From 2014 until the very beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, the state leadership of Ukraine (both during the presidency of Petro Poroshenko and from the beginning of the term of office of his successor and political opponent, Volodymyr Zelenskyi) preferred the so-called "political-diplomatic path" of deoccupation of the Crimean Peninsula. The Ukrainian authorities considered the mechanisms of international law, sanctions, international courts and arbitrations, various international platforms and monitoring mechanisms - starting from the UN and ending with UNESCO - to be the main instruments of the "peaceful deoccupation" of Crimea. The prospect of forceful liberation of the occupied Crimea was rejected altogether. Why so?
Let's reveal the context: "Kurt Walker's Peace Formula" is a fear-generated imitation of violent activity, a simulacrum instead of real actions
After 2014, I constantly heard the mantra from our government officials and international partners: "There is no military way to liberate Crimea, political and diplomatic steps must be used." Counter questions "Why?" and "How?" either remained unanswered or covered up with long meaningless rhetoric about peace, trust and the principles of the United Nations.
After all, sometimes it was possible to get an answer to the first question. "The return of the conflict to a heated phase will put an end to all reforms and the restoration of the standard of living of Ukrainians at a time when the society is tired of the war," President Petro Poroshenko explained to the society the path chosen by the government. "There is no military way to resolve the "Crimean issue" - because this is war! And we all do not want a new war in Europe! Guns should not talk in Europe..." foreign diplomats echoed him.
The second part of the question, how do Europeans see the liberation of Crimea from occupation "by political and diplomatic means", was usually left unanswered. Not always. The clearly consolidated position of our Western partners was already spoken by the former special representative of the US State Department for Ukraine, Kurt Volker. "I don't think this [a military operation to liberate the Crimean Peninsula] is a good idea," he said in an interview with "Krym.Realia" in July 2020, "I think that such an operation will be devastating both for people's lives and for property Russia has a very powerful military force. All this would lead to a conflict both outside Crimea and in other parts of Ukraine, even in other parts of Europe. There is no option for a good military return of Crimea." And he added regarding the prospects of "political-diplomatic steps": "Frankly speaking, we must be patient: Russia will change sooner or later, Putinism and the continuation of his power until 2036 is a sign of weakness rather than strength. I think that Russia will change over time. We need to keep the pressure on and be ready for these changes..." This statement by Kurt Volker can be interpreted more simply: "We are afraid of war - so we do not advise making sudden movements. Suddenly, the Russians will lose their minds, be ashamed of what they have done, and turn everything back themselves..." In the end, we were so afraid of war that we ourselves called it into our home. The situation changed dramatically on February 24, 2022.
Is it possible to talk about such a "diplomatic way" of liberating Crimea from Russian occupation today? Obviously, no. In the best case, the "bloodless" liberation of Crimea can be a consequence of the collapse and defeat of the Russian Federation in the war. It is the defeat of Russia, even talking about which our partners are still trying to avoid: "Ukraine must not lose, but Russia must not be defeated either." However, hypothetically, the way to restore Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea as an element of reparations imposed on the aggressor remains one of the options.
The military way of liberating the occupied territories, including Crimea, appears to be a priority and realistic for Ukraine. By the "military way" we mean not only the directly possible offensive operation of the Defense Forces of Ukraine on the Crimean peninsula, but also the retreat from it of a local group of Russian occupation forces under the threat of its defeat, as well as the "peaceful exit" of the Russian occupiers from Crimea due to their inability effectively manage and maintain the isolated territory of the peninsula. This can happen both as a result of direct hostilities in the south of Ukraine and in Crimea, and through diplomatic agreements under the direct threat of the latter. Both directly and with the possible involvement of international mediators, including, not excluded, in the format of "peacekeeping forces".
The real significance of Crimea for Russia: not at all the legendary "unsinkable aircraft carrier", but the atherosclerotic logistical artery of the occupying forces
The military potential of the Russian army in Crimea cannot be assessed separately "in a vacuum", in isolation from the assessment of the composition and condition of the Russian occupation forces in the south of Ukraine and from the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces as a whole - the "island of Crimea" is not an isolated state entity, today it is a rear hub , the logistics hub of the Russian army in the south of our country.
When the Ukrainian military and Western military experts say that the liberation of Ukraine from the Russian occupation should start from the south, they base their assessment precisely on the vulnerability of the enemy's undiversified Crimean logistics through the Crimean peninsula. The rear of the enemy in the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine is connected to the base areas in the Russian territory by a dense network of roads and railways. This allows, in the case of cutting certain supply routes, to easily bypass the affected areas and quickly restore logistics. With Crimea, the situation is completely different - logistics through the Crimean peninsula are limited by several large channels: in the east, it is the Crimean bridge, the Kerch ferry crossing, the ports of Feodosia and Kerch when using sea transport; in the north - Chongar and Perekop. The interruption of any of these communication paths is critical for the aggressor. Figuratively speaking, the Ukrainian occupied south is connected to Russia by a dense network of transport capillaries, and the logistics routes through Crimea are large spinal arteries, the cutting of which is fatally dangerous for the life of the Russian army in Crimea and in the south and the entire occupation "organism" on the peninsula.
An additional "innate pathology" of Crimea for the occupiers is the fact that the road network on the peninsula was historically formed from north to south, naturally connecting the peninsula with the world through the Crimean Isthmus. The artificial transfer of the "gateway to Crimea" to Kerch did not change the road atlas of the peninsula - from Kerch and Feodosia, the railway goes north to Dzhankoy, in the zone affected by the Armed Forces, and only from there - again to the south, to the main industrial and urban areas of Crimea. Putin's brainchild, the second most symbolic after the Crimean bridge, the "Tavrida" federal highway did not correct the anomaly, because the main logistics of Russians remains traditionally tied to the railway. So logistics decides everything - "The Crimean bridge will be destroyed."
For decades, Soviet and later Russian propaganda nurtured the myth of "legendary Sevastopol, impregnable to enemies." Perhaps this legend is relevant for the era of sailing fleets of the 8th - the first half of the 19th century (although it is not indisputable). But this story is not for the 20th century. And even more so - not for our time, when it is not the wind direction that determines superiority at sea, but the capabilities of aviation and missile weapons, other means of destruction in the air and on water. The command of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, namely the one responsible for the maritime direction in the structure of the Southern Military District of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, ignored this truth from the beginning of the large-scale invasion. The Russians were convinced of the absolute domination of the sea and the coast so much that, starting the war, they did not even think of carrying out the classic dispersion of the forces of the fleet. And they paid for it. Since the summer of 2022, the Defense Forces of Ukraine have launched a combined operation to defeat the grouping of enemy forces in Crimea, effectively destroying enemy control points, supply warehouses, striking air defense equipment, airfields and ship bases, points of permanent deployment of units and compounds of the Russian army on peninsula Subsequently, the focus of strikes on enemy infrastructure in Crimea was shifted to the destruction of military logistics.
After the occupation of Crimea in 2014, the then Russian military-political leadership considered the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation as the main combat force in the Black Sea-Azov theater of operations: during the military reform, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were divided into five military-administrative components - Western, Southern, Central, Eastern military districts and the joint strategic command "Northern Fleet"; The Black Sea Fleet became part of the Southern Military District, whose area of responsibility was the Northern Black Sea. From 2014 to 2017, the three-tiered structure of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea was rapidly formed - naval, aviation and land components. In February 2017, it was announced that the formation of the 11th Army Corps as part of the Black Sea Fleet was completed. Even then, our experts said that the structure of the Southern Military District was "sharpened" specifically for an aggressive war with Ukraine. Moreover, the Black Sea Fleet, as a kind of operational-strategic unit, was supposed to act as the vanguard, and the forces of the former North Caucasus Military District – the second echelon of the invasion forces. The occupation of the southeastern regions of Ukraine with the aim of creating a "land corridor to Crimea" was seen as the most likely task of the Southern Military District.
From 2014 to 2022, Crimea was considered by Russia as the main rear area of the invasion forces, new operational-tactical units were strengthened or formed - the 126th coastal defense brigade, the 127th separate reconnaissance brigade, the 8th artillery regiment of the 11th AK, 388 special reconnaissance point of the Black Sea Fleet, etc., shock forces were redeployed "from the mainland" - The 56th Airborne Assault Regiment was formed as a "combat reserve" - the 47th Territorial Defense Division (reformed into a motorized rifle division in 2023). Stockpiles of material and technical resources were being formed in the rear of the invasion forces - mobilization deployment support centers, TsOMR. One of these centers - the 943rd TSOMR was created in 2019 on Lake Donuzlav, near the village of Novoozerne on the territory of the former military unit of the Navy. In 2019-2022, hundreds of obsolete artillery systems and armored vehicles were accumulated on the territory of the center in case of a major war - for the purpose of forming new land units and units in Crimea "from scratch", judging by the preserved equipment - tank , artillery, engineering.
However, the main role assigned to Crimea is the function of an intermediate logistics hub for transferring the main forces of the "second echelon" of the Southern Military District. It was for this reason, and not to satisfy Putin's sick self-love, that immediately after the occupation of the peninsula, the construction of a complex transport crossing across the Kerch Strait known as the "Crimean Bridge" began. Railway and road bridge crossings connect the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, temporarily occupied by the Russians, with Russia. The second stage is the construction in 2017-2020 of the federal highway "Tavrida" - the Kerch - Simferopol - Sevastopol highway with the Simferopol - Yevpatoria - Myrnyi branch. As in the old Soviet times, each "big construction" should first of all perform military functions, then propaganda, and only at the end of the list, optionally, should have socio-economic significance.
De-occupation is not an event. It's a process. And it is implemented by the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine. Already. Regardless of when exactly the Ukrainian flag will fly over the Grafska Pier
The reality of hostilities from the very first months after the large-scale invasion showed the weaknesses of the "unsinkable aircraft carrier Crimea". Some of them were completely predictable, others came as a surprise for the occupiers.
The first, and the biggest, surprise for the Russian commanders was that "Kyiv in three days" failed... The victorious march through the south of Ukraine, due to the factor of surprise, after achieving the first task of the Russian offensive - the creation of a "land corridor to Crimea" - stalled. The Armed Forces of Ukraine did not "break down", moreover, they demonstrated the ability to mount systematic resistance, and even more so - to counterattack. The Russian occupiers were stopped in front of Mykolaiv, and later knocked out from the right bank of the Dnieper, liberating Kherson, which Moscow had already managed to "referendate" to the Russian Federation. The created "corridor" turned out to be too thin to remove the danger from Crimean logistics. Crimea has become a "weak link" in the construction of Russian troops on the Southern Front.
The second passage for the Kremlin was that, unlike in 2008 and 2014, the West did not turn a blind eye to aggression. Turkey, considered almost an ally in Moscow, unexpectedly closed the Black Sea Straits for the Kremlin, citing the Montreux Convention. Thus, the Black Sea turned into a localized closed theater of war. All the Russian power of the Northern, Pacific and Baltic fleets turned out to be in vain. After an aimless one-year stay in the Eastern Mediterranean, the entire Russian naval horde was forced to leave.
Another "knife in the back" for the occupier was the permission of Ukraine's Western partners to hit them with high-precision long-range weapons for military purposes in Crimea. Here, however, not everything went smoothly: from the very beginning of the large-scale invasion, Western countries, "wary of escalation", avoided giving permission to the Defense Forces of Ukraine to strike targets outside the occupied Ukrainian territory. Initially, they also tried to include Crimea under this restriction. And here our partners drove themselves into a trap: "You can't strike on the territory of Russia, and Crimea too! - But you yourself declared that "Crimea is Ukraine"! Is Crimea Ukraine? - Yes, Crimea is Ukraine. We allow the use of Western weapons for purposes in Crimea..."
The headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Sevastopol after a missile attack on September 22, 2023. Source: Commons.wikimedia. Halifers. CC-BY-SA-4.0
Since the summer of 2022, Ukraine has been systematically attacking Russian military facilities in occupied Crimea - air defense systems and radar stations, military airfields, bases of Black Sea Fleet ships, locations of units and units of the occupying army, warehouses and bases. The goal of this operation is to isolate the peninsula, weaken its defenses and eventually render it unusable as a staging ground for Russian forces.
The first attacks on Crimea in 2022 took place in August - Russian air bases were hit in Novofedorivka ("Saki-4"), Gvardiyskyi, and "Belbek" in Sevastopol. It was also then that Ukraine attacked the Crimean Bridge for the first time. During the year, the intensity of the blows was 1-2 during the month.
In 2023, attacks on Russian military facilities in Crimea continued - combined missile and drone strikes were repeated every month. August was literally and figuratively the hottest month for the occupiers - there were approximately 15 attacks on the objects on the peninsula, in fact these are attacks every two days. On July 17, the Crimean Bridge was attacked for the second time by unmanned kamikaze drones, as a result of which one of the spans fell. In the dock of the Sevastopol Naval Plant, the Defense Forces of Ukraine hit the large landing ship "Minsk" and the submarine "Rostov-on-Don". On September 22, 2023, as part of the "Crab Trap" operation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacked the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol with Storm Shadow missiles. In the same year, the patrol ship "Pavel Derzhavin", the tugboat "Nikolay Mur", the missile ship "Askold" and several boats were seriously damaged or destroyed.
In 2024, the Defense Forces of Ukraine continued to attack Russian military facilities in Crimea - naval bases, airfields, warehouses of fuel, lubricants and ammunition. For example, in January there were at least nine attacks (3-6, 11, 17, 21, 30-31.01), in February - two (1, 14.02), in March - five (1, 3, 5, 23 -24.03), in April – nine (2, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, 21, 28, 30.04), in May - eleven (4, 6, 13, 15, 17, 19, 23-25, 29, 30.05), in June - nine (6-8, 10, 12, 18, 20, 23, 24.06), in July – eight (1, 5, 7, 10, 15, 18, 21, 26.07), in August – three (2, 9 and 16.08). On October 7, the Feodosiya oil terminal was successfully attacked - the largest enterprise in terms of transshipment of oil products in Crimea. This year, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation lost the large landing ship "Cesar Kunikov", the patrol ship "Sergei Kotov", the missile ship "Zyklon".
Infographics of IA "Voice of Crimea"
After a series of surprisingly effective strikes by the Defense Forces of Ukraine on military facilities in Crimea, the Kremlin was forced to remove the "burner" - the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Viktor Sokolov. Admiral Nikolay Yevmenov, commander of the Russian Navy, also resigned from his post. Away from sin, the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet were relocated from Crimea and Sevastopol to the Caucasus coast to the Novorossiysk naval base.
Today's state of the Black Sea Fleet was aptly described by the spokesman of the Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Captain 3rd Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk: "The Russian fleet can no longer influence the course of hostilities in Ukraine - the weakness of the Russian fleet is confirmed by actual hostilities in Ukraine." He described the situation with the ships of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimean bases as follows: "only the "sick and old" remained, meaning by "sick" ships and ships of the fleet that were damaged as a result of Ukrainian strikes, or those in need of repair, and by "old" means physically and morally obsolete combat units of the ship's crew. At the same time, there are no warships at all in the ports of Feodosia and Kerch, only patrol boats remain, and the situation is similar in the bases on the western coast of Crimea - in Donuzlav and Chornomorsk.
The last refuge of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea remains Sevastopol, in the bays of which some of the fleet's supply ships are still standing. At the same time, since at least the middle of summer, not a single ship has gone to sea from there. It is interesting that Sevastopol became a kind of trap for the Russians: reluctantly building a naval base in Novorossiysk, the Russians did not bother at all with the transfer of naval infrastructure there - warehouses, arsenals, ship repair enterprises - all this remained in Sevastopol. After the occupation of Crimea, the concentration of the fleet's infrastructure in Sevastopol increased - the Sevastopol Ship Repair Plant, which was "squeezed" out of Ukrainian owners, was determined to be the basis of naval ship repair. This is in addition to the 13th ship repair plant, the 54th plant, "Artzavod" (1127th missile and artillery repair plant), "Radiozavod" (Repair plant of communication equipment), which the Black Sea Fleet had in Sevastopol before the occupation. Now the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, in case of any accident or malfunction, willy-nilly, are forced to return to Sevastopol under the blows of our Storm Shadow and ATACMS. The mousetrap clicked!
As Russian military facilities in Crimea are destroyed, the Defense Forces of Ukraine logically shift their focus to the destruction of enemy infrastructure and logistics - the "Crimean logistics hub" of the occupiers must be destroyed! Attacks on the Crimean bridge, the Kerch ferry crossing, the Feodosia oil terminal, and the sinking of large amphibious ships of the Black Sea Fleet while crossing the sea are from this series. The "weak link" - the Dzhankoy node - becomes an important object of damage as it goes on (remember, the enemy's logistics is built in such a way that goods sent to the Crimea from the east by rail first go to the north, to Dzhankoy, and then disperse to on the way to end consumers in different parts of the peninsula). In addition, the Dzhankoy military airfield is the main base of the army aviation, a promising "Chornobaivka 2.0".
It is most likely that the strikes of the Defense Forces of Ukraine will continue to be directed at the enemy's airfield network in Crimea - these are already familiar to us airfields of the Air Force and Naval Aviation Saka (43rd omshap), Gvardiyske (37th zap), Belbek (38th vap ), as well as airfields in the eastern part of Crimea, where Russian aviation is deployed - Kirovske, Bagerove (Kerch), Pervomaiske (Stari Crimea), Primorskyi (Feodosia); on infrastructure and logistics facilities of the fleet in Sevastopol, Feodosia, Kerch, as well as advanced bases on the western coast of the Crimean Peninsula in the Karkinit Bay (in particular, in the Chornomorsky area and in the Vuzky Bay); points of permanent and temporary deployment of units of the Russian occupation army in the north and in the central part of Crimea, warehouses of ammunition and fuel and lubricants. Of course, the air defense system of the occupied peninsula will also be destroyed: the neutralization of anti-aircraft defense is the key to the success of strikes on strategic and operational targets of the enemy. And more. "Cotton" today at one or another Russian military facility in Crimea is no guarantee that it will not fly there again. The Russians are constantly trying to eliminate the consequences of shelling, to restore the work of their rear. And therefore, "arrivals" will be repeated.
A publicly available interactive map of Russian military facilities on the Crimean peninsula - potential targets of the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine - was developed by a group of enthusiasts from Radio Liberty, Crimea. Realia, and Scheme. Journalists marked and described more than 200 objects of the Russian Armed Forces in Crimea. That's about half of those occupier facilities on the peninsula that are potential targets for our drones, Neptunes, Storm Shadows, and SCALPs.
Interactive map of Russian military facilities in Crimea. Screenshot. ©Radio Svoboda, 2024.
"If we return once again to the weapons systems and to what changes the methods of combat use underwent during the SVO, then the Black Sea Fleet is an illustrative example. He was forced to change, in fact, his registration due to the fact that our large ships have simply become large targets for the enemy's unmanned boats," Dmytro Rogozin, the former head of Roscosmos and the "senator" of the Russian State Duma from the Zaporizhia region, recently stated in an interview "To the Moscow Komsomol". We state: the Black Sea Fleet lost the war at sea.
Realizing that a similar prospect is quite possible on land, the command of the Russian occupation army excluded the "rotten link" from the "military district - fleet - army corps" management system: in 2023, the land component of the Black Sea Fleet was withdrawn, based on the 22nd Army Corps The Black Sea Fleet deployed the 18th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District. It included units and units of the 22nd AK - the 126th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade, the 127th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade, the 8th Separate Artillery Regiment, the 1152nd, 1153rd and 1154th Regiments 47- of the Territorial Defense Division, which was accordingly transformed into a motorized rifle division.
"Atesh", "Yellow Ribbon" - Crimeans are fighting. Meanwhile, Russia is digging in, trying to create "New Vorkuta" from Crimea
Implementation of the Kremlin's policy of turning the occupied Crimea into a military base requires the presence of a loyal population in the occupied territory. However, the many years of Crimea being a part of Ukraine, as well as the presence of significant Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar communities, question the loyalty of a significant part of the population.
The active work of the Defense Forces of Ukraine on Russian military facilities in Crimea would not be so effective without the help and support of the population of the peninsula. Despite the occupation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, Ukrainian citizens who find themselves in the occupation voluntarily or involuntarily resist the enemy in all possible ways, risking their safety and life. Whole movements are known, as well as isolated cases and initiatives of individual people. But being a pasionarian in the conditions of an aggressive occupation is another quest. The repressive machine of the Muscovite special services is spinning up with unprecedented speed and force - the number of court sentences for "terrorism" and "extremism" is increasing year by year, a new article appeared "for discrediting and slandering the participants of a special military operation", according to which for an imaginary "discrediting" the Russian occupiers can be served for 15 years. The fear of repression forces the majority of residents of the occupied Crimea to "lie down" and "go under the radar" due to internal emigration - Ukrainians of Crimea are waiting for the return of Ukraine, despite the pressure and the possibility of being detained, they raise their children with love for the Motherland.
The occupation repressive machine is designed not only to "quiet" the "old Crimeans", but also to displace the most active part of the pro-Ukrainian population from the occupied territory in one way or another. In the first year of the occupation, according to the Black Sea Strategic Studies Institute, about 70,000 residents left the peninsula for political reasons and fear of reprisals. This migration stream consisted mainly of active members of resistance to the occupation, journalists of independent mass media, civil activists of pro-Ukrainian, including Crimean Tatar organizations, other people who categorically did not accept life under occupation based on their views on life. Since 2017, the flow of Crimean residents leaving for mainland Ukraine has stabilized and, despite the difficulties of wartime, is about 5,000 people a year. Those who remained are subject to aggressive propaganda, the occupation regime is actively militarizing the educational sphere, implementing its ideology aimed at changing people's identity to Russian and educating the younger generation in the spirit of Russian patriotism. This process has been going on for ten years(!)
In addition to mass "brainwashing", militarization of consciousness, deportation and displacement of the most active part of the "old Crimeans" disloyal to the occupiers, the Kremlin is purposefully pursuing a policy of forming a statistical image of the "new Crimean population" - stimulating and encouraging the maximum number of residents of Russian regions to move to Crimea. To this end, since 2014, the Kremlin has been actively encouraging the resettlement of Russian citizens to occupied Crimea, including education workers, pensioners, civil servants, law enforcement officers, military personnel and their family members, etc.
According to the assessment of colleagues from the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, the number of "native Russians" who moved to Crimea for permanent residence from 2014 until the beginning of a large-scale invasion in 2022 amounted to about a million (!) people - instead of the pre-war population of the Crimean Peninsula, including Sevastopol, at 2, 35 million we are dealing with a population of at least 3 million. persons
The resettlement of Russians in the occupied Crimea aims to ensure that the Russian authorities cannot return to the status quo as of 2014, before the beginning of the occupation. According to the Russian authorities, this should permanently and irrevocably cement Crimea as part of the Russian Federation: the local population becomes smaller and less influential, which strengthens Russian control over the region. In addition, the resettlement of Russians in the occupied Crimea is accompanied by discrimination and repression against the locals, which further complicates their situation. Such a policy is aimed at demoralizing and reducing the resistance of the local population, thus contributing to the consolidation of the power of the occupier. The change in the demographic composition of the population in favor of the aggressor state makes a peaceful return to the pre-war status quo almost impossible. For this, Moscow is calm.
The fact that the Russians are much more serious about the prospect of liberating Crimea by military means is evidenced by the increased activity of the occupiers in the construction of defensive lines and field defense structures. Moreover, not only are new engineering fortifications built in the period 2015-2018 of the "New Perekop Wall" in the north of Crimea being built and restored, but also the coastal strip on the landing-accessible sections of the western coast and the shores of the Sea of Azov and the Arabat River is being equipped in terms of engineering.
The construction of a fortified line of defense on the Ak-Monai Isthmus, which separates the Kerch Peninsula from the main part of Crimea, is telling. That is, the Russian General Staff assumes not only the possibility of an operation by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to liberate the Crimean Peninsula, but also that the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine will be successful in the new "Woodpecker Hunt", and the Russian occupiers will have to hide in Adzhimushkai, as in 1942 stone quarries
Instead of conclusions: Do you want the liberation of Crimea? - Don't think in terms of Kurt Walker, think like General Hodges!
Therefore, the liberation of Crimea from Russian occupation in the course of a ground military operation is a very likely way. But there is a "but". In order to start the Crimean offensive operation, it is now necessary for us to "break through the corridor to Crimea." As the experience of the summer counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2023 showed, it will be extremely difficult to achieve this without a general breakdown on the battlefield - the enemy did not sit idly by for three years and turned the southern front into a solid line of fortifications.
Another option that can force the occupiers to leave the Ukrainian Crimea is to strike at its "pain points". Logistics is the "weak point" of the occupied Crimea. Cutting logistics chains can force Moscow to make "difficult decisions." But even in this case, a military blockade of the peninsula will not be enough - from the way Putin's army behaves in Kurshchyna, it is clear that the fate of the Crimeans is indifferent to him. A condition for the implementation of the "Crimean scenario" may be the strategic defeat of the Kremlin in the war.
Is it possible to return Crimea by political and diplomatic means according to Kurt Volker's recipe: Putin is not eternal, Russia will change... and we just "need to maintain pressure and be ready for these changes...". Where does the conviction come from, that after Putin's death, Yashin and Kara-Murza, and not Bortnikov and Naryshkin, will come to power in Moscow? Or that Patrushev Jr. in the role of "successor" will be a bigger "democrat" than the young lieutenant colonel Putin? No real reason. This is a belief, not a prediction. The blue dream of Western utopians.
"Can we recapture Crimea from Russia by force? Realistically - no. Will she leave there alone? Unfortunately, no. But we can create conditions when Crimea will become an unbearable burden for Moscow. Yes, the thief sometimes throws away the stolen thing when it starts to burn for him. We have to create all the conditions for him to grow stronger," stated the then Head of State Petro Poroshenko in his annual Message to the Verkhovna Rada in 2017. How realistic is this scenario? Very doubtful. So this is a program of actions for the worst case - it is better to do something than to do nothing.
Back in December 2022, at the Atlantic Council in Washington, the ex-commander of the US armed forces, three-star general Ben Hodges, stated that it was not necessary to throw tanks at Perekop for the liberation of Crimea. "If the Ukrainians now had a sufficient number of long-range ATACMS missiles, they would be able to bomb every Russian headquarters, every transport hub or ammunition depot in Crimea right now, and this would make the peninsula unsuitable for the presence of Russian armed forces." The reason that the Ukrainians do not yet have all these weapons in their arsenal is that too many people in the US Administration doubt that it is possible to force the Russians to leave Crimea, the American general is convinced: "Somewhere in the depths of their hearts, they believe that this impossible That such an attempt will lead to escalation."
According to "Iron Ben", the White House should say "We want Ukraine to win. And we will do everything so that Ukraine wins." "If they had said that, then all the conversations about how much and what kind of weapons to give would not even be a subject for discussion," the general stressed, "I think that Crimea is the key to victory. This is a crucial area. If we do not help Ukraine to return its sovereign territory in Crimea, then in a few years we are guaranteed to get the next phase of this conflict."
The Ukrainian leadership and civil society must demonstrate all these aspects to our foreign partners - the conventional Kurt Walker of the West must change to the decisive Ben Hodges of Victory. The "Crimean Platform" and the Strategy for Deoccupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol should be aimed at this.
Pavlo LAKIYCHUK, Head of security programs of the Center for Global Studies "Strategy XXI", captain 1st rank