15-й Українсько-американський діалог: вимірювання обороноздатності та потреб України після року війни, 28 лютого 2023

28 лютого відбувся 15-й Українсько-американський діалог: вимірювання обороноздатності та потреб України після року війни. Виконавчий директор Центру глобалістики "Стратегія XXI", Оксана Іщук взяла участь у заході з доповіддю на тему резистивності української енергегосистеми.

Нижче коротко викладаємо основні тези доповіді мовою оригіналу. 

  1. The power grid has resumed its work. There is no deficit in the power grid despite missile attacks. It is already the third week that electricity generation fully meets consumption and there are no power outages. The recovery of the energy sector is taking place with the support and assistance of international partners. The key task now is to restore damaged objects before the next heating season and ensure maximum decentralization of the power grids to make it “warproof” so that damage to separate power objects does not cause shutdown of entire regions. This requires a serious complex of works, which will take months, and of course, for this purpose it is necessary that the missile attacks stop, we need more air defense systems so that the energy companies can restore the infrastructure and the system enters a long deficit-free period. At the moment, a certain capacity reserve has appeared thanks to the introduction of additional nuclear generation capacities, more than half of the country's electricity is produced by the Rivne, South Ukrainian and Khmelnytsky NPPs.  More air defences needed to protect power grids.
  2. App 10 GW of the main installed capacities are currently inaccessible and are under the control of the enemy. This is the largest in Ukraine and Europe: Zaporizhzhia NPP, Zaporizhzhia Thermal PP, Luhansk TPP, Vugleghirskaya TPP, Kakhovskaya Hydro PP. In addition, the majority of wind and solar power plants are also located in the temporarily occupied territories of the south. As a result of the full-scale invasion of Russia, 90% of wind energy capacity in Ukraine has been decommissioned, and 30% of solar generation capacity. In future, RES potentially could be a key for new decentralised system.
  3. It was not only the power grid that was hit. The fuel system suffered the greatest destruction. The Kremenchug Refinery and 28 oil depots were destroyed by the enemy. Before the full-scale invasion Ukraine was highly dependent on fuel supplly from Russia and Belarus. As of April last year, Ukraine lost 100% of its pre-war sources of supply of petroleum products. During war we managed to introduced a mobile method of storing fuel, which made it possible to disperse the reserves throughout the country, thus making it impossible for Russia to attack them. The logistics system has changed dramatically, now it is not provided by rail and sea as it was before the war, and 40% of supplies are provided by road transport. Experts consider this a revolutionary thing, because a large number of mobile storage points show the main problem of the enemy - the inability of missiles to hit moving targets in the deep rear. This logistics system was tested during a sharp increase in the use of generators in the country in December-January, currently there is even a small surplus in the market. A stable supply of petroleum products remains a strategic priority, as they are absolutely necessary for the military equipment of the Armed Forces, their logistical support and transport needs. New logistics chains built during the months of the war made the fuel system more flexible and diversified.
  4. What Russia has not done yet it has not launched missile strikes on the gas transmission system and oil pipelines, as it is highly dependent from the revenues of oil and gas export. The volumes of natural gas transmission through the territory of Ukraine are approaching to the contract maximums. Also the oil supply is stable. Through the southern branch of "Druzhba", which passes through the territory of Ukraine, oil is supplied to the refineries of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic on the basis of a long-term contract between PJSC "Transneft" and JSC "Ukrtransnafta", because these supplies were exempted from the oil embargo from December 5 . The Russians are acting in a patterned way, and therefore, in the future, one cannot rule out strikes  on the GTS or oil pipelines, as well as on the surface part of the underground gas storages.  
  5. Russia struck gas production facilities. since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the energy infrastructure has been subjected to large-scale destruction. Most of all in the territories where hostilities continue. Own gas production in Ukraine for 2022 amounted to slightly more than 18 billion cubic meters, which was a slight decrease compared to last year. In particular, gas production was negatively affected by the occupation of the Kharkiv Region at the beginning of last year.  This winter, Ukraine will reduce gas consumption by half. Thus, according to the forecast of the Ministry of Energy, Ukraine should consume about 11.7 billion cubic meters of gas in the winter of 2022/2023. This indicator is significantly lower than in 2021, when a total of 19.4 billion cubic meters of gas was burned. The small indicator of gas consumption is due to industry slowdown.
  6. In terms of nuclear energy, we have a stock of nuclear fuel, with the beginning of the war we switched completely from Russian TVEL to American Westinghouse fuel, unlike many EU-countries that are still dependent on Russian fuel. The supply of nuclear fuel from Canada is also being discussed. Unfortunately, we do not see active sanctions against Rosatom. In April of last year, within the framework of the Yermak-McFaul sanctions group, a detailed plan of these sanctions was proposed, but there are still no significant results. Orbán's regime  blocks sanctions in the nuclear sector, we do not see political will in the direction of nuclear sanctions, and Russia takes advantage of this.
  7. The oil embargo somewhat limits Russia's potential for war, but does not eliminate it completely. Russia receives enough income from energy exports to continue waging war against Ukraine in 2023. This year, income will collapse, a slight budget cut will occur, but the war will continue due to the funds from the regions and local oligarchic  groups.

The EU and Ukraine, as a candidate for the EU, must have a single voice and jointly defend their interests in the energy war with the Russian Federation. No exemptions from sanctions, which destroy a coordinated position, solidarity and indulge the aggressor. The formula for effective resistance to the Russian war in Europe consists not only of sanctions, but above all, of energy solidarity of EU and NATO member states and transatlantic solidarity in the form of LNG supplies from the USA.

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