency Situations of Moldova until June 30 (with the possibility of extension) to cover 100% of Moldova's electricity needs.

It is emphasized that according to the new contract terms, from April 1, 2020, the average price of electricity purchase for Energocom will be approximately 9% lower than the average price applied under previously signed contracts. Earlier, the President of Moldova Ihor Dodon stated that from April 1, the purchase price of electricity for Moldova will decrease by 9%, to \$49.5 per 1 MWh. Until March 31, 2020, approximately 85% of the required electricity volumes were purchased from the Moldovan SRPP at US\$52.4 per MWh, and 15% from DTEK Pavlogradvuhillya at US\$64.4 per MWh.

Despite the officially declared course of Ukraine and Moldova to join the European continental network ENTSO-E and disconnect from the energy systems of Russia and Belarus, recent events in the power industry show the reluctance of the ruling authorities in both Ukraine and Moldova to adhere to a strategic course, as the lobby of electricity im-

FOCUS ON: MOLDOVA

port from Russia continues in Moldova, as we see from the story of the extension of the contract with the Moldovan SRPP, and in Ukraine. So, in October 2019, the Parliamentary Committee on Energy, Housing and Utilities at the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine submitted to the Parliament an amendment to the Law "On the electricity market", opening the import of electricity from Russia. As early as October 1, 2019, the first deliveries of Russian electricity with a smooth schedule and a capacity of 100 MW began, despite the fact that in the recent years, electricity imports from the Russian Federation have not been carried out. The only exporter from the Russian side is Inter RAO state monopoly [9].

Although the import of electricity from Belarus and Russia was temporarily suspended for the period of quarantine from April 8, 2020, only in January-February 2020, according to the State Customs Service, Ukraine imported from Russia electricity for US\$ 25.81 million.

Inter RAO has every opportunity to replace a third of all electricity consumed in Ukraine, as it applies a dumping policy, and in general, as known, energy resources from the Russian Federation are always not only resources, but also weapons, performing certain political tasks. Therefore, they can be traded at the Kremlin's desired periods at low prices. In addition, the import of electricity from Russia, if restored, will go smoothly, so it will not only destroy Ukrainian thermal power plants but also will necessarily have a negative impact on nu-

clear generation, which already faced a forced reduction during the quarantine period and suffered the largest crisis during the times of Ukraine's independence.

The growth of the electricity surplus in Ukraine caused by a drop in demand during the pandemic and DTEK's manipulation of artificially low prices on the "Day Ahead" market at the end of May, strengthen the chances of DTEK's resumption of the electricity exports to Moldova. However, at this stage, Moldova, being in the Russian debt loop, is not able to jump off the electric power needle of Inter RAO.

Conclusions

Russia's universal technology for creating critical energy dependence of post-Soviet countries on the Russian Federation has shown its absolute effectiveness in Belarus and Armenia, from which Moscow has received all possible political concessions and economic preferences. The Moldovan option for Russia is more complex for various reasons, but the direction of the evolution programmed from Moscow to Chisinau is the same – interruption of the Moldova's European integration process, launch of the Eurasian, prevention of the development of Moldovan-Romanian and Moldovan-Ukrainian relations, transformation of Moldova into an amorphous state of the Black Sea region, unable to develop independently. The alternative that Russia creates is the lack of an alternative to the EAEU.

FOCUS ON: MOLDOVA

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Regulatory Impact of International Maritime Organizations on Ukraine's Provision of Navigation and Hydrographic Aids for Maritime Traffic¹⁵

It is well known that in the modern world, about 90% of all cargo is transported by sea. As a result, the humanity depends on safe and efficient maritime traffic. However, in the context of this article, it is necessary to pay priority attention to the definition of navigation and hydrographic aids to maritime traffic. Thus, navigation and hydrographic support of maritime traffic is the creation of favourable maritime traffic conditions for ships through establishment and maintenance of the means of navigation equipment, required the intensity of ship traffic and the degree of danger, conducting hydrographic surveys, publishing, distributing and maintaining up-to-date navigation and hydrographic information in accordance with the requirements of the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter – the International Maritime Organization or IMO).

Navigation and hydrographic aids are specialized services related to the organization of maritime traffic safety provided to ships in accordance with international obligations of Ukraine [1]. It should be noted that navigation and hydrographic support of maritime traffic in accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine is carried out by:

- equipping the seas with coastal (lighthouses, navigation signs, navigation gates, hydrotechnical lighthouses, radio systems, and e-navigation means) and floating (floating lighthouses,



Photo 1. IMO Headquarters in London.
Source: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/International-Maritime-Organization>

buoys, milestones) means of navigation equipment, ensuring their uninterrupted operation in accordance with the established operating modes and the recommendations of the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (hereinafter – the International Association of Lighthouse Authorities or IALA);

- conducting hydrographic surveys of the Black and Azov Seas to prepare and publish official navigation maps, manuals and guidelines for navigation in accordance with the standards of the International Hydrographic Organization (hereinafter – the International Hydrographic Organization or IHO);
- collecting and providing to ships the data on changes on vessel traffic conditions and regimes at seas.

¹⁵ The publication was prepared in the framework of the project "Promoting Security in the Black Sea Region through Greater Engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations" with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Black Sea Trust Fund or its partners.

FOCUS ON: INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATIONS

Thus, Ukraine, as a coastal state, for proper safety of navigation in its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive (maritime) economic zone, takes into account:

- requirements of the International Maritime Organization;
- the standards of the International Hydrographic Organization;
- recommendations of the International Association of Lighthouse Authorities.

In view of the above, it is necessary to review in detail each of the international organizations mentioned. We shall start with the International Maritime Organization, which is a specialized intergovernmental Agency of the United Nations and started its work in 1959. Ukraine has been a member of the International Maritime Organization since 1994 [2].

Goals of the International Maritime Organization:

- a) to provide a forum and framework for cooperation among governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; encourage and facilitate the general adoption of standards in support of its international agreements concerning maritime safety, security, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships and review of the administrative and legal issues related to IMO goals;
- b) to encourage the removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions by Governments affecting shipping engaged in international trade to promote the availability of shipping services to the commerce of the world without discrimination; assistance and encouragement given by a Government for the development of its national shipping and for purposes of security does not in itself constitute discrimination, provided that such assistance and encouragement is not based on measures designed to restrict the

freedom of shipping of all flags to take part in international trade;

- c) to provide for the consideration by the Organization of matters concerning unfair restrictive practices by shipping concerns in accordance with IMO Convention;
- d) to provide for the consideration by the IMO of any matters concerning shipping and sea environment impact that may be referred to it by any organ or specialized agency of the United Nations;
- e) to exchange information among governments on matters under consideration by the IMO [3].

The IMO has developed over 40 conventions and agreements, and about a thousand Codes and recommendations that are in force worldwide [4]. The governing body of the International Maritime Organization is the Assembly convened twice a year and consisting of representatives of all member-states. In turn, the Assembly elects a 40-member Council that meets twice a year and serves an Executive body for IMO.

The IMO also has five main Committees:

1. Maritime Safety Committee (MSC);
2. Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC);
3. Legal Committee;
4. Technical Cooperation Committee;
5. Facilitation Committee.

The structure of the IMO also includes a Secretariat headed by the Secretary-General. The Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization is located in its headquarters in London and has about 300 people, citizens of different countries.

In the context of this publication, it is impossible to ignore the most famous and landmark document of the International Maritime Organization – Inter-

FOCUS ON: INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATIONS

national Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS-74) dated 1974 [5]. Some norms of SOLAS-74 concerning navigation and hydrographic aids have been implemented in the national legislation of Ukraine and are reflected, in particular, in the current Code of Commercial Navigation of Ukraine.

Ukraine has undertaken, inter alia, to comply with Regulation 4 “Navigation notifications,” Regulation 9 “Hydrographic Services,” Regulation 13 “Establishment and operation of aids to navigation” Chapter V “Safety of Navigation” of SOLAS-74.

Also, in 1995, Ukraine joined the Convention on the International Hydrographic Organization dated 1967 [6]. But before we provide the general description of the IHO, it seems worth focusing on the key definition in the context of the name of this International Organization, namely, the hydrography.

Hydrography is a branch of the applied science that aims to study (measure) and describe the physical characteristics of oceans, seas, coastal zones, lakes, and rivers, as well as predict their changes over time, to ensure the safety of navigation and other marine activities, in particular those related to economic development, security and defense, scientific research and environmental protection. In addition to supporting safe and efficient navigation, hydrography is directly related to almost every type of work at sea, including:

- exploitation of resources: commercial fisheries, exploration and development of minerals, etc.;
- environmental protection and management;
- delimitation of maritime boundaries;
- creation, operation and development of a National infrastructure of marine spatial data ;
- sailing on watercraft/small vessels;
- maritime defense and security;
- research and estimate of floods due to tsunamis and development of flood zones’ models;
- coastal zone management;
- tourism;
- marine science [7].

Thus, according to the Convention on the International Hydrographic Organization, the International Hydrographic Organization was founded in 1967 with the seat in Monaco [8]. The Organization shall have a consultative and technical nature It shall be the object of the Organization:

- a) To facilitate coordination of hydrographic activities among the Member States;
- b) To unify sea charts and documents to the greatest possible extent;
- c) To adopt reliable and efficient methods of hydrographic research and use of results thereof;
- d) To develop hydrography-related sciences and techniques used for descriptive oceanography.

Members of the IHO are governments that are parties to this Convention.

The Organization comprises:

- International Hydrographic Conference (hereinafter – the Conference);



Photo 2. The Headquarters of the International Hydrographic Organization in Principality of Monaco.

Source: <http://www.iho.int>

FOCUS ON: INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATIONS

- International Hydrographic Bureau (hereinafter – the Bureau) under the management of the Steering Committee.

The Conference consists of the representatives of the Member States. The Conference shall meet in ordinary session every five years. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference may be held at the request of a Member State or the Bureau subject to the approval of the majority of the Member States

The functions of the Conference shall be to:

- a) provide the overall directives of the Organization functioning;
- b) elect the members of the Steering Committee and its Chairman;
- c) consider reports put to it by the Bureau;
- d) decide on any technical or administrative proposals submitted by Member States or the Bureau;
- e) approve the budget by a majority of two-thirds of the Member States represented in the Conference;
- f) adopt by a majority of two-thirds of the Member States the amendments to the Basic and Financial rules;
- g) adopt by the majority provided for in the preceding paragraph any other special rules that may be required, especially with regard to the status of Directors and Bureau personnel.

In turn, to meet the objectives set out in the IHO Convention, the Bureau is, inter alia, shall:

- a) ensure close and permanent cooperation between the national hydrographic services;
- b) study all issues related to hydrography and associated sciences and technologies, collect the required documents;

- c) facilitate the exchange of marine maps and documents between the hydrographic services of Member States;
- d) distribute relevant documents;
- e) provide, upon request, instructions and advice, especially to countries that are establishing or expanding their hydrographic services;
- f) encourage coordination of hydrographic research with related oceanographic activities;
- g) distribute of oceanographic knowledge and facilitate its application for the benefit of navigators;
- h) cooperate with international organizations and scientific institutions with similar goals.

The Bureau consists of a Steering Committee, technical and administrative staff required for IHO.

Since 2004, Ukraine has been a National Member of the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities [9]. IALA was founded in 1957 and is a non-profit, International Technical Association with the seat in Saint-Germain-en-Laye, France. The International As-



Photo 3. The Headquarters of IALA in Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

Source: IALA

FOCUS ON: INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATIONS

sociation of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities is currently in the process of its status change as an international non-governmental organization established under French Law to an International Intergovernmental Organization.

IALA brings together marine aids to navigation authorities (lighthouses, buoys, milestones, navigation lines, radio systems, e-navigation tools, etc.), manufacturers, consultants, and, scientific and training institutes from all parts of the world and offers them the opportunity to exchange and compare their experiences and achievements. IALA encourages its members to work together in a common effort to harmonize aids to navigation worldwide and to ensure that the movements of vessels are safe, expeditious and cost effective while protecting the environment.

Taking into account the needs of mariners, developments in technology and the requirements and constraints of aids to navigation authorities, a number of technical committees have been established in the organizational structure of IALA bringing together experts from around the world. The work of the committees is aimed at developing common best practice standards through publication of IALA Recommendations and Guidelines. Thus, IALA contributes to a reduction of marine accidents, increased safety of life and property at sea, as well as the protection of the marine environment [10].

In addition, according to the Regulations on navigation and hydrographic navigation aids in internal sea waters, territorial sea and exclusive (maritime) economic zone of Ukraine, approved by the Order of the Ministry of Transport of Ukraine No. 514 dated May 29, 2006, navigation and hydrographic aid is performed by the State Institution Derzhhidrografia and funded in accordance with current legislation. Derzhhidrografia, in accordance with the assigned tasks of navigation and hydrographic aids (NHA) to mariners:

- participates in the development of programmes for the development and improvement of the national NHA system;
- initiates the development of standards and legal framework governing navigation NHA;
- equips the seas with navigation aids, ensuring their development, maintenance, repair and uninterrupted operation in a given mode;
- conducts hydrographic surveys and oceanographic research in the Black and Azov Seas;
- conducts topographic and geodetic works in the five-kilometre zone off the coast of Ukraine;
- provides comprehensive management in the field of sea and inland waterways' mapping;
- creates nautical charts, manuals and guidelines for navigation in analogue, digital and other forms and sells them to mariners;
- organizes a database of hydrographic and oceanographic data;
- develops and submits projects for vessel traffic routes, sea corridors and traffic separation systems in the territorial sea based on hydrographic surveys;
- brings to mariners information on changes in navigational conditions and regime through the publication of Notices to mariners and navigation radio warnings;
- serves as the National Coordinator of navigation radio communications of Ukraine within the world navigation warning service;
- represents Ukraine in the OHO and IALA, cooperates with hydrographic and lighthouse services of other states;
- ensures compliance with official international NHA rules and standards, participates in the development of new documents taking into account the interests of Ukraine;

FOCUS ON: INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATIONS

- within the scope of authority coordinates the construction of facilities on the Ukrainian coast and in the waters of the Black and Azov Seas that may affect the established mode of NHA operation or create a navigation hazard;
- approves, within the scope of authority, project documents for the construction of hydrotechnical structures, hydraulic engineering works, laying of underwater cables and oil and gas pipelines at seas and coast of Ukraine;
- provides organizational, technical and functional support for the operation of the network of the base and floating automatic identification systems (AIS), put on its balance sheet;
- provides organizational, technical and functional support for the backup routing server of the monitoring system;
- serves as the national coordinator of the international automated service for delivery of navigational and meteorological warnings and forecasts (NAVTEX);
- establishes, and updates when necessary, a list of delimiting sea areas under the jurisdiction of Ukraine (annex), delimiting the zones for all-year round operation and, where appropriate, restricts the periodical operation of the classes of ships, using the criteria for classes set out in Part 1, Article 4 of Directive 2009/45/EU of the European Parliament and European Council dated May 2, 009 On safety rules and standards for passenger ships;
- publishes in the Warnings to mariners a list of Delimiting sea areas under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, changes to the list;
- submits to the Central Executive Authority, which implements the state policy on Maritime and River Transport Safety, a list of Delimiting sea areas under the jurisdiction of Ukraine and information on its update for publication on the official website

of this Authority and awareness of international organizations.

That means, the Derzhhidrografia performs practical tasks for navigation and hydrographic aids to navigation.

Taking into account all the above, this article analyses the relevant regulations of the main documentary sources directly related to the provision of navigation and hydrographic aids by Ukraine and the regulatory impact of the International Maritime Organization, the International Hydrographic Organization and the International Association of Lighthouse Services on the provision of this service.

At the same time, it is impossible not to draw readers' attention to the actual situation in the field of navigation and hydrographic aids in the Ukrainian sector of the Black and Azov Seas after the Russian military invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

Thus, as a result of the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and other numerous illegal actions of the Russian Federation, Ukraine does not control most of its territorial sea and exclusive (maritime) economic zone – about 100,000 square kilometres in the Black and Azov Seas from 137,000 square kilometres of the total area of sea waters covered by the sovereignty of Ukraine or its sovereign rights. For example, the area of the Ukrainian sea occupied by the Russian Federation is equal to the total area of such states as the Republic of Korea or Iceland!

Given the above factual circumstances, the provisions of international maritime law and national legislation of Ukraine, as well as the objective impossibility of implementation of Regulation 4 “Navigational Warnings”, Regulation 9 “Hydrographic Services”, Regulation 13 “Establishment and operation of aids to navigation”, Chapter V “Safety of Navigation” of the SOLAS-74 within the occupied by the Russian Federation internal sea waters and the territorial sea around the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine, as a coastal state, shall establish in the respective internal waters and the territorial sea around the Crimean Peninsula, *an area*, where the temporarily ban on navigation and stay

FOCUS ON: INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATIONS



Photo 4. Chersonesos Lighthouse is one of the 37 lighthouses of Ukraine captured by Russia.
Source: <https://www.facebook.com/derghydro/posts/1076958192461153/>

of Ukrainian and foreign non-military vessels and warships will be imposed before the restoration of the constitutional order of Ukraine on the temporarily occupied territories.

In addition, to preserve its own sea for future generations, Ukraine shall immediately adopt the law “On Internal Waters and Territorial Sea” and take

all measures provided for by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to establish a maritime border with Russia in the Black and Azov Seas and the Kerch Strait. In addition, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine needs to approve the 2020 Maritime Doctrine and Strategy of Ukraine, which shall contain specific deadlines for its staged implementation and the indication of responsible persons.

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ĚRZÄŇ VAL

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Ěrzä raškeŇ ajgemaŇ
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Завдання ерзянам
від Пантелеймона
Куліша — 48

The Erzya people is one of the many indigenous peoples living in the Russian Federation. Erzya language is the official language of the Republic of Mordovia, and it is spoken by about half a million people worldwide. Little is usually known about the Erzya people in Ukraine. This is, in particular, because, in Russia, Erzyas and related Mokshas are consistently represented as the sub-ethnic groups of the only Finno-Ugric people - the Mordovians.

The name "Ěrzäň Val" is translated "Erzya word" from Erzya. The first issue of the publication appeared in Kyiv and was presented on June 30 this year. Why did Ukraine become the place of publication of the magazine of the small people from the Volga region? Why is "Ěrzäň Val" interesting for Ukrainian readers?

Like most indigenous peoples in Russia, Erzya faces difficult times. Talking about the oppression of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, in Russia, the Putin regime is pursuing a course to curtail federalism and assimilate the peoples who have lived on their land since ancient times. National languages, many of which are official languages in the republics of the Russian Federation, are systematically pushed to the margins of public life. Under the new Russian legislation, they are no longer compulsory for secondary education in the republics. Higher education in national languages is not mentioned at all in Russia. The use of the Latin alphabet in the official languages of the republics is prohibited by the Russian law, although many indigenous peoples have a long and successful experience of its use.


Activists of national movements, who have the courage to oppose Russification, are terrorized by the prosecutor's office and the FSB, and they often disappear or die under unknown circumstances. The real act of despair was the self-immolation of

Udmurt scientist Albert Razin in front of the parliament building of the Udmurt Republic on September 10, 2019. In this way, the honored scientist protested against the policy of destroying his native language by the Russian authorities.

Under such circumstances, the national movements of the indigenous peoples of Russia are developing their activities in exile. National representative bodies of the Erzya people have recently been formed in Ukraine. They received a mandate from a national board of activists in Mordovia and other regions where Erzyas are living. The work of Kirdiyur (national authorities) takes place in several areas. This includes the creation of informational and educational materials to preserve the identity and raise the national consciousness of Erzya, and to draw the attention of the international community to the problems of the indigenous people in Russia.

The new Ěrzäň Val magazine should perform both above mentioned tasks. The first issue of the magazine presents materials on 55 pages. More than half of it is in the Erzya language (Latin alphabet). Some of the materials are duplicated in English and Ukrainian. Several materials have been prepared in Russian, especially for those Erzyas who do not speak their native language well or at all. The publications of the issue tell about the recent history of the Erzya national movement, contain reflections of the Erzya people on relations with the Russian authorities. A separate section of the magazine is devoted to the Erzya culture and history, and the world ones.

The first issue of the magazine calculates only 100 copies, and most of them are to be sent to the Russian Federation. The electronic version of the magazine is also available at <https://bit.ly/2BmLMpI>. It is planned that Ěrzäň Val will be published twice a year.





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